Panjab University
Research Journal
Social Sciences

About the Journal

The research journal has been a tri-annual publication of Panjab University, Chandigarh since 1976. It is a peer-reviewed initiative that publishes articles, review articles, perspectives, and book reviews drawn from a diversity of social science disciplines. Each of the pieces published is of a very high standard, and lays the groundwork for a systematic exchange of ideas with scholars across the country and the world. The prime objective of the university has, therefore, been to initiate and stimulate debate on matters of contemporary socio-political significance, a vision that the journal endeavours to carry forward.

Contents

Articles

Review Article

Book Review

Early Panjab: From a Gateway to a Metaphor- A Historiography

Ashish Kumar*

Abstract

This paper critically analyzes the various approaches to the study of Panjab's ancient and early medieval history and their impact on the historical narratives of early Panjab. Early Panjab is studied as a 'gateway' in the colonial and nationalist histories, which traced the origin of Panjab region and Panjabi identity from antiquity. Contrary to it, the Sikh historians connected the formation of both, Panjab region and Panjabi identity with the rise and spread of Sikhism; and therefore, the presence of Panjab as a distinct region in pre-sixteenth century era was doubted. This paper, while contextualizing the formation of these approaches to early Panjab's history, explores the possibilities of a third approach for the study of ancient and early medieval Panjab.

Key Words: Panjab region, *gana sangha,* Hindu Shahi, Islamicate polity, Pentapotamia

*Assistant Professor, Department of History, Panjab University.

Introduction

A region 'is a mental construct,' and it is 'created' as well as 'nourished by human minds and emotions' (Vora and Feldhaus 2006: 7). So is the case with the history of a region, which not only unravels the region specific events that have had played a crucial role in the shaping of the concerned region, but also the processes involved in the shaping of regional consciousness. In the colonial period, Panjab came to be seen as a distinct region in historical narratives and Panjab's history was periodized into three religious and one secular phase- Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and British; and even later, when an alternate periodization – ancient, medieval and modern in the histories of India became popular, in the history of Panjab, religion remained a defining criteria of periodization (Latif 1891; Douie 2003 [1916]; Trevaskis 1928: for a discussion on the periodization of Indian history see: Mukhia 1998; Thapar 2012). From the historical narratives produced in the colonial and post-colonial Panjab it appears that two distinct approaches to Panjab's history prevailed in the 19th and the 20th century: first, the history of Panjab was framed by placing the history of the region of five rivers within the meta-history of India, and it consistently traced the ways historical events of this region impacted the mainland India. Second, the Panjab's history was written from the perspective of a community and this community centric history traced the formation of Panjab's regional and cultural-linguistic character along with the rise of Sikhism as a religion and Sikh as a political community.

In this paper, the formation of these two perspectives and changes in these due to various historical factors for the study of Panjab's ancient past are critically analysed. This paper also explores the possibility of a third perspective that studies Panjab as a region, having distinct socio-cultural character in different ages and under different polities. It is proposed that the glimpses of the third perspective have been visible, however in incoherent manner, in several papers on ancient and early medieval Panjab; but due to an overt emphasis on community centric history, this

perspective remained ignored in Panjabi academia.

A Gateway to the Ganga valley

In the 19th and early 20th century, Panjab, due to its peculiar geographical location in the northwest frontier of mainland India, was invariably identified as a gateway to the Ganga valley in particular and to India in general. Syad Muhammad Latif (1891: iii) had described Panjab as the gateway to India that every invader aimed to possess for fame; and in a same manner, Hugh Kennedy Trevaskis (1928: xv) identified Panjab as 'the arena of conflict between political systems far greater than itself, affording as it does the only practicable highway between the nomad breeding grounds of central Asia and the rich and fertile valley of the Ganges.' In their writings, Panjab's history is divided into Hindu, Muslim and Sikh periods, and particularly Trevaskis (1928: 348-349) in his book has credited the British government for causing 'a sudden burst of prosperity' by introducing a benevolent revenue system in Panjab province. Latif (1891: 25-26) and Trevaskis (1928: 29-34, 44, 51-53), both have traced the origin of Panjab and Panjabi people from Hindu period, when Aryans invaded India and laid the foundation of Hindu civilization; but the major part of their discussions on early Panjab remained focused on foreign invasions, particularly of Alexander, Scythians, Persians, Turks and Hunas among others. The treatment of foreign invasions as a driving force in the history of Panjab is also visible in their books, which applies the typical colonial concepts of race and religious conflicts for the study of Panjab's history.

The partition of Panjab and Bengal impacted the historiographical traditions and the scholars of the newly created nation-states, viz., Pakistan and India, got busy in preparing new histories to legitimise the historicity of their respective countries. One of the earliest attempts to legitimise Pakistan's creation as a distinct nation-state however was done by a British archaeologist R. E. M. Wheeler, who as an archaeological advisor to the Government of Pakistan wrote *Five Thousand Years of Pakistan: An Archaeological Outline* (1950) and he traced the origin of Pakistan's

distinct identity from antiquity. It was an attempt to legitimize Pakistan's identity as a distinct nation-state by tracing its origin from the Palaeolithic Age to the modern times, in which the Indus valley civilization provided 'a sort of basic unit to Pakistan itself in … historic consciousness' (Wheeler 1950: 11, 26). This book by establishing Pakistan as a distinct geo-historical unit left the Indian as well as Panjabi scholars in lurch. After partition almost all the sites (including Harappa and Mohenjodaro) of Indus valley civilization (also known as Harappan civilization) had gone to Pakistan, leaving India without any major site to claim its own. It put a big question mark on the antiquity of India. On the other hand, the political developments of 1960s shook entire India. India's war with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965 and 1971) challenged its sovereignty and intense linguistic movements particularly in a border state of Panjab, where the Akali leaders had been leading the demand for a separate Panjabi Suba based on Panjabi language, forced the Congress to redefine the centre-state relationship. Particularly the sporadic demands for a separate Panjab state for the Sikhs had made the Congress apprehensive about Panjabi Suba agitation (Dhillon 1974: 326-373; Oberoi 1987: 38). The differences between the Sikhs and the Hindus strained, when the Hindus of Panjab opposed 'the regional demands raised by the Akalis, such as the unilingual state of Punjab', and 'the Hindus of Punjab, by disowning the Punjabi language… made the Sikhs the sole custodian of the Punjabi language and culture' (Singh 1994: 1878).

However, Panjabi Suba by separating Haryana, having Hindu majority, from it and transferring parts of it to Himachal Pradesh in 1966 was eventually created; but the entire movement of Panjabi Suba, coupled with the escalating tensions between India and Pakistan that dominated the political scene of India and particularly of Panjab in 1950s and 1960s, impacted the ways Panjab's ancient history was imagined in Panjabi as well as Indian academia. Particularly the fear of another partition that has been demanded by several Sikh leaders loomed large in the minds of Panjabi Hindus and the Congress leadership (Jeffrey 1987: 59-61;

See for a discussion on the demand of separate Sikh state: Singh 1994: 1878-1881; Oberoi 1987: 38-40), and this fear is amply demonstrated by several delegates, who participated in the proceedings of the Punjab History Conference. In the inaugural address of the Punjab History Conference that was started as an annual affair in 1965, Vice Chancellor of Punjabi University, S. Kirpal Singh Narang (1965: 6) underlined the need of having a regional history of Panjab in order to serve the interests of Indian nation. The history of Panjab was supposed to blend and integrate in the national history within which it was supposed to be contextualized. The platform of Punjab History Conference was used by several dignitaries –both scholars and politicians, from Panjab as well as other parts of India (for instance, D. V. Potdar (1965), Bisheshwar Prasad (1966), B. P. Saksena (1968) and others) to promote the history of Panjab within the framework of Indian history to strengthen the unity and stability of India. Simultaneously words of caution against separatist tendencies that a regional history may invoke were also passed on to the Panjabi academia.

The nationalist scholars from Panjab adopted the framework of Syad Muhammad Latif and Hugh Kennedy Trevaskis for the study of early Panjab and discussion on racial conflicts and foreign invasions found much attention in their writing. They responded to both Pakistan's attempt to rob India from its antiquity and the demand of Sikh dominated Panjabi Suba by producing historical narratives of Panjab, in which origin of Panjab region and Panjabi identity was traced back to India's ancient past. The nationalist scholars from Panjab like Buddha Prakash, Hari Ram Gupta, and L. M. Joshi among others not only located the origin of Panjab in the ancient period but also glorified the military achievements of ancient Panjabis. In addition, India's history was suggested to have started from ancient Punjab and historical figures such as Panini, Chandragupta Maurya, Harshvardhan, Sher Shah Suri, Hyder Ali and Ranajit Singh were all identified as Panjabis (Gupta 1966: 36; Sharma 1968: 28; Gupta 1976: 31).

The antiquity of the Harappan civilization, which flourished in the northwest India some five thousand years ago, had been fully realized by the mid-20th century; therefore, after the loss of major Harappan sites (Harappa and Mohenjodaro) to Pakistan due to partition a call was given by the Archaeological Survey of India to find pre-and-proto-historical sites in India to show the presence of this civilization within the political boundaries of Independent India. Madho Sarup Vats, who had become the Director General of Archaeological Survey of India in 1950, gave a call for explorations in Rajasthan and Kutch to find out Harappan sites, which stimulated the search for Harappan sites by archaeologists like A. Ghosh in Panjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Gujarat (Chakrabarti 2003: 6-7, 11-12). Since several major Harappan sites had been located within the geographical boundaries of the colonial Panjab (pre-partition Panjab), the beginning of Panjab and Panjabi identities was connected with the Harappan civilization.

Buddha Prakash (1976: 2-4) correlated the archaeological evidences of the Harappan civilization with the literary evidences from the *Rigveda* to prove that the Aryans had been the authors of India's earliest urban civilization. He even coined a term the 'Harappa-Rupar Civilization' for it and identified Rupar in East Panjab as a key centre like Harappa in west Panjab of this civilization. However, not many scholars accepted Buddha Prakash's propositions. Instead, the Aryans were identified as invaders, who reached India in several waves and destroyed the Harappan civilization (Joshi 1976: 2, 78, 90, 93). In nationalist writings from Panjab foreign invasions, which were often condemned, had found greater attention and were identified as a major feature of Panjab's history. Resultantly, early Panjab whereas was identified as 'a gateway', and 'a melting-pot' of diverse cultures (Prakash 1964: 241, 261; Narang 1965: 9; Saksena 1968: 8), ancient Punjabis, particularly rulers like Chandragupta Maurya, were glorified for their military achievements against the foreign invaders (Prakash 1965: 19; Gupta 1966: 36; Vig 1966: 37-38; Sharma 1968: 32; Gupta 1976: 31; Prakash 1976: 255-269).

The belief in the eternal presence of Panjab region and Punjabi identity was also displayed by the attempts of scholars to identify modern Punjabi castes and communities with the people, castes, tribes and communities, which are mentioned in early Indian literature (for instance, Vedas, Epics and Puranas. See, Prakash 1964: 197; Singh Sara 1977: 247-269). In addition the foreign invasions are identified by the same authors as a causative factor behind the formation of early Panjab's distinct socio-cultural character, which distinguished it from adjoining regions. One finds a deliberate categorization of invasions into two groups: one comprising those invaders (e.g., Aryans, Persians, Macedonians, Greeks, Shakas, Kushanas, Hunas), who settled down in India and adopted Indian culture and religions either Buddhism or Hinduism, and second comprising those invaders (e.g., Arabs, Turks, Afghans and Mongols), who settled down in India but retained their religious identity. And the arrival of the later group, invariably having Muslims of different ethnicities, was associated with the end of ancient period and beginning of medieval period; resultantly, the Ghazanvid and Ghorid invasions have become events of disjunction, marking the advent of foreign rule in India as well as in Panjab's history (Sharma 1968: 42; Singh 1968: 72, 74).

From Dark Age to a Metaphor

The partition of Panjab in 1947 and bifurcation of Panjab in 1966 'established an undeniable nexus between the Punjab and Sikh consciousness,' and Herjot Oberoi (1987: 38-40) draws our attention to the fact that the Punjabi Suba agitation in 1950s-and-1960s created a belief among the Sikhs that 'they more than anybody else had a moral relationship to the land of the five rivers.' After the Partition and resultant migration, in western parts of Indian Panjab, Sikh population had been concentrated and gained majority compared to other communities. This changed situation intensified the demand for a Punjabi Suba, where Sikhs would be in majority; and after the bifurcation of Panjab in 1966 the new

Punjabi Suba that came into existence came to be seen as a homeland of the Sikhs (Sathyamurthy 1986: 46-47; Dhillon 1974: 369-371). The Panjab governments and political parties –both Congress and Akali, after the creation of the separate Punjabi suba promoted Panjab's Sikh identity and sponsored the lavish celebration of the three hundredth anniversary of Guru Gobind Singh's birth (1967), the five hundredth birthday of Guru Nanak (1969) and several other similar anniversaries. The newly founded universities – Punjabi University (Patiala), and Guru Nanak Dev University (Amritsar), and the journals dealing with Panjab's history (for instance, the *Journal of Sikh Studies*, the *Journal of Punjab Politics* (both published from Guru Nanak Dev University) and the *Punjab Past and Present* (Punjabi University) promoted Punjab's history from Sikh perspective (Jeffrey 1987: 64-66; For a comment on the Sikh history centric syllabi in the history departments of Panjab University, Punjabi University and Guru Nanak Dev University, see: Singh and Gaur 2009: 32-34). The political and financial support extended by Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) further promoted Sikh centric history of Panjab (Webster 1976: 406-407; Jeffrey 1987: 68) and any scholar proposing a view different from the 'official Sikh historiography' had to face severe criticism and even rejection.[1]

In the community centric history, the historical context in which Guru Nanak was born was projected as of social and religious crisis due to a conflict between the Hindu subjects and the Muslim rulers. Muslim rulers belonging to different successive houses and ethnicities were projected as being autocratic and

---

[1] The expression 'official Sikh historiography' has been borrowed from Harjot Oberoi (1992: 362), who uses it for the Sikh history that agrees with the views of Singh Sabha movement, which advocated the purging of the non-Sikh beliefs from otherwise pristine Sikh doctrines. It is noticeable that scholars who proposed new interpretations of the events connected with Sikh Gurus often faced criticism and they were blamed for distorting the Sikh history (Jeffrey 1987: 66). The attack on the noted historian, Satish Chandra for writing about the Sikh Gurus in the NCERT textbooks is another example in this regard. See for the details: (Kaur 2001: https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1822/18220820.htm).

tyrannical, who had created an environment of fear, distrust and hopelessness. Within this context, the birth and activities of Guru Nanak (1469-1539 CE) were located as a social-religious revolution (Singh 1967: 33-34). In other words, a dark age prevailed before the arrival of Guru Nanak. Even the period before the advent of Muslim rule –in other words, Hindu/ancient period, was characterized as one full of inconsistencies (Singh 1968: 71). Since the ancient Indians lacked a sense of history, Ganda Singh (1968: 74) opined that: 'we are, comparatively, in the dark about the history of that period [i.e., ancient period], however, glorious and great it was'. He thus seems to have questioned the validity of the history of ancient Panjab, and by doing so he transformed the period before Guru Nanak in the history of Panjab as a dark period. It was argued that much before modern times Guru Nanak in the first quarter of the sixteenth century perceived the entire India as one country (Hindustan) and Punjab as an integral part of it (Singh 1979: 1, 1994: 1881). In this way, the life of Guru Nanak is transformed into a milestone – a marker that could be used to divide the history of Panjab between pre-Nanak phase, which was a dark age and post-Nanak phase, which witnessed Punjab's rise as a distinct region under the Sikh Gurus and formation of Sikh nationality.

Its noticeable here that Sikh history centric approach to pre-Nanak's period of Panjab in particular and India in general displays a strong impact of colonial historiography and also perhaps a deliberate ignorance of the historical works on ancient Panjab of Panjabi historians for instance Buddha Prakash, Hari Ram Gupta, and L. M. Joshi. The idea that the ancient Indians – particularly Hindus, lacked a sense of history was first proposed and popularized by James Mill in his *The History of British India* (1817). The European scholars following Mill declared Indian culture, particularly the Hindu culture, as a-historical. Except Kalhana's *Rajatarangini*, a twelfth-century history of Kashmir, all other early Indian literature was dismissed as fanciful and mythological; and the lack of historical narratives was explained by the European scholars like James Mill as an outcome of the

insular nature of Indian society (Thapar 2013: 18-25). In this way, the ancient Indian literature, comprising myths, legends and philosophical discourses, was described as having lacked a historical consciousness. The same view precisely is advocated by Ganda Singh (1967), when he described 'a sense of reality' and 'historicity' as 'a Semitic gift to India' by the followers of Islam.

On the other hand, J. S. Grewal (1974: 1-2; 1995: 5-6) advocated the absence of Panjab as a distinct region in ancient and early medieval times; and he also rejected the widely held view that the term Panjab means the land of five rivers or five waters; instead, he translated this term as a land of five *doabs* (interfluves) and six rivers. His writings marked a clear departure from the nationalist perspective that traced the origin of 'Panjabi' identity from ancient times. The very presence of a socio-cultural region, which could be identified as an early Panjab, in pre-Nanak phase, therefore, was doubted; resultantly, first appearance of the Persian term Panjab (which is primarily a semantic expression) is transformed into an event –the beginning, from which the process of region's formation could be traced. In context of Panjab's historiography, this event is identified with the formation of Lahore province, comprising five doabs between the Sutlej and the Indus, under the Mughal emperor Akbar (late 16th century), which roughly coincided with the appearance of Guru Nanak and use of Punjabi language in Mughal Panjab (Grewal 1995: 3-10). And the formative process of Panjab's regional identity is suggested to have culminated in the establishment of Sikh state under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, which was the 'only regional, rather supra-regional, state known to the Punjab in its entire history' (Banga 2013: 2).

The Sikh historians placed the Sikh period after the Hindu and the Muslim periods, and Guru Nanak was suggested to have inaugurated a new as well as distinct phase in Panjab's history. This approach to Panjab's history was strongly grounded in the historical framework that first appeared in the 19th century and J. D. Cunningham (*A History of the Sikhs: From the Origin of the Nation to Battles of the Sutlej,* 1849) was one of the earliest Europeans, who by equating Panjab with Sikh nation merged the regional and

religious identities. The Hindu and Muhammad period of pre-Nanak phase, according to Cunningham (1918 [1849]: 19-20) witnessed the invasions of Aryans (mentioned as a warlike subdivision of the Caucasian race), Scythians and Turks, and eventually, altering of 'the Hindu mind… by the genius of the Arabian prophet'. A new religious mindset, promoted by Shankar Acharj, Kabir, Ramanand, Vallabha Swami and others, popularized the inward looking philosophy that considered the world as *maya* or illusion. It was argued that in an age of oppressive Muslim rule, first Guru Nanak and then Guru Gobind Singh transformed their followers into a Sikh nation (Cunningham 1918 [1849]: 37-38; Macauliffe 1909: xli; see for a comment on the oppressive Muslim rule: Grewal 2009: 13-14). This approach prepared the ground for community centric history (for a comment on the different aspects of the Sikh history, see: Oberoi 1987; Jeffrey 1987; Murphy 2007) and impacted the ways history of ancient and early medieval Panjab was studied in 1980s and 1990s.

The tussle for power in Panjab between the Congress, which was ruling the centre and the Akalis, a political group based on communal identity in the 1970s-1980s paved the way for a decade long political turmoil in Panjab's society (Sathyamurthy 1986: 47-48). The consistent refusal of the Congress under Indira Gandhi – ruling the central government, to acknowledge the demands of Akalis (for instance, Chandigarh territorial dispute, and the sharing of river waters) and tacit support to Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale against the Akalis proved to be a blunder and paved Panjab's fall into an era of militancy. The Operation Blue Star and the Sikh massacre in 1984 created an atmosphere of distrust in Panjab and beyond (Gupta 1985: 1185-1190). For more than a decade between 1980 and 1992, Panjab witnessed anti-state and pro-secessionist militant struggle, and it pushed the Akalis to redefine their approach to Panjab politics. Panjab crept into normalcy gradually in the late 1990s and soon found political stability with the shifting of Akalis' focus from separatism to Panjabiyat. It was also a time when scholars in India and abroad –

particularly Panjabi Diaspora, had begun to interrogate the 'Panjabi identity' and the notion of 'Panjabiyat' ('a sense of belonging to Panjab'), which paved the way for newer studies focusing on the Sufis, Nath yogis (Nath Siddhas) and Bhaktas to explain the formation of Panjab region, Panjabi identity and notion of Panjabiyat that hitherto had been broadly connected with the Sikh community (Dyke 2009: 979-980; Singh 2014: 65-67; Chima 2015: 151; See for studies on Sufis, Nath Siddhas and Bhaktas: Singh and Gaur 2009; Siddiqui 2009: 103-119; Snehi 2019: 6-11).

This shift away from community-centric discourse also prepared the way for the reworking of the history of early Panjab, which now began to be seen as an integral phase of Panjab region's five thousand years long history (Grewal 2005; Grewal and Pall 2005).

The idea of 'dark age' that Ganda Singh applied to ancient phase of Indian history was abandoned; but his suggestion to divide Panjab's history in two parts- pre-and-post Guru Nanak phases continued. Instead of calling the pre-Guru Nanak phase as 'dark age', now it was suggested to be a period when Panjab lacked a distinctive regional identity; therefore, J. S. Grewal suggested to use the term Panjab as a 'metaphor' in context of ancient and early medieval history of the land of five rivers (Grewal 2004a: 3) and he developed a panoramic survey of *this region's history in Social and Cultural History of the Punjab: Prehistoric, Ancient and Early Medieval* (2004). This approach to ancient and early medieval Panjab's history becomes logical, when it is seen in relation to Grewal's long held view that the idea of Panjab as a distinct region first appeared during the reign of Akbar- the first Mughal emperor. His view that Panjab as a region evolved in the medieval times, particularly from the late 16th century onwards has taken so deep roots that the ancient and early medieval phase of Panjab's history is almost ignored by several Punjabi scholars, and perhaps this is the reason why Anshu Malhotra and Farina Mir's edited book: *Punjab Reconsidered: History, Culture and Practice* (2012) neither contain any single article on ancient/early medieval Panjab nor it takes into discussion the early phase of Panjab's history. Curiously, the use of

the term Panjab by J. S. Grewal for writing the history of ancient and early medieval period is termed 'anachronistic' in this book (Malhotra and Mir 2012: xix-xx), which otherwise is evident from its title, claims to have reconsidered Panjab without exploring the possibilities of this region's ancient history.

On the other hand, in his book *The Making of Medieval Panjab,* Surinder Singh (2020: 608) has widened the framework of historical analysis by focusing on three entities – 'the representatives of the state, zamindars and Sufis' as the dominant factors in the making of medieval Panjab between 1000 and 1500 CE. It marks a departure from the community centric approach to Panjab's history and shifts the focus of historical analysis on pre-Mughal period, in which the complex interactions between/among different sections of society – rulers, local potentates and Sufis shaped the formation of Panjab region. Similar studies on early Panjab are absent largely due to an overwhelming emphasis on Panjab's community centric history; but it does not mean that Panjab's ancient history cannot be written. Rather, it can be written if studies on north-western India including Panjab underlining continuity in socio-cultural and political spheres from ancient to medieval period are taken into account. A possible framework of such a study of ancient and early medieval Panjab has already been suggested –however, in a loosely defined manner, by scholars like Romila Thapar and B. D. Chattopadhyaya among others.

The Third Perspective

The outline of ancient Panjab's political history from nationalist perspective had broadly been drawn by the 1960s, which laid emphasis on invasions and conflicts, and identified following key political phases: Stone Age-and-Harappan civilization, Vedic-and-Janapada period, Mauryan Age, Shaka-Pahlava-Kushana-Gana-Sangha period, Gupta-Huna-Pushyabhhuti period, and Hindu shahi-Ghaznaid period. Interspersed by invasions of the Aryans, Macedonians, and different central Asian tribes the

ancient history of Panjab was suggested to have shaped by the admixture of races and people. In the course of 1980s, importance of archaeological evidences for the study of ancient Panjab was particularly underlined by Y. D. Sharma (1980), Udai Vir Singh (1982), Suraj Bhan (1985), and Devendra Handa (1989), who had identified several sites connected with Neolithic cultures, Chalcolithic cultures, Pre-Harappan, Harappan and Late-Harappan phases, Painted Grey Ware and Northern Black Polished Ware cultures in Panjab and Haryana; yet they failed to cast away entirely the invasion centric approach. However, it does not mean that none challenged this approach. Rather, voices against the invasion centric approach for the study of ancient Panjab had begun to appear in the 1970s with a shift from political to economic and cultural history of ancient India; simultaneously, the view that the ancient Indians lacked a sense of history was rejected (Sharma, and Jha 1974: 48-80; Thapar 2002: 1-36; Thapar 2005: 1442-1448. See for a discussion on early Indian people's distinctive understanding of their past: Thapar 2013: 47, 49-50, 60-64).

The invasion centric approach for the study of ancient Panjab's history was questioned and an emphasis was laid on indigenous economic and cultural developments to study the formation of ancient Panjab (Gopal 1978: 6-15).[2] Romila Thapar (2010: 97, 101-103) criticised both- the nationalist scholars, who tended to suggest the presence of Panjabi identity in ancient times, and the Sikh scholars, who tended to link the formation of Panjab and Panjabi identity with Sikhism. Whereas she questioned the imposition of modern territorial as well as communal identities on ancient Panjab, she has also suggested studying the formation of Panjab region as a historical phenomenon, which was not suspended in space and time. In her view, the most distinguishable features of ancient Panjab had been the *gana-sangha* polities, absence of strong agrarian economy as well as absence of land-grants to brahmanas

---

2   See for research on early Panjab's economy and urban centers in the late 1970s and 1980s: Sharma 1979: 39-41; Singh 1980: 32-37; Ahuja 1985: 1-8; Ahuja 1986: 1-19).

and temples, which shaped the formation of unorthodox cultures here (See for a discussion on the nature of *gana-sangha* polities: Sharma 2009: 119-132). Instead of relegating early Panjab to "one of history's eternal 'march' regions," B. D. Chattopadhyaya (2011: 48-51, 53-60) argued to study it 'in terms of local cultural evolution'. Like Romila Thapar, he identified the formation of *janapadas* (e.g., Gandhara, Madra, Kuru) and *gana-sanghas* (e.g., Malava, Yaudheyas, Arjunayanas) one of the crucial developments in the early historical Panjab. He drew our attention to the fact that *janapadas,* based on monarchical form of polity, whereas tended to disappear, *gana-sanghas* have shown remarkable consistency. Under the major polities of the Mauryas, the Indo-Greeks, the Scytho-Parthians and the Kushanas, these *gana-sanghas* not only survived, but they actively participated in the vast network of commerce and they minted their own coins. These oligarchies display a long continuity from the pre-Vedic Age archaeological cultures to the early medieval period; however, with the rise of monarchies in the western Himalayas the oligarchic form of polity (*gana-sanghas*) disappeared.

The rise of monarchical polities (integrative polities according to B. D. Chattopadhyaya[3]) in the western Himalayas (mentioned as Panjab Hills in colonial records) and the Panjab plains in early medieval period prepared the political context within which the rise of Sultanate polities coincided with the integration of local Hindu potentates. Having different spatial and temporal existence, the monarchical polities, for instance, Chamba and Kangra among others that arose in the western Himalayas in the course of early medieval period[4] remained politically significant

[3] For a discussion on the integrative state polity, see: (Chattopadhyaya 2012: ix-lxvi, 1-37, 190-231; Sahu and Kulke 2015: 16- 51; Kulke 2018: 215).

[4] In the western Himalayas, several local states, for instance, Chamba, Kulu, Mandi, Kangra, Bashahr, Kahlur, and Sirmur emerged in the early medieval and medieval periods. The rulers of these states patronized both the temples of Puranic gods/goddesses (e.g., Shiva, Vishnu and Durga) as well as brahmanas, which facilitated the integration of local populations through the assimilation of local gods and goddesses in Brahmanical-Puranic religion. The local deotas, having devotees 4

even in the early 19th century, when Maharaja Ranjit Singh devised diverse strategies to expand his authority in western Himalayas (Sharma 2017: 505-533). Mahesh Sharma (2015: 493, 498-500) shows that the Chamba state imitated the typical north Indian state model, which had first evolved under the Guptas, and it accomplished territorial integration by making land grants to brahmanas and building temples of Shiva, Durga and Vishnu (See also, Jha 2000: 197-209). In western Himalayas, Kashmir was another area that saw the formation of monarchical polities, which made land grants to brahmanas as well as promoted Brahmanical-Puranic religion (Deambi 1985: 20-26; See for a detailed discussion on the political history of Kashmir: Jagannath 1981: 524-557). Shaivism particularly found the royal support and thrived here and it is amply demonstrated by the *Rajatarangini and* the *Nilamata-Purana* that imagined Kashmir's sacred geography from Brahmanic point of view and identified rivers of this region with Ganga and Yamuna as well as equated different places with the holy *tirthas* of mid-Ganga valley (Kaul 2018: 59-98; Sharma 2008: 129-138). In a similar manner, the Panjab plains witnessed the rise of the Hindu-Shahi rulers, whose kingdom comprised a vast territory extending from Lamghan near Kabul to Chenab River. Even though, their political life remained fraught with Turkish invasions from the Ghazni (see for a detailed discussion: Mehta 1980: 47-57; Deambi 1985: 12-20; Misra 1992: 344-361), the Hindu Shahi rulers extended their patronage to different Brahmanical-Puranic cults, assumed grand titles like *Parambhataraka*, *Maharajadhiraja* and *Paramesvara and*forged matrimonial ties with the Kashmiri rulers *(*Mishra 1972: 56-57, 69, 82, 89, 114, 127, 165*)*. Their coins that are found in large number from different parts of

---

In their respective localities, were subordinated to the royal divinity, who was placed at the top in the hierarchy of the local deotas; it symbolized the royal authority over all the localities of different deotas as well as their devotees. The hierarchy in religious space thus exhibited the political hierarchy that was systematically evolved and preserved by the rulers of Chamba, Kulu, Mandi, Kangra, Bashahr, Kahlur, and Sirmur through territorial conquests and religious patronage (Singh 2018: 56-75).

northwest India as well as a virtual absence of land grants in their territories (including parts of early Panjab) suggest the presence of a strong inter-and-intra regional trade network, which formed the backbone of the Hindu Shahi economy (Bhatia 1973: 50-61; 1981: 25-28).

The Panjab plains and the western Himalayas, while witnessed the formation of different integrative polities, the adjacent region of Sind and Multan came under Islamicate polity[5] with the conquest of these by the Arabs under the leadership of Muhammad Kasim (also mentioned as Muḥammad bin Qāsim) in about 711-13 CE; however, the Arabs' all attempts to occupy eastern Afghanistan and Panjab faced failures due to a firm presence of the Hindu Shahis (See for a discussion on Sind's conquest: Gabrieli 1965: 281-295; Majumdar 1981: 559-575; Siddiqi 1992: 322-327). It was only in the 10th century CE, with the rise of Ghazna as a Turkish political centre under Alp-tigin and his successors the Islamicate polity could manage to push its frontiers eastwards at the coast of the Hindu Shahis (Chandra 2011: 16-18). The Ghaznavid-Hindu Shahi conflicts had actually been a political conflict between two different political systems, one affiliated with the Islamic ideas and another with the Brahmanical-Puranic ideas. In this conflict, the Ghaznavids outwitted the Hindu Shahis by 1021 CE and occupied entire Afghanistan, Panjab, Multan and Sind (Khan 2000-2001: 262-266). Subsequently, several urban centres that had come up in the course of the first millennium CE and flourished under the Hindu Shahis, became the seats of local administration under the Islamicate polities; under Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni and his successors, however, the rural administration remained in the hands of local non-Muslim elites (e.g., *khut* and *dehgan*) (Raza 1991: 232-241).

---

[5] The term 'Islamicate' is coined by Marshall G. S. Hodgson for 'the social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims' (Hodgson 1977: 59).

After the Ghaznavids, Panjab came under the Ghurids, who prepared the ground for the rise of Delhi Sultanate based on Islamic ideas in the course of the 13th-14th centuries CE (Chandra 2011: 22-29). The new rulers adopted diverse methods including issuance of bilingual coinage (Raza 2014: 227-228) and marriage in rural non-Muslim elite families (Singh 2008) among others to integrate both land and people of the conquered territories in their political edifice (Raza 2010-11: 213-225; Devra and Arora 2012: 205-2011). Neither the Ghaznavid nor the Ghurid invasions however caused a break between ancient and medieval periods of Panjab's history[6]; rather the establishment of Islamicate polities in the Panjab plains under the Ghaznavids and then under the Ghurids followed by the formation of Delhi Sultanate needs to be seen as the transition phase in Panjab's history, when the erstwhile integrative polities (based on Brahmanical-Puranic ideas) disintegrated and in its place Islamicate polity/polities was/were founded. It has been suggested that the Turk rulers after settling down soon realized the difficulties 'to rule a mainly non-Muslim population using a narrow interpretation of the shariat.' Therefore,

---

[6] In the nationalist historiography the medieval period is usually characterized as a dark phase of Indian history, when India lost its classical standards in all the fields of human life- polity, economy and society. Particularly, the invasions of different central Asian tribes, for instance, the Hunas, Turks, and Mangols among others, are held responsible for causing a break between the ancient Hindu and medieval Muslim periods as well as for pushing India into social, cultural and political decadence (Ray 1967: 14-17, 27-29). See for a critique of this approach: (Thapar 2002: 15-22). According to B. D. Chattopadhyaya (2012 : lxiii-lxiv), the 'advent of Islam in India and its various forms' actually created wider 'spaces for new sets of religious ideologues and new powerful centres of religious communications', which sometimes conflicted with existing non-Muslim power centers as well as sometimes entered into a dialogue with these. And both of these religious power centers (i.e., Islamic and Hindu) were irrelevant to those, 'who born Hindu or Muslim, were by conviction opposed to ideological orthodoxy and its institutionalized maneuvering.' Chattopadhyaya further adds that "Kabir or Nanak, Chaitanya or Tukaram- all represented different faces of protest against institutionalized orthodoxy, Brahmanical or Islamic, but their ideas did not suddenly originate in a 'medieval' seclusion, but drew on the continuing contestation with orthodoxy in various forms from their past and their present." In this way, he ruled out the possibility of a break between ancient and medieval period.

they attempted to evolve 'non-theocratic state law, *zawabit-i-mulki*, while still maintain public protestations of respect to Muslim divines and their institutions' (Aquil 2017: 32). In the Islamicate polities, which are popularly known as the Delhi Sultanate, the local Hindu elites (*rana, khut, muqqadam, chaudhuri, thakur*) at different levels were assimilated to tap agrarian resources from countryside (Satish 2011: 275; for a discussion on the position of rural non-Muslim elites in Delhi Sultanate, see: Habib 2014: 53-60). Amidst this political transition, a shift from ancient/early medieval to medieval period in Panjab's history took place and alongside it, a distinct cultural fabric of medieval Panjab started taking a shape at ground due to the activities/interactions of the Sufis, Natha-yogis and Bhaktas with/or without the patronage of state and local potentates.[7]

Post-Script

It would undoubtedly be futile to look for Panjabi identities in ancient times because the historical conditions in which modern Panjab state and Panjabi identities have acquired a distinct shape had been entirely absent in a period, when neither modern nation-states nor rigid electoral identities were present. But it does not mean that the land of five rivers was too absent as a distinct geographical unit in ancient and early medieval times. Even

---

[7]   The 'interactions between various strands of Islam and diverse Indic religious traditions led to the emergence of new forms of religiosity, cults and sects, the most prominent being Sufism, Bhakti and Sikhism' in Indian subcontinent (Aquil 2017: 3). The Sufism started in Panjab with the arrival of Shaikh Ali bin Usman Hujwiri (d. 1072) and after him, under Baba Farid (1175-1265), Shaikh Bahauddin Zakariya (1182-1262) and several others it was entrenched in Panjab's soil. The lives of Sufis were closely connected with the Nath yogis, who had been widely present in medieval Panjab (For a discussion on the interactions between Nath-Yogis and Sufis, see: Ernst 2005: 15-43; Snehi 2019: 6-11). Nath yogis' importance in Panjabi culture one can guess from their consistent visibility in medieval Panjabi literature (for instance, love tale of Hir and Ranjha). And if the history of Nath yogis (also referred as Nath Siddhas) is taken into account then the study of early medieval religious developments, particularly the rise and popularity of Tantrism become imperative that have had provided the historical context within which Nath-yogis (Nath Siddhas) emerged. See (Joshi 1976: 45-72; Sharma 2014: 216-218).

though the Persian term Panjab was absent in ancient and early medieval records, the land of five rivers (or five doabs with six rivers[8]) was not only present but it had been a part of people's consciousness; the prevalence of several region specific nomenclatures regarding the land of five rivers in both texts and epigraphs displays a sense of regional distinctiveness among the people. The terms, Pentapotamia (the Greek sources) and Pancanad (the *Mahabharata* and the *Puranas*) that are usually considered the ancient names of Panjab, highlight the distinctiveness of the land of five rivers (Vig 1966: 38; Handa 1989: 27; Joshi 1997: 1).

The terms Pentapotamia[9] whereas refer to a distinct geographical region, Pancanada has been used for a) distinct region of Indus and its tributaries,[10] b) for the lower course of the Indus River in which the five tributaries merged and c) for 'the

---

[8] J. S. Grewal (1995: 4-6; 2004: 9-10; 2004a: 1-3) argues that if the letters dāl (d) and wā (o) is dropped from the compound panj-doāb then the word Panjāb would emerge. The term Punjab thus actually referred to an area of five doabs instead of five rivers, and this fact in Grewal's opinion makes Punjab a land of six rivers. Noticeably, even if Grewal's interpretation of the Persian word Panjab is accepted, it does not make the use of the terms, for instance, Pentapotamia, Pancanada and Banj Ab, in pre-Mughal writings insignificant. Rather it reinforces the fact that the land of Indus and its tributaries, that had been considered a distinct region in early Indian literature, remained distinct even in the medieval period.

[9] The Greek term Pentapotamia is mentioned in Arrian's Annabasis Alexandri, which has quoted Megasthenes extensively to describe India. The Greek ambassador of Seleucus Nekator, Megasthenes is mentioned to have entered India through Pentapotamia (literally meaning, land of Five Rivers) and reached by the royal road to Palibothra (i.e., Pataliputra), the capital of Sandrocottus (identified with the Mauryan king Chandragupta Maurya) (Anthon 1853: 399; Smith 1880: 1008; For a description of Indus and its tributaries by Megasthenes, see: McCrindle 1877: 190-191). The appearance of a distinct nomenclature, Pentapotamia for the Indus and its tributaries (Hydraotes-Ravi, Akesines- Chenab, Hyphasis- Beas, Hydaspes- Jhelum, and Toutapos- Sutlej) shows the earliest appearance of a distinct regional identity for this region of the northwest India (Chakravarti 2011: 13).

[10] The Sanskrit term Pancanada, according to D. C. Sircar (1960: 185-186; 1997: 27) referred to the land watered by Sindhu and its five tributaries (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab, and Jhelum), and in the Mahabharata, the terms Vahika, Madra, Jartika,

place where the joint course of the Beas and Sutlej meets the combined waters of the Indus, Chenab, Jhelum and Ravi below Multan' (Sircar 1960: 238-239; 1997: 27). Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (1325-1354 CE) uses the Arabic term Banj Āb in place of Pancanada for the river Indus (Gibb 1971: 593; Phadke 2005: 71) and in the Sultanate official letters of Naib-i-Multan (*Insha-i-Mahru*, dated about 1340-41 CE) the Persian term Panjab that either included the shiq of Multan or had been intimately connected with it, is mentioned. In the *Akbarnama* and the *Ain-i Akbari* of Abu al-Fazl (late 16th century) the term Panjab came to be employed for the province of Lahore that covered all the five doabs between the Sutlej and the Indus (Grover 1985: 10). The appearance of these terms, i.e., Pentapotamia, Pancanada and Panjab, indicates the formulation of a consciously conceptualized as well as a geographically distinct space in the course of ancient and medieval period. Since Indus and its tributaries including *doabs* have historically constituted a distinguishable geographical region in the northwestern parts of Indian subcontinent, people of different cultural and linguistic background have had produced semantically common nomenclatures, reflective of this geographical reality. And the appearance of these semantic expressions needs to be seen as a part –not as a break, of the processes involved in the formation of Panjab region.

References

Ahuja, R. L. (1985). 'Antiquity of Taxila', *The Panjab Past and Present*, 19(1): 1-8.

---------------. (1986). 'Clash and Synthesis of Cultures: Greeks at Taxila,' *The Panjab Past and Present*, 20(1): 1-19.

Anthon, C. (1853). *A Manual of Greek Literature from the Earliest Authentic Reports to the Close of Byzantine Era*, New York: Harper & Brothers.

Aquil, R. (2017). *The Muslim Question: Understanding Islam and Indian History*, Gurgaon: Penguin Books.

Aratta and Pancanada are used synonymously. On the other hand, Alberuni has identified Pancanada with the confluence of the five rivers with Indus at a place below Multan (Sachau 2003: 194).

Banga, I. (2013). 'General Presidential Address: Region, Locality and Community: A Professional Journey', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 74: 1-22.

Bhan, S. (1985). 'Presidential Address: Growth of Urbanization in Ancient Punjab and Haryana', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference,* Nineteenth Session.

Bhatia, P. (1973). 'Bull/Horseman Coins of the Shahis, C. AD 650-1026', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 34: 50-61.

--------------. (1981). 'Presidential Address -Ancient Punjab', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Fifteenth Session.

Chakrabarti, D. K. (2003). *Archaeology in the third world: A History of Indian Archaeology since 1947*,New Delhi: D. K. Printworld (P) ltd.

Chakravarti, R. (2011). 'Presidential Address: Pentapotamia and the Crossroads of Asia: Politics, State Society and Linkages (c. Second Century BCE-300 CE)', *Proceedings of the Punjab History Conference*, Forty-Third Session.

Chandra, S. (2011). *Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals, Delhi Sultanat (1206-1526),* New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications.

Chattopadhyaya, B. D. (2011). *Studying Early India: Archaeology, Texts, and Historical Issues*, Delhi: Permanent Black.

--------------------. (2012 [1994]). *Making of Early Medieval India*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Chima, J. S. (2015). 'The Shiromani Akali Dal and Emerging Ideological Cleavages in Contemporary Sikh Politics in Punjab: Integrative Regionalism versus Exclusivist Ethnonationalism', *Journal of Punjab Studies*, 22(1): 143-174.

Cunningham, J. D. (1918 [1849]). *A History of the Sikhs: From the Origin of the Nation to Battles of the Sutlej*, (edited by H. L. O. Garrett), London: Humphrey Milford Oxford University Press.

Dani, A. H. (2000-2001). 'Mazar-I-Sharif Inscription of the Time of the Shahi Ruler Veka, dated the Year 138,' *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 61: 132-135.

Deambi, B. K. K. (1985). *History and Culture of Ancient Gandhāra and Western Himalayas: From Sāradā Epigraphic Sources*, New Delhi: Ariana Publishing House.

Devra, G. S. L. and Arora, S. (2012). 'Hindu Commanders in the Army of Sultans of Ghazna: A Case Study of Vijaypal of Bayana', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 73: 205-211.

Dhillon, G. S. (1974). 'Evolution of the Demand for a Sikh Homeland', *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 35(4): 362-373.

Douie, J. (2003 [1916]). *The Panjab, North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir*, New Delhi: Asian Educational Service.

Dyke, V. V. (2009). 'The Khalistan Movement in Punjab, India, and the Post-Militancy Era: Structural Change and New Political Compulsions', *Asian Survey*, 49(6): 975-997.

Ernst, C. W. (2005). 'Situating Sufism and Yoga', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 15(1): 15-43.

Gabrieli, F. (1965). 'Muḥammad bin Qāsim ath-Thaqafī and the Arab Conquest of Sind', *East and West*, 15(3/4): 281-295.

Gibb, H. A. R. (1971). *The Travels of Ibn Battuta, A.D. 1325-1354, Vol. III* (translated with revisions and notes from the Arabic text edited by C. Defremery and B. R. Sanguinetti), London: Cambridge University Press.

Gopal, L. (1978). 'Presidential Address: Ancient Section', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Twelfth Session.

Grewal, J. S. (1974). *Miscellaneous Articles*, Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University.

-----------. (1995). 'Inaugural Address', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Twenty Seventh Session.

------------. (2004). *Social and Cultural History of the Punjab: Prehistoric, Ancient and Early Medieval*, Delhi: Manohar.

------------. (2004a). 'Historical Geography of the Punjab', *Journal of Punjab Studies*, 2(1): 1-18.

-----------. (2009). *The Sikhs: Ideology, Institutions and Identity*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Grewal, R. (2005). *Five Thousand Years of Urbanization: The Punjab Region*, New Delhi: Manohar.

Grewal, R. and Pall, S. (2005). *Precolonial and Colonial Punjab: Society, Economy, Politics and Culture- Essays for Indu Banga*, New Delhi: Manohar.

Grover, B. R. (1985). 'Presidential Address', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Nineteenth Session.

Gupta, D. (1985). 'The Communalising of Punjab, 1980-1985', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 20(28): 1185-1190.

Gupta, H. R. (1966). 'Was Chandragupta Maurya a Punjabi?', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Second Session.

------------. (1976). 'Chandragupta Maurya- A Native of Punjāb,' in Singh, H. and Barrier, N. G., (eds) *Punjab Past and Present: Essays in Honour of Dr. Ganda Singh*, Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau, 27-32.

Habib, I. (2014). 'Agrarian Economy', in Raychaudhuri, T. and Habib, I. (ed.) *The Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. I, c. 1200- c. 1750*, Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan: 48-76.

Handa, D. (1989) 'Presidential Address: Ancient Section', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference,* (Part-I) Twenty-Third Session.

Hodgson, M. G. S. (1977). *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in World Civilization- Vol. I, The Classical Age of Islam*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Jagannath, (1981). 'Chapter Eighteen- Kashmir', in Majumdar, R. C. and Dasagupta, K. K. (ed.) *A Comprehensive History of India, Vol. III, Part. I (AD 300-985)*, New Delhi: 524-557.

Jeffrey, R. (1987). 'Grappling with History: Sikh Politicians and the Past', *Pacific Affairs*, 60(1): 59-72.

Jha, D. N. (2000). *The Feudal Order: State, Society and Ideology in Early Medieval India*, New Delhi: Manohar.

Joshi, L. M. (1976). 'The Siddha Tradition Before Gurū Nānak', in Singh, H. and Barrier, N. G. (ed.) *Punjab Past and Present: Essays in Honour of Dr. Ganda Singh*, Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau: 45-72.

------------. (1997 [1976]). 'Introduction: Ancient Punjab' and 'Religion and Society in the Rigvedic Age,' in Joshi, L. M. and Singh, Fauja, (ed.), *History of Punjāb (From Pre-Historic Times to the Age of Aśoka), Vol. I*, Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau, 1-23, 78-93.

Kaul, S. (2018). *The Making of Early Kashmir: Landscape and Identity in the Rajatarangini*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Kaur, N. (2001). 'Controversy: History and Sensibilities', *Frontline* (18), available at https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1822/18220820.htm (accessed on 04 January 2020).

Khan, Z. A. (2000-2001). 'Afghanistan and Northwestern India in the Eleventh Century Mapping the Ghaznavid Empire', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 61 (Part- I): 262-266.

Kulke, H. (2018). *History of Precolonial India: Issues and Debates* (English edition revised and edited by B. P. Sahu and translation from German by Parnal Chirmuley), New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Latif, S. M. (1891). *History of the Panjāb: From the Remotest Antiquity to the Present Time,* Calcutta: Calcutta General Press Company.

Macauliffe, M. A. (1909). *The Sikh Religion: Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors- Vol. I*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Majumdar, R. C. (1981). 'Chapter Nineteen: The Western Frontier', in Majumdar, R. C. and Dasagupta, K. K. (ed.) *A Comprehensive History of India, Vol. III, Part. I (AD 300-985)*, New Delhi: People's Publishing House: 559-575.

Malhotra, A. and Mir, F. (ed.) (2012). *Punjab Reconsidered: History, Culture and Practice*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

McCrindle, J. W. (1877). *Ancient India as Described by Megasthenēs and Arrian*, London: Trubner & Co.

Mehta, J. L. (1980). *Advanced Study in the History of Medieval India*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.

Mishra, Y. (1972). *The Hindu Sahis of Afghanistan and the Punjab AD 865-1026 (A Phase of Islamic Advance into India)*, Patna: Vaishali Bhavan.

Misra, S. C. (1992). 'Chapter Twelve- Section One: The Ghaznavid Invasions', in Sharma, R. S. and Shrimali, K. M. (ed.) *A Comprehensive History of India, Vol. 4, Part. I (AD 985-1206)*, New Delhi: People's Publishing House: 344-361.

Mukhia, H. (1998). ''Medieval India': An Alien Conceptual Hegemony?' *The Medieval History Journal,* 1(1): 91-106.

Murphy, A. (2007). 'History in the Sikh Past', *History and Theory*, 46(3): 345-365.

Narang, S. K. S. (1965). 'Address', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, First Session.

Oberoi, H. (1992). 'Popular Saints, Goddesses, and Village Sacred Sites: Rereading Sikh Experience in the Nineteenth Century', *History of Religions*, 31(4): 363-384.

Oberoi, H. S. (1987). 'From Punjab to "Khalistan": Territoriality and Metacommentary', *Pacific Affairs*, 60(1): 26-41.

Phadke, H. A. (2005). *Essays on Indian Historiography*, Jaipur: Rawat Publications.

Potdar, D. V. (1965). 'Presidential Address', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, First Session.

Prakash, B. (1964). *Political and Social Movement in Ancient Panjab (From the Vedic Age upto the Mauryan Period)*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

------------. (1965) 'Presidential Address: Ancient India', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, First Session.

------------. (1976). 'Ancient Panjāb- A Panoramic View,' in Singh, H. and Barrier, N. G., (eds.) *Punjab Past and Present: Essays in Honour of Dr. Ganda Singh*, Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau, 1-26.

Prakash, Om. (1976). 'The Punjab under Chandragupta Maurya', in Joshi, L. M. and Singh, Fauja, (ed.), *History of Punjāb (From Pre-Historic Times to the Age of Aśoka), Vol. I*, Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau, pp. 167-186.

Prasad, B. (1966). 'Presidential Address: Ancient Section', *Proceedings of the Punjab History Conference*, Second Session.

Ray, N. (1967). 'General President's Address', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 29 (Part. I).

Raza, S. J. (1991). 'Ghaznavid Origins of the Administrative Institutions of the Delhi

Sultanate', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 52: 232-241.

-----------. (2010-2011). 'Hindus under the Ghaznavids', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 71: 213-225.

-----------. (2014). 'Coinage and Metallurgy under the Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 75: 224-231.

Sachau, E. C. (2003). *Alberuni's India (An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Geography, Chronology, Astrology, Customs, Laws and Astrology of India about Ad 1030) Vol. I and II*, New Delhi: Indialog Publications.

Saksena, B. P. (1968). 'Presidential Address', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Third Session.

Sara, H. I. S. (1977). 'The Scythian Origins of the Sikh-Jat', *The Panjab Past and Present*, XI(II): 247-269.

Sathyamurthy, T. V. (1986). 'India's Punjab Problem: Edging Towards a Solution?' *The World Today*, 42(3), 1986: 46-50.

Sharma, D. (1968). 'Presidential Address- Ancient Section', *Proceedings of the Punjab History Conference*, Third Session.

Sharma, G. B. (1979). 'Sanghol Through the Ages,' *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Thirteenth Session.

Sharma, M. (2008). 'Puranic Texts from Kashmir: Vitasta and River Ceremonials in the Nilamata Purana', *South Asia Research*, 28(2): 123-145.

------------. (2014). 'Protest and Counter-protest: The Nath Siddhas and Charpatnath' in Ramaswamy, V. (ed.) *Devotion and Dissent in Indian History*, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press: 216-254.

-----------. (2015). 'Building 'Consent-to-Rule': State Formation and Cultural Complex in Western Himalayas, 700-1650 CE', in B. P. Sahu and Hermann Kulke ed. *Interrogating Political Systems: Integrative Processes and States in Pre-Modern India*, Delhi: Manohar: pp. 491-535.

-------------. (2017). 'The frayed margins of empire: Early nineteenth century Panjab and the hill states' *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 54(4): 505-533.

Sharma, R. S. (2009). *Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Sharma, R. S. and Jha, D. N. (1974). 'The Economic History of India up to AD 1200: Trends and Prospects', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 17(1): 48-80.

Sharma, Y. D. (1980). 'Presidential Address: Ancient Section', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Nineteenth Session.

Siddiqi, I. H. (1992). 'Chapter Ten (B)- Dynastic History of Sind', in Sharma, R. S. and Shrimali, K. M. (ed.) *A Comprehensive History of India, Vol. 4, Part. I (AD*

985-1206), New Delhi: People's Publishing House: 322-327.

------------. (2009). *Medieval India: Essays in Diplomacy and Culture*, New Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors.

Singh, C. (2018). *Himalayan Histories: Economy, Polity, Religious Traditions*, Ranikhet: Permanent Black.

Singh, G. (1967). 'Editorial,' and 'Introducing the Panjab,' *The Panjab Past and Present*, 1(1): 28-46.

-----------. (1968) 'Presidential Address- Medieval Section', *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Third Session.

-----------. (1979). 'Presidential Address', *Punjab History Conference*, Thirteenth Session.

------------. (1994). 'Complexities of the Question of Sikh Nationality', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 29(29): 1877-1882.

Singh, M. (1980). 'Sanghol: A Numismatic Study,' *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Fourteenth Session.

Singh, P. (2014). 'Class, Nation and Religion: Changing Nature of Akali Dal Politics in Punjab, India', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 52(1): 55-77.

Singh, S. (2008). 'Presidential Address: Medieval Section- The Making of Medieval Punjab: Politics, Society and Economy c. 1200-c. 1400,' *Punjab History Conference*, Fortieth Session.

-----------. (2020) *The Making of Medieval Panjab: Politics, Society and Culture, c. 1000- c. 1500*, New Delhi: Manohar.

Singh, S. and Gaur, I. D. (ed.) (2009). *Sufism in Punjab: Mystics, Literature and Shrines*, Delhi: Aakar Books.

Singh, U. V. (1982). 'Presidential Address: Ancient Section', in *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Seventeenth Session.

Sircar, D. C. (1960). *Studies in the Geography of Ancient and Medieval India*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

------------. (1997 [1976]). 'Ancient Geography of the Punjab', in Joshi, L. M. and Singh, F. (ed.) *History of the Punjāb (From Pre-Historic Times to the Age of Aśoka), Vol. I,* Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau: 25-45.

Smith, W. (ed.) (1880). *A Dictionary of the Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology- Vol. II*, London: John Murray.

Snehi, Y. (2019). *Spatializing Popular Sufi Shrines in Punjab: Dreams, Memories, Territoriality*, London & New York: Routledge.

Thapar, R. (2002). *Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300*, New Delhi: Penguin Books.

------------. (2005). 'Decolonising the Past: Historical Writing in the Time of Sachin-and Beyond,' *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40(14): 1442-1448;

-----------. (2010). *Cultural Past: Essays in Early Indian History*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

------------. (2012). 'Reporting History: Early India', *Social Scientist*, 40(7/8): 31-42.

------------. (2013). *The Past Before Us: Historical Traditions of Early North India*, New Delhi: Permanent Black.

Trevaskis, H. K. (1928). *The Land of the Five Rivers: An Economic History of the Punjab from the Earliest Times to the Year of Grace 1890*, Great Britain: Oxford University Press.

Vig, I. G. (1966). 'Punjab: The Sword-Arm of India During the Ancient Period', in *Proceedings of Punjab History Conference*, Second Session.

Vora, R. and Feldhaus, A. (ed.) (2006). *Region, Culture, and Politics in India,* New Delhi: Manohar.Webster, J. C. B. (1976). 'Research on Modern Punjāb History Currently Being Conducted in the Punjāb,' in Singh, H. and Barrier, N. G., (eds) *Punjab Past and Present: Essays in Honour of Dr. Ganda Singh,* Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Bureau: 406-416.

Wheeler, R. E. M. (1950). *Five Thousand Years of Pakistan: An Archaeological Outline* London: Royal India & Pakistan Society.

Forms of Social Control and the Process of Transfer of Agrarian Settlements and its Resources in Early medieval Vidarbha Plain (c. AD 400 to c.AD800)

Shyam Narayan Lal*

Abstract

Notwithstanding the fact that the major trajectories of historical developments in the context of early and early medieval India has largely been sought to be visualized through different aspects of rural settlements and society, our understanding of how rural society organized and distributed its varied resources and the level and extent to which the existing authority structure intervene in that still remains inadequate. This inadequacy arises partly out of the wide-ranging, often mutually contesting, generalizations made at different points of time by historians holding different ideational positions and also the fact that knowledge about them is necessarily derived from works on agrarian or administrative history in which information about them is merely incorporated and rarely analyzed as an independent subject of study. The present paper, therefore, makes a foray into exploring the role of rural settlement and society in the organization and distribution of

*Professor, Department of History, Jammu University, Email:shyamnlal@gmail.com

resources and how it functioned in the context of the totality of the existing state structure by examining or linking together pieces of evidence culled from the land charters recording transfer of agrarian settlements and its resources. The land charters taken up for discussion were   issued by different ruling houses, having differential   authority status, who controlled   the segments of space falling within the geographical boundaries of Vidarbha plain, as part of their larger political domain, between 5th and the 9th century. In our endeavor to understand this, several components in the total structure of the land charters, particularly the nature of authority behind the grant, the manner in which the representatives of apparatus of the state and the contexts in which different members of rural community figures   in the process of the transfer of agrarian resources would be examined. We would also, look into the phraseology and the variation within it, if there is any, used to communicate the transfer of resources to different categories of people involved in the entire process. These pieces of evidence, taken together with other relevant component of the land charter, one hopes, would bring out, pointers which may bear upon our understanding of the nature of linkages between the apex political organization and the various components of rural society.

A cursory glance at the existing corpus of historical research on early medieval India is enough to realize that the rural settlements and society has invariably been one of the core categories through which various processes occurring within the time span of early and early medieval period in Indian history has been both imaged and imagined by historians[1]. Starting from the days of Orientalists

1   The sentiment expressed by A.S.Altekar who produced one of the earliest

and Colonial historiography in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century[2], it has continued to figure, in some form or other, in the recent historiography of all hues as well. However, ironically enough, when it comes to the issue of understanding how the agrarian resources were controlled, managed and distributed by rural society and how it was located in the context of the existing

---

works on history of village community in India captures this well. In the preface he wrote, "The importance of the history of the village communities in India can hardly be overrated; for the real history of India consists of the history of its village communities. Dynasties have come and dynasties have gone, but it is the village communities that have preserved intact the culture and tradition of the old Bharatavarsha through several revolutions". A. S. Altekar, *A History of village communities in western India,* Bombay,1927

2   It was way back in the second decades of the nineteenth century that the colonial interest in the agrarian economy of India necessitated the engagements of several of their bureaucrats and scholars with the issues of understanding the Indian rural settlements and rural community and there were several official Reports in which their image of existence in history as isolated "Little Republic" with self sufficient economy having no built in potential for change was alluded. See for example ,Select committee -Fifth Report, House of Commons , 1812,pp.25-26, 807-8,855-6. This initial imaging of rural settlements and society of was lucidly articulated by Sir H.S. Maine, especially in his "Village Communities of the East and West" and in several lectures, afterwards collected in a book entitled "The Early History of Institution". Sir Henry James Sumner Maine, *Village-Communities in the East and West. Six lectures delivered at Oxford,* London, 1871.Maine's construct of Indian village and its organic communities soon became hegemonistic and was widely read and recommended for the charm of his style and the suggestiveness of his method. Several works on Indian village and village community appeared since then, including those who raised critical concern about the validity of his arguments, yet till as late as the third forth decades of the 20th century his construct was in full possession of the field to the extent that it strongly informed the writings of radical thinkers like Marx who wrote about Indian rural settlements and society about forty years later. He also went on to project rural society as stagnant, governed by the communalistic nature of village life Also see B.H.Baden-Powell, *The Origin and Growth of Village communities in India,* London, 1999, (rep).2003 It is only towards the end of the third decades of the decades of the 20th century that Indian historians decided to break away from this continuing construct and the fist attempt in this direction was made by A.S. Altekar in 1927.

structure of state, we have to necessarily derive our understanding from the generalizations which are part of works on agrarian history[3] or the administrative structure of state[4] etc, in which information on rural settlements and society are incorporated, but rarely analyzed. While on the one hand the shadow of conventional historiography which treats the rural settlements and society as 'little republic', located outside the larger structure of state, which were not influenced by, and did not in turn influence, the wider political structure continues in some form or other[5], on the other hand, we also have writings which continues to project the rural settlement and society located in a given space as passive unit or physical isolates generating revenue for state which, as and when wanted, transferred it, unilaterally along with its resources, to whosoever it wished to do so.Though a departure from the conventional perception of rural settlements and society is noticeable in some of the recent writings, especially of those who consciously reject the unchanging character of Indian society, particularly the rural one, their position as to how rural settlements and society were located within the existing power structure too carries the burden of conventional historiography[6]. Thus the

---

3   See, for example, U. N. Ghoshal, *Contribution to Hindu revenue system*, Culcutta, 1929; also , A. Appadorai. *Economic Conditions in Southern India (A.D. 1000–1500).* (two volumes), Madras, 1936

4   A.S. Altekar, *State and government in Ancient India*, Delhi,1962, Chapter, XII,pp.225-44;also, G. S. Dikshit: *Local self-government in mediaeval Karnataka*. Dharwar, 1964.

5   This idea was best articulated in the context of south India by Nilakantha Shartri who argued for the existence of village community as self governing autonomous authority within the larger framework of centralized Chola polity. See, K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *Studies in Chola History and Administration.* Madras, (1932).

6   This is particularly true of the way R.S.Sharma treats the rural settlements and society in his seminal work on the origin of feudal social formation. Prof Sharma would like us to believe that initially the rural settlements were part of power structure and the king exercised an absolute control overt its, including its resource. This unbridled control gave the monarch the authority to donate them, as and when he wished to do so, to whomsoever he wanted. However,

available generalizations about the rural settlements and society are largely superficial in nature and do not help us to understand how the agrarian resources were managed by the village communities and how the existing apex authority reached out to rural society, particularly at the time of the transfer of land and its other resources which was central to their life[7].

The present paper makes a foray into these issues of understanding how rural settlements and society were located vis-a vis the existing larger authority structure which invariably figure as the sole authority in the land charters which records the transfer of agrarian settlements and its varied resources. The exercise involves the interrogation of the structure and the processes involved in the transfer of agrarian settlements and its resources by linking together pieces of evidence culled from the land charters the spatial context of which relates to the region of Vidarbha plain[8].

---

once donated the same rural settlement starts existing outside the state structure and its relationship with state starts getting mediated through the recipients of the rural settlements, generally described as the feudal lords or *s manta. See R.S.Sharma, Indian Feudalism, C. AD 300-1200*, 3rd RevisedEdition, Delhi, 2005

7   It may, however be stated that the insights offered by historians like D.D.Kosambi and R.S.Sharma in the context of early medieval agrarian order has significantly changed the approach to rural settlements and society by bringing into discussion several new dimensions which were not part of earlier historiography on rural settlements and society. See D.D. *Kosambi, An Introduction to the study of Indian society*, Bombay, 1956; R.S. Sharma, *Indian Feudalism, c. AD 300-1200*, Calcutta, 1956. However B.D. Chattopadhyay's, *Aspects of Rural Settlements and Rural Society in Early Medieval India*, Calcutta 1990, stands out in terms of breaking new grounds in rural historiography.The slim monograph on rural settlements and society analyses epigraphic data on rural settlements and society from three regions to bring out how new beginning in this direction can be made on the basis of exiting epigraphic records .Also see B.P. Sahu (ed), Land System and Rural Society in Early India, New Delhi, 2003.

8   The region is a distinct physical and cultural region and largely consists of the area drained by Wardha and Wainganga rivers, which are the two important tributaries of the Godavari river. The Wardha rises in the Betul district of M.P. It enters Maharashtra after traveling about 32 km from its source and joins the

The evidence examined consists of three sets of land charters, ranging in time from 5th to the 9th century. These three sets of charters were issued by three different powers which controlled the region under discussion at different points of time. The first set of five charters, falling within the time span of 5th century, belongs to the main branch of the Vakatakas. The second set consists of four charters, issued by the Vidarbha branch of Rashtrakuta[9]. They fall within the period of the 6th and the 7th century. The last set consists of four charters, covering the time span of 8th and 9th century, relates to the Malkheda or the Imperial branch of Rashtrakuta. In our endeavor to understand the issue under discussion, several components in the total structure of the land charters, particularly the nature of authority behind the grant, the manner and the context in which the representatives of the apparatus of the state and different members of rural community figures at various levels of the process of the transfer of agrarian resources, the phraseology used to communicate the transfer etc would be taken up for analysis. These evidences, taken together with other relevant component of land charter, one hopes, would bring out, not only the structure and the process involved in the process of the transfer of resources but would also throw pointers which may bear upon our understanding of the nature of linkages between the apex political organization and the

---

Wainganga at an elevation of 146 mts. draining an area of about 24,087 km. The Wainganga rises in the Seoni district of M.P. and drains an area of about 61,093 sq.km. The combined drained area of these two tributaries includes a distinct physical and cultural region known as the Vidarbha plain. This area used to be thickly forested and inhabited by primitive tribes. See *Report of the Irrigation Commission*, Vol. III,.part II, 1972,p.119, also R.L. Singh (ed).1971,p.732

9   It is in this region that we see the emergence of one of the early house of the Râ rakû as, popularly known as the Vidharbha branch of the Râ rakû as. All the property transfer documents issued by the rulers of this house relate to this region. Even their centers of authority issuing the charters were located in this area only. The area however, did not remain with them for longer period as it was appropriated by the Malkhed branch of the Râ rakû as towards the close of the eighth century. This branch has been referred to variously by different scholars; see for example A.S. Altekar, Râ rakû as, 1967, A.P. Madan, *The History of the Rashtrakuta,* New Delhi, 1990.

various components of rural society. Since one is also seeking to locate elements of change and continuity in the structure and process of transfer over time, it has been decided to treat the data by century.

Fifth Century

Let me start the discussion by taking up the four land charters issued by the main branch of the Vakatakas[10]. One of the earliest land charters of this branch recording transfer of agrarian settlements alongwith its resources in this region is the Poona plates of Prabhavatigupta datable to AD 418[11]. The charter was issued from Nandi-vardhana[12] by Prabhavatigupta, the chief queen of the Vakataka Maharaja Rudrasena[13]. If the mode of address and the legend of the seal[14] is any indication, the queen decidedly enjoyed the sovereign authority to affect the transfer. The property being transferred through the charter consisted of a *grama*[15], which was part of an Supratishtha *ahara*[16] alongside certain

---

10   For a discussion on the discussion on rural settlements in the kingdom of Vakataka and the cartographic representation of their distribution, see Krishna Mohan Shrimali, Agrarian structure in Central India and the northern Deccan, A study in Vakataskas inscription,delhi, 1987

11   *CII*, Vol. V, *Inscription of thre Vakatakas*, (ed), V.V.Mirashi, Ootacamund, 1963, p.5-9, also see Krishna Mohan Shrimali, *Agrarian Structure in Central and the Northern Deccan, A Study in Vakataka Inscriptions*, Delhi, 1987, p.85-86

12   The place has been identified with modern Nagardhan,near Ramtek, about twenty miles from Nagpur., CII. Op.cit, p.xxiii

13   She has bee described as the *agra-mahishi* (crowned queen) of Rudrasena II

14   The charter carries a seal which reads as: '(This is) the enemy-chastising command of the Mother of the Yuvaraja, the ornament of the Vakatakas, who has attained royal fortune by inheritance'. Ibid, p.8

15   The donated village was called Danguna, which was situated in the ahara of Supiratishtha and its boundaries consisted of the following: to the east ofVilavanaka, to the south of Sirshagrama, to the west of Kadapinjana and to the north of Sidivivaraka, as

16   The term ahara has generally been taken to represent an administrative unit like contemporary district. See D.C.Sircar,*Indian Epigraphical Glossary*, 1966p.12

exemption[17] in favor of a the recipient of grant who was possibly a brahman[18].

What is however, important for us is the list of those who were communicated the transfer. It consisted of "*gr maku umbinnas,*(the householders of the village), *Br hma as* and others[19], which possibly included those, apart from the householders of the village, residing in the village. This charter, we are told was engraved by a private individual named Ghakradasa.

The second charter[20] recording transfer of rural settlements called Kothuraka *grama* located in the same *ahara* as the earlier one[21] was issued by Pravarasena II who enjoyed the sovereign authority. It was again issued from the same place Nandivardhana and the donated property was located in the Wardha district.

Though the charters largely follow the same pattern and phraseology as the earlier one, two points of difference may be pointed. The first one is that the list of those who were communicated the order was not the same. Now instead of members of local community we have 'officials of noble birth[22], who were employed by the order of the *Sarv- dhyaksha*[23] and

17   This portion starts with the term *agrah rapaih ra*. Fro details see ll. 16-18

18   The name of the donee is Acharya Ghanalasvamm, his cate has not been mentioned in the inscription.

19   See ll.

20   Jamb Plates of Pravarasena II, CII,op.cit, p.10-15, also *Agrarian Structure in Central and the Northern Deccan.. op.cit,* p.87-88

21   village named Kothuraka (*Kothuraka n ma-gr ma*), which was located in an *h ra.* The donated village lay to the west of the river Uma, to the north of Ghinchapa, to the east of Bonthikavataka and to the south of Mandukigrama.

22   The term used is *Kulaputra* whose primary function was to maintain law and order.

23   The term literally meant a general superintendent, probably the chief minister or administrator and same as *Sarva- dhik rin*; see D.C. Sircar, *Indian Epigraphical Glossary,* Delhi,1966, p.303

soldiers and policemen[24]. The other difference is that unlike the earlier charter, the order of transfer was not communicated, at least to official, at the time of transfer, rather they all were made aware of the act of transfer and its terms and conditions before the transfer was made public[25].

The other state functionary which figures in this context is the *Dutaka* and, unlike the earlier charter now we have a writer, not engraver, of the charter who did not carry any official designation.

The third charter, which is a set of two charters, was issued by the same ruler in eleventh year of his reign[26] from the same place as earlier. Both the charter together speaks of the transfer of three rural settlements[27], one of which was located in a *bhkti* [28] and grant of certain exemption[29]. The description of the details of the transfer and the list of those communicated is the same[30]. The only difference that we see is that instead of inscriber now we have the description of *senapati* as the writer of the charter.

---

24   The term used is *bha s-ch tras*; for explanation of the term see CII, op .cit,xxxvii

25   It is stated that the officials are directed by the command which is already well known to them.

26   Belora Plates (Sets A And B) ff Pravarasena II, CII, p.16-21,

27   The first charter record the grant of the village Mahalla-Lata in the Asi bhukti, which was situated in the marga (subdivision) of Sailapura, while the second register the donation of two villages, viz..Dirghadraha in the Pakkanarashtra and Mahallama-Lata.

28   The first charter records the donation of village Mahalla-Lata in Asi *bhukti*, which was situated at the *marg* of Sailapura.

29   All the three settlements have been located in the Amravati district.

30   Exp.used: *j -sa ch ri-kulaputra- dhikrit bha -chh tr -cha* (Our officials of noble birth, who are employed by the order of the Sarvddhyaksha (General Superintendent) and who exercise their authority by (Our) command, and (our) Soldiers and Policemen should be directed by the (following command) which is already well-known'

The next charter issued by the same ruler in the 18th year of his region[31]. It was issued from Pravarapura which seemed to have been a new centre of authority[32]. Pravarsena made the grant at the request of Kondaraja, the son of Satrughnaraja[33].

The charter speaks of the transfer of the village Charmanka situated on the bank of the Madhunadi in the *rajya* (division) of Bhojakata which consisted of 8000 *nivartanas* by the royal measure. The donees were a thousand Brahmans.

The list of the addressees and the form of the address remains the same as obtainable in the earlier charter[34]. However, what is noteworthy is the condition which was imposed on the recipients of the grant for its continuation. The terms for the continuation of the grant states that the no recipients would indulge in the act of treason against the kingdom consisting of seven constituents of the (future) kings[35]; not to be found guilty of the murder of a Brahmana, theft, adultery and high treason, etc.; that they would not wage war; and that they shall do no harm to other villages. It is further stated that in case of the violation of these condition the king shall takes the land away from them[36].

At the end of the charter we are told that it was written by Chitravarman who held the position of *Senapati*.

---

31   Chammak Plates Pravarasena II, CII, p.22-27, also *Agrarian Structure in Central and the Northern Deccan.. loc.cit, p.90-91, alsop.40-41*

32   The place has been identified with …..

33   The authority status of Kondaraja has not been stated in the charter.

34   Exp.used: *j̄ -sa ch ri-kulaputra- dhikrit bha̅ -chh tr -cha* (Our officials of noble birth, who are employed by the order of the Sarvddhyaksha (General Superintendent) and who exercise their authority by (Our) command, and (our) Soldiers and Policemen should be directed by the (following command) which is already well-known'

35   The seven elements of state referred to are the King,, his minister, ally, territory, treasure, fortess and army. See CII, op.cit, p.26,fn.2

36   The condition of the grant reada as follows: " (This grant shall be enjoyed by the Brdhmarias) as long as the sun and the moon will endure, provided that they commit no treason against the kingdom consisting of seven constituents

We have one charter the spatial context of which relates to the modern Amravati district. The authority behind the issuance of the charter was one of Mahadevi Prabhavatigupta, who has been described as the chief queen of the Vakataka Maharajaa Rudrasena II and the mother of the Vesakataka Maharaja Damodarasena Pravarasena. The charter is dated in the 19th regnal year of the Vakataka king Pravarasena II.

The property transfer by Mahadevi Prabhavatigupta through this charter consisted of a field (*kshetra*) together with a house and four huts of farmers[37]. The said properties, we are told, was located in Asvatthanagara[38] which was included in the *marga* (subdivision) of Kosika. The recipients were Brahmanas, who were of the Parasara *gotra* and the Taittirlya *sakha*. It may be mentioned that the property under transfer was being enjoyed so far by certain Bhuktaka.

Significantly enough, even though the process of transfer involved the transfer of right to use the properties from one person to another, the charter does not mention the involvement of any state functionaries in the entire process. Instead, the people involved were the *Mahattaras*[39] (village elder) of the village led by the Brahmanas, possibly residing in the Asvatthanagara.

The last charter that we take up for discussion is Pattan Plates of Pravarasena II which has been discovered at Pattan, a village in

---

of the (uture) kings ; that they are not found guilty of the murder of a Brahmana, theft, adultery and high treason, etc.; that they do not wage war; {and} that they do no harm to other villages. But if they act otherwise or assent to such acts, the king will commit no theft if he takes the land away {from them}.see Ibid, ll.39-44

37   Expression used :*sa-krasaka-nivesanani*; CII,. Op.Cit,p.36,l.15

38   Asvatthanagara has been identified with Asatpur in the Achalpur tahsil of the Amaravatl District of Vidarbha

39   The term has also been taken to represent an elder of the town or village, a village headman, or head of the family or community. See, *Indian Epigraphical Glossary*, 1966,p.191

the Multai tahsil of the Betul[40]. It was issued in his 27th regnal year which would correspond to AD 447.

The charter speaks of the donation of four hundred *nivartanas* of land by the royal measure, (*rajakiyamanen*) in a village which was part of two tired administrative unit[41].

The details of the charter also reveal that it was issued from the capital city of the Vakataks by the sovereign authority and that it was done at the request of certain Narayanaraja whose authority status is not specified.

What is noteworthy about the transfer of the village is that it was affected by the apex authority of the region from his centre of authority and, that the village in which this transfer took place was part of at least two tired administrative division, yet nowhere does the representative of state apparatus figure in the charter. All we have is the references to the residents of the village led by the Brahmanas as the addressee of the transfer. Further, we also have certainKalidasa, a servant of the *Senapati,* as the writer of the inscription and goldsmith Isvaradatta, a servant of Kaondaraja, as the inscriber of the charter. Even the executors of this royal charter, Pitamaha and Nanda, were not the representative of state apparatus.

---

40   CII, op.cit, pp.57-

41   the village Asvatthakhetoka located in the *marga* of Varadakheta which was included in the *bhoga* of Lohanagara

II

Sixth century

Now we take up the land charters issued by Vidarbha branch of the Rashtrakuta[42] who controlled the area from 6th to 8th century AD.

The first charter that we have of this dynasty is known as the Nagardhan plates of *Svâmirâja,* datable to AD 573[43]. It is purported to have been issued from a place called *Nândîvardhana* which incidentally was also the centre of authority during the Vakatakas.

The charter consists of three copper plates[44] and refers to the reign of *Sv mir ja* in the beginning and then projects his younger brother Nannaraja as the donor. However, it also carries a seal; the lower part of which has a legend which reads as '*ga a-dattih*' suggesting thereby that the real donor was a corporation (*Ga? a)*.

The charter records two donations[45]. The first one, consisting of twelve *nivartanas*, was made by *Nannar ja* at the request of the

---

42   Attempts have been made by A.S. Altekar to connect this house with the Malkhed house of Râ rakû as, See A.S.Altekar, Râ rakû as…,1967, …….loc. cit, p. 10. However, Prof. Mirashi has strongly argued against it and has also suggested that both the houses were ruling contemporaneously over two different regions. See V.V.Mirashi, 'Tivarkheda Plates of Nannarâja' in *Studies in Indology,* Vol.II, …..loc. cit, pp.25-30

43   Nagardhan plates of Svamiraja, EI,XXVIII,pp1-16. H.C.Thosar, however, would like us to believe that Svâmirâja of this plate was not a Râ rakû a ruler, rather he is the same as Svamiraja of the Châlukya dynasty who was killed by Ma glesa. See, H.S.Thosar, 'Re-examination of the Historical contents of the Nagardhan Plates of Svâmirâja and the Rithapur grants of Nala King Arthapati', in *Journal of the Epigraphical Society of India*, XX,1994,pp.12-25.

44   Nagardhan plates of Svamiraja, *EI*,XXVIII,pp.1-11

45   This charter carries a list of rights and privileges that were transferred in favor of the donee. The section of the charters dealing with the rights and privileges of the donee begins with expression '*â-candr-ârk-âr ava-k iti-sarit-parvata-sama-kâlin-putra-pautr-ânvaya-kram-opabhogya…* After this, the charter precedes on to list the following exemptions which the donated *grâma* was

president (*sthavra)* and members of the executive committee (*pram khas*) of the assembly (*sam ha*) of the corporation (*ga? a*) *mah m traga? a*[46]. The charter also goes on to mention the executive committee of the *sam ha* which consisted of the *following:*

1. *Kalî? ga,* the president (*sthavira*) of the *Mahâ-M traga? a,*

2. *K ?abha, R lad va Prad phbah?a,* two *ivad vabha?as, M ?risv min, Gu? ad va, K ? kabha?a, Asangata.*

3. The physician of elephant (*hasti-vaidya*) named *S masv min*

4. The chief of the elephant corps (*p lu-pati*) named M ll yika and Prabh kara.

The second grant which consisted of a *gr ma* was made by *Nannar ja* on his own account.

The passage relating to the addressees begins with the statements that Nannar ja, the donor, honors all (his officers) and then goes on to address the grant to *'R jasth n ya, Uparika, D ?? ap ika, Ch ?a, Bha?a, D ta-sampr sha? ika,* and *Dr ? gika.* The list seems not to have been exhaustive as it ends with the term adin. The list is indicative of the involvement in the process of transfer of the multiple layers of state apparatus, as all those who figure in the list are state officials.

However, apart from the list of state functionaries two more points needs to be noted. The first is the reference to 'the future *vishayapati* and *bhôgapati* (*ch- g mi-vishaya-bh gapati*). It is pertinent to note that the reference to *vishayapati* and *bh gapati* do not occur in the context of the list of the state functionaries, rather they have been refereed to separately at the fag end of the charter. Further,

---

granted:*sarva-ditya*: *vi ika*:   *Jêmaka-kara-bhâra parihîna* : *sarv-âdâya-vi uddh*: *antah-siddhika.*

46   Bhindon plates of Rashtrakuta Kakkarâja, *Journal of Epigraphic society of India* (hereafter referred to as *JESI),*X,pp.30-35. The charter carries no date and the dating has been done on the basis of paleography.

neither of the property has been stated to be part of any *bh ga* or *vishaya.* It is also important to note that, the authority behind the grant is not addressing them the way it does to state functionaries; rather they are being 'requested to consent to and preserve the grant' (emphasis mine). These points taken together may point to them being not part of regular state functionaries, as has generally been understood. Whatever may be their status, they seem not to have been part of state apparatus and yet they seem to have been too important in the given agrarian setup to be ignored in the process of the transfer.

Another point relates to the reference to the engraver, of the charter. Usually the charter refers to its writer at the end but what we have here is the name of the engraver who has been described as Kshatriya *Durg ditya.* The fact that his name and caste were found important enough to be referred to, not his official status, in the inscription makes it highly unlikely that he was part of state functionary.

Lastly, the details of *gana* by name and designation are also significant. Apart from the legend of the seal which describes the transfer by member of community, and not by the apex authority, and the recorded details of members is a clear indication of dominant role played by local community in the process of transfer of agrarian settlements and its resources.

Seventh Century

In the subsequent century we have three land charters belonging to the house of Vidarbha, speaking of transfer of landed properties in the region.

The earliest charter in this group seems to have been issued some time after the close of the seventh or the beginning of the eighth-century[47]. It consists of three plates and carries a seal with a legend which reads as *r -Prat pa lasya.* On the top of the legend is

---

47   It is stated in the charter that the gifted village was bounded on the north by

a symbol which is probably a Nandipada.

The charter records Sv mir ja as the donor. He is stated to have made the donation of a *gr ma* whose boundaries have also been specified[48]. It may be mentioned that though Sv mir ja has been recorded as the donor, he seemed not to have the authority to make it operative on his own right as we are told that the consent of Prat pa ila Karkkar ja was sought before the grant was made[49].

Unlike the earlier charter, the present one does not offer any list of addressee; instead it mention two witnesses in whose presence the grant was made[50]. They are *sandhivigraha*[51], and a *purôhita*. Of these, *sandhivigraha*, represented minister of peace and war who was also often the writer of important documents[52]. However, *Purohita* is generally taken to mean a family priest or the royal priest who often found mentioned among the list of state functionaries[53]. However, as far as the present charter is concerned we do not have any supportive evidence to assume that *Purohita* necessarily was part of state functionary. Thus, apart from *Sandhivigraha* we are not sure of the involvement of any other representative of state authority in the process of village transfer.

---

two *a vattha* trees while, on the three remaining quarters , viz.,the east ,south and west , it was bounded by two rivers,ibid,p.32

48   Though we are told that the grant was made when the donor was encamped at a place called Pi galik -ta ka, we have no way to ascertained that this was also the place of the issue of the charter.

49   Ibid, Exp.used : `san[dhi]v?ishabha-purôhita-samaksha datt[h]*,L.22,p.35

50   Ibid. The editor of the inscription would like us to believe that that the engraver was not able to follow the lines of the letters *vigraha* correctly and had thus *mis-inscribed* the word as *v?ishabha*.It should therefore be read as *sandhivigraha*.p.31

51   D.C.Sircar,1966,p.295

52   Ibid,p.266

53   Tiwarkhed plates of the Rashtrakuta Nannaraja, *EI*,XI,pp.276-280

Another charter issued in AD 631[54] records the transfer of pieces of lands by different authorities at two different occasions. It may be mentioned that at least in one case the place of making the grant and the place from which the charter was issued were not the same. While the grant seems to have been made at the Kapil - *t rtha,* the charter was issued from a place called Achalapura which has been referred to right at the beginning of the charter[55]

As to the details of the donations and the donors, we are told that the first donor was Nannar ja, who had attained the five great sounds[56]. He made a donation of fifty *nivartanas* of land, not directly but through the hands of illustrious ankarga? a. No information is given as to who this ankarga? a was.

The second grant, which consisted of fifty *nivartanas* of land, seemed to have been made jointly by the same set of donors.

The third grant, which consisted of ten *nivartanas* of land, was made jointly by *G vinda,* who has been described as *dharmaka a*, and Narasi? ha who has been described as *mah sandhivigrahin.* As to the term *dharmaka a* it has been suggested that it should be read as either *dharmaka a* or *dharm ?ku a*[57] which possibly meant in-charge of religious affairs[58]. As to the term *mah sandhivigrahin,* it has generally been used to represent the office of the minister for peace and war or of foreign affairs[59]

Apart from referring to the status of the authorities of the donors, the charter does not speak of the involvement of other

---

54   The charter opens with the following expression: "Om Sva-Achalapur d vist r " ibid,L.1.,p.279

55   The donor has been described as '…parama-brahma?ya? pr pta-pañchamah abda? r - Nannar ja…' ibid,p.279,ll-5-6.

56   Ibid,p.279,fn.13

57   Ibid,p.277

58   D.C.Sircar,p.188

59   Sangalooda Plates of Rashtrakuta Nannaraja: Saka 615, *EI,*XXIX,pp 109-115

authority, even though the charter was issued from a place which appears to have been the centre of authority.

The next charter datable to AD 693[60] consists of a set of three plates and also carry a seal containing the legend r -Juddh surah and an emblem which looks like a flying *garu? a*. It was issued by R ??rak ?as Nannar ja who has been referred to without any title which may indicate his status. The purpose of the charter is to record gift of lands (*ksh tra*) by him which were part of two different *gr mas*. The charter is stated to have been issued from a place called Padmanagara and the way it figures in the charter gives the impression of its being a centre of authority.

The charter offers a list of addressee which is longer than those obtainable in the earlier charters and it runs as follows:*râja-sâmantavishayapati,grâma-bhôgika, purillaka,câ a-bha a sevaka âdin*[61].

The last three, ie, *Purillaka,Câ a-bha a Sêvaka âdin*[62] were decidedly part of the state administrative apparatus. However, one would like to draw attention to the references to the first three who possibly cannot be treated the same as the last three.

I.   *r ja-s manta:* the has been taken to mean a feudatory *s manta* enjoying the designation of *rajan* also whose basis of power was land that he controlled[63]. Now the question is: can we take him to be a state functionary?   In the absence of any decisive evidence, it may not be wrong to suggest that possibly *r ja-s manta* represented a class of

60   The list runs as follow: " r -Juddh sura- paran m sa-sarv nn n va r ja-s manta-
      vishayapati-gr ma-bh gika-purillaka-ch a-bha a-s vak- d n,Ibid, p.115,L14-15

61   *Purillaka*: the term has been taken to mean 'the Mayor of the town.

62   *ii.   câ a-bha a*: The term *bha a* refers to king's *pâiks* and *pîadas* and the term *câ a*
      has been taken to mean the leader of the group of *pâiks* and *pîadas*.

      iii.   sevaka: it would normally mean somebody who serves. It is however, also
      used in the sense of a soldier.

63   See D.C.Sircar,1966,p.272

local landed magnets and they were influential enough to find a place in the list of addressees.

II. *vishayapati*: This term also occurs in the first charter of the house, ie, the Nagardhan plates of *Svâmirâja* is datable to AD 573, however, the manner of occurrence in this context is different. While in the Nagardhan plates it has been referred to separately and was requested to consent and preserve the grant, no such request is made here in this charter and it occurs in the list consisting of state officials. However, the fact that there is no reference of *vishaya* in any context in the charter, it is little difficult to believe that he really was part of state administration. It can also have different implication to which we shall turn to at the end of discussion.

III. *grâma-bhôgika*: This designation probably represent the one who enjoys a village as a free holding[64] and thus represented the dominant landed class of the locality.

Thus apart from state officials the involvement of other non state agents representing dominant land holding classes is also present in the process of transfer.

The last charter of the house was issued in the beginning of the 8th century some time around c. AD 708[65]. It also consists of three plates and the ring carries a seal which consists of a figure of *Garu?a* with a legend *r -Juddh surah*. The donor in this case is named as *Nandar ja* who seemed to be the same person who has been referred to in the earlier charters[66]. The object of donation was a *gr ma* whose boundaries have also been specified in the charter.

However, like the charters of the 7th century discussed above,

---

64   Ibid,p.120

65   Multai copper plate grant of Nandaraja, *I A*,(August 1889)

66   Tiwarkhed plates of Nanaraja,… loc.cit.

67   Ibid, Exp. used :*sarvvaneva raja-samanta-vishayapati-gramabhogik- adin samanubodhayati*,L.15-16

in this case, too, we are provided with a list of addressee which runs as `*râja-sâmantas, vishayapatis, gramabhojakas,* and others (*âdin*)[67]. What is significant is that while the references to all the non-state functionaries of the Sanglooda charter, discussed above, continues to figure in this charter too, the state functionaries in this charter have been reduced to the categories of (*âdin*).

The only clear reference to the state functionary, apart from the authority behind the grant, that occurs in the context of the transfer is the writer of the inscription, who has been described as a *sandhivigrahika* called Nâula.

Eighth Century

After the issuance of the last charter by the house of Vidarbha in the fist decades of the 8th century, the political configuration in the area under discussion seemed to have been altered. To begin with, the house of Vidarbha disappears altogether and now has evidence of the emergence of the Rashtakutas of Malkheda. By the end of the first half of the period the house managed to transform itself into a trans-local / imperial power. We also notice a sudden increase in the frequency in the issuance of charters by the ruler of this house and the geographical distribution of their donative inscriptions point to the fact that all the territorial segments controlled earlier by the house of Vidharbha was integrated as part of their larger territorial domain. These developments, as we shall see, seemed to have had important bearing on the structure and the process of the transfer of agrarian settlements and its resources, at least in this region.

The first charter in this region by the imperial branch of the Rashtrakuta was issued in *c.* AD 772[68] by Krishnaraja. The property being transferred through the charter consisted of some land in a *grâma* measuring hundred *nivartanas.* The people who were informed about the donation were *râ rapati, vi ayapati,* and

---

68   Bhandak plates of Krishanaraja,*EI*,XIV,pp121-130

bhogapati only. We are also told about the writer of the plate named *Vâmana-nâga*. He seemed not to be a regular part of administrative set up.

Till the issuance of this charter the list of member of state apparatus involved in the process of the transfer remains moderate. There is also continuity in the references to the involvements of those representing village notables alongside the members of state apparatus. However the structure and the process in the following period no longer remains the same.

In the next charter of the 8th century[69] that was issued in AD 786 we have reference to the sovereign authority PMP *Dhârâvarsha*. However, the donor was his wife   ila-mahâdêvî who has been described as *'paramê varî parama-bha ârikâ'* and the great queen of PMP *Dhârâvarsha*. The object of donation was a *grâma* which was part of *Nândîpuradvârî vishaya*.

Those who were communicated the transfer of the village included the following: *râ rapati, vi ayapati,, grâmakû a, niyuktaka, yuktaka âdhikârika, mahattara*. Apart from these, there seems to have been others as well as the list ends with âdini.e. etc.

The *dûtaka* of this order was a person called *Somayâji* who has not been given any official designation. However, the writer of the plate has been described as *mahâsandhivigrahin*.

If we compare the list of addressees as given in these two charters of the imperial branch of the Rashtrakuta issued in eighth century, we find the occurrence of certain new designations in the second charter such as:

1. *grâmakû a*: The term has been used to denote the headman of a village or probably a member of the village

---

69   Jethwai Plates of the Rashtrakuta queen Silamahadevi, *EI*,XXII,pp,98-109

70   D.C.Sircar,1966,p121

71   Ibid.,p.221

council[70].

2.   *niyuktak*: This is commonly held to be an   designation of an official who is subordinate to *âyuktaka*[71]

3.   *yuktaka*: It has been suggested that it refers to an officer in general. Its varied form such as *ayuktaka, âyukta* figure in the charters of other periods[72].

4.   *adhikârika*: It is generally taken to represent an officer and is the same as *adhikârin* which occurs in the charters of pre-AD 750.

5.   *mahattara*: The term meant the head of the village. In some records it has also been used to indicate the *mahâjanas* or head of the family or communities, who constituted the village council[73].

6.   *mahâsandhivigrahin*. It is same as *sandhivigrahin* which occurs in the earlier charters also. It is taken to be a designation of the minister for war and peace.

Ninth Century

We have two charters of the ninth century. Both of them were issued by PMP Govinda III. The one datable to AD 800[74] registers grant of a *grâma* to thirteen *brâhma a*s and the transfer of certain fiscal and administrative rights.

The list of addressees as given in the charter is the same as we see in the case of the second charter of the eight century which included *râ rapati,vi ayapati,grâmakû a yuktaka niyuktak, adhikârika mahattara âdin*. The only difference that we find is the occurrence of

---

72   Ibid.pp.386-87

73   Ibid,1965,p.361, Also see B.D.Chattopadhyaya, *Aspects of Rural settlements and Rural Society in Early Medieval India, Calcutta,1990, chapter II,section II.*

74   Anjanvati plates of Govinda III,EI,XXIII,p.8-18

yuktaka before *niyuktak.*

The *dûtaka* of the charter has been descried as   *i Chakkirâja* . The charter also refers to   *i Gauta,* the son of a *sâmanta,* as the writer of the charter.

The second charter datable to AD 803[75] which, as we are told, was drafted in the presence of the king[76] records the donation of a *grâma* along with certain rights and privileges.

As far as the list of the addressees is concerned, most of them are those which are mentioned in his earlier charter. However, the order of the occurrence of those terms is slightly different in this case. The list in the present case reads as *'vi ayapati, râ rapati, bhogapati, grâmakû a ayuktaka, niyuktak, adhikârika, mahattara âdin.* Thus the only new official which figure in this list is the *bhogapati.*

However, what is noteworthy is the way this charter was drafted. We are told that the charter was written in the presence of the king by *Kukkâyya* who was the son of a general (*balâdhik ta*) who have had the privilege of *pañcha-mahâsabda,* and was written by *Dêvayya* who holds the position of the officer in charge of record (*ak apa al-âdhipati*).

The major points flowing from the data discussed above may now be summarized in the form of conclusion. To start with points, somewhat general in nature, our data clearly brings out that the fact that   that the transfer of land or its resources did not take place in isolation involving a simple process of give and take between the donors and the recipients, whatever their authority status might have been. There have invariably been   references to the involvements of different authorities and state functionaries in different capacities in the process of the transfer of resources. However, apart from the references to the involvement of various layers of state officials, no less frequently mentioned in the charters

---

75   Jharika grant of Rashtrakuta Govinda III,EI,XXXII,157-164

76   Ibid, *mahaparamesvara-pratyakshm,*L.73

are individuals or the representatives of village communities, both of the localities of the transfer and outside it, in different contexts. This is suggestive of the fact that the transfer of agrarian resources, land or otherwise, was a matter of concern for the members of rural communities as much as it was for the state and recipients. These evidence taken together one the one hand point to the role of member of rural representative in the matter relating to the managements and control of agrarian resources and the state authority deemed it important to involve them in the process of the transfer; on the other hand it also brings out the fact   that   the entire process of transfer of rural settlements and their resources, took place within an existing societal and governmental structure and that there were certain procedures that required to be followed before the transfer of agrarian resources, whatever may be the basis of the authority of its issue, became effective. This is an important indicator of the role of rural settlements and society in terms of managing its resources and the way they were located in the larger structure of state.

Our discussion also points to the fact that societal and governmental structure was neither uniform nor immutable across time and space and the relation of rural settlements with the existing political authority remains open to reorientation.

In all the charters issued by the *Vakatakas,* we find the involvement of small administrative setups to deal with resource transfer. While the references to the representative of state apparatus are limited and often indirect, the references to different representative of village communities invariably occur at the beginning of the list of addressee in majority of the charters. In fact there have been instances when only the representatives of village community, not the members of state apparatus, which figures in the context of the property transfer, even though the property has been stated to be part of multi-tiered administrative division or the order of the transfer was issued from the centre of authority. This points to the larger autonomy that the rural society enjoyed in the management and the distribution of its resources during the reign

of *Vakatakas.*

The situation did not remain the same, there seemed to have started the process of erosion of the autonomy of rural communities by the end of the 6th century. In comparison to the 5th century charters of the Vakatakas, the charters of the house of Vidarbha, falling in the time period of 6th and 7th century, throws a longer list of state functionaries who were recipients of the communication regarding resource transfer. In fact the detail of the Nagardhan plates which speaks of the transfer of properties by member of *gana* who figure so prominently in the entire process of transfer of resources and yet we also find the presence of various representative of state involved in the entire process of transfer. It may, however, be noted that despite increasing occurrence of the references to the members of various categories of state representatives, the references to different members of rural communities, though not the same as we see in the charter of Vakatakas, continue to figure in the process of transfer. Now we see the inclusion in the list of addressee of groups like *râja-s manta, grâmabhojaka, the future vishyapatis , bhogapti etc.,*which possibly represented the dominant section of the rural society. This goes on to indicate that despite the increasing involvement of larger state apparatus, it was still considered necessary to involve members of village communities to make the entire transfer of resources functional.

Apart from these, a word may be said about the engraver of the charter which invariably figures often in conjunction with the writer in all the charters of the 5th and 6th century. They were drowned from various backgrounds ranging from private individuals to *senapati* to the servant of *senapati.* The situation, however, changes with the beginning of the 7th century. While the reference to the writer remains in continuation, the engraver of the plates no longer figures in the charters of post six century.

By the beginning of the 8th century, we notice further change in process and the structure of the transfer of agrarian resources. Now, the references of representative of state apparatus start

getting longer and also acquire structured form. By the time we reach the period of the Malkheda branch of the Rashtrakuta, we find that while the   list of the members of state apparatus representing various levels of administrative setup have substantially proliferated, the reference to members of village community witnessed a sharp decline. The only visible representative of village communities which figures in the charters issued after the second half of the 8th century, which also coincides with the emergence of the Rahstrakuta as sovereign authority, is *mahattar*. It is pertinent to mentioned that even the order of the place of their occurrence also changes. Now they are being referred only at the end of the list of addressee representing members of state apparatus.

The increasing number of member of state apparatus is an indicative of the increasing bureaucratization at the level of village administration and also greater control of state over the management of agrarian resources. This change may be attributed to the local state formation which was trying to integrate the rural settlements to augment its resource base more strongly than earlier. However, despite the involvement of larger bureaucratic set up of state to integrate the rural settlements, the occurrence of the references to *mahattras* in the list of addressee is a reminder of the presence of members of village communities in the entire process of transfer. However the manner and the place of their occurrence in the list of addressee clearly point to the fact that even *mahattra* became more a part of state apparatus than representative of village communities.

It may be stated at the end that the select evidence examined above and the points emerging out of them may not be enough to offer any generalization at larger level. However, it does indicate the importance of undertaking micro regional study on rural settlements in order to counter several stereotypic notions of rural settlements and society ranging from rural settlement as an undifferentiated landmass, a little republic or a 'self-sufficient', isolated, autonomous unit in space, or a unit of human settlements with 'closed, corporate community'.

References

Altekar, A. S., *A History of village communities in western India,* Bombay, 1927

Chakravarti N.P. (ed) , *Epigraphia Indica* ,Vol XXII, Delhi, 1938

…………………, *Epigraphia Indica* ,Vol ,XXIII, Culcutta,1940

Chhabra, B Ch, *EI*,XXIX(ed), *Epigraphia Indica* Vol.,XXIX, Culcutta, 1955

Fleet, J. F., and Temple, R. C. (eds.) (1889 [reprinted 1984]). *The Indian Antiquary. A Journal of Oriental Research, Archaeology, Epigraphy, Ethnology, Geography, History, Folklore, Languages, Literature, Numismatics, Philosophy, Religion, &c. &c.,* Vol. XVIII – Delhi, 1889

Ghoshal U. N., *Contribution to Hindu revenue system*, Calcutta, 1929

Jain, Ajit Prasad, *Report of the Irrigation Commission*, Vol. III,.part II, New Delhi, 1972

Kosambi ,D.D., *An Introduction to the study of Indian society*, Bombay, 1956

Maine, Sir Henry James Sumner, *Village-Communities in the East and West. Six lectures delivered at Oxford,* London, 1871

Effectiveness of Delivery of Public Services through Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 : A Study of SUWIDHA Centres in District Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar (Punjab)

Jyoti Arora*

Abstract

Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar lies in the south-eastern part of Punjab. It was carved out of Hoshiarpur and Jalandhar districts as the sixteenth district of Punjab State in 1995. It is the leading district in the state in the field of providing citizen services in a transparent and time bound manner using Information Technology. Technology has become an accelerator for enabling more effective government through better access to services and strengthening the democratic process. E-governance has now been widely recognized as a significant mechanism for transformational improvements in quality, efficiency and effectiveness of governance all over the world. SUWIDHA (Single User Friendly Window Disposal and Helpline for Applicants) Centres, an e-governance initiative of the Government of Punjab, promises delivery of multiple services such as birth certificates, ration cards, old age pensions, arms license related services and other essential services through single window system channel in accordance

*Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, Mehr Chand Mahajan DAV College for Women, 36-A Chandigarh

with the Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011. The Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 is a landmark legislation with provisions to ensure time bound delivery of various public services. It provides a mechanism for punishing errant public servants who are found deficient in providing services within the stipulated time. The objective of the present study is to assess this citizen/service seeker-centric mechanism and analyze the perception of service seekers and employees regarding the effectiveness of its working and the services provided by SUWIDHA Centres, under the Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 in the district of SBS Nagar, Punjab.

Keywords: E-governance, SUWIDHA Centres, Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011

Introduction

E-governance is a contemporary concept in administration for trying to involve people in administration and address transparency issues in bureaucracies. The Government of India defines e-governance as 'using Information Technology to bring about Simple, Moral, Accountable, Responsible and Transparent (SMART) governance.[1]

The Right to Service Act, 2011 is based upon the values of citizen's charter. The origin and concept of citizen's charter was first articulated and implemented in the United Kingdom in 1991. The concept of citizen's charter enshrines trust between the service provider and its users. In 1997, at a Chief Minister's Conference, an Action Plan was accepted by central and state governments in India to devise citizen's charters for enterprises with huge civic interface. The Second Administrative Reforms commission (2007)

---

[1]Promoting E-Governance - Department of Administrative Reforms, available at https://darpg.gov.in/sites/default/files/promoting_egov11.pdf (accessed on 4 April, 2016)

headed by Verappa Moily suggested that citizen's charters should stipulate penalties for non-compliance. The standing committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice proposed providing statutory grade to grievance redressal mechanisms in 2008. The Central Information Commission also suggested that grievance redressal systems should be accurately strengthened to lessen the appliance of the Right to Information Act, 2005 to redress grievances of the citizen's charter. In 2009, the then former President of India Shrimati Pratibha Patil, in her address to Parliament had stated that the government would guarantee effective and efficient delivery of community services. The standing committee that had scrutinized the Lokpal Bill, 2011 suggested the creation of a separate legislation to pact with citizen's charter and grievance redressal. The Parliament on August 27, 2011 while adopting the 'Sense of the House' resolution on Lokpal, agreed in principle to the establishment of a citizen charter and grievance redressal bill in India and made it obligatory for the state government and its agencies to extend services to communities within stipulated time frame.[2]

The Citizen's Charter and Grievance Redressal Bill 2011 is also known as 'The Right of Citizens for Time bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill, 2011. Right to Public Services Act in India comprises of statutory laws which guarantee time bound delivery of services for various public goods and services provided by the government to citizens and ensuring mechanisms for penalizing the errant public servant who is lacking in providing the service within the stipulated time. The objective of this act is to reduce corruption, to enhance transparency and public accountability among the government officials. Madhya Pradesh was the first state in India to enact Right to Service Act on 18 August 2010 and Bihar was the second one to enact this act on 25 July 2011. Several other states like Bihar, Punjab, Rajasthan, Kerala Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh

---

[2] Legislative Brief PRS, available at www.prsindia.org, (accessed on 5 April, 2016).

have introduced similar Right to Service Acts as mentioned in Table1:

Table 1
Implementation of Right to Service in various states of India

Title of the Act	Date and Year of enactment
The Madhya Pradesh Lok Sewaon Ke Pradan Ki Guarantee Adhiniyam, 2010	August 18, 2010
The Uttar Pradesh Janhit Guarantee Adhyadesh, 2011	January 13, 2011
The Jammu and Kashmir Public Services Guarantee Act, 2011	April 13, 2011
The Delhi (Right of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery of Services) Act, 2011	April 28, 2011
The Bihar Right to Public Services Act, 2011	August 15, 2011
The Rajasthan Guaranteed Delivery of Public Services Act, 2011	September 21, 2011
The Uttarakhand Right to Service Act, 2011	October 4, 2011
The Himachal Pradesh Public Services Guarantee Act, 2011	October 17, 2011
The Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011	October 20, 2011
The Jharkhand Right to Service Act, 2011	November 15, 2011
The Chhattisgarh Lok Seva Guarantee Act, 2011	December 12, 2011
The Assam Right to Public Services Act, 2012	March 29, 2012
The Karnataka (Right Of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery Of Services) Bill, 2011	April 2, 2012
The Kerala Right to Service Bill, 2012	July 27, 2012
The Odisha Right to Public Services Act, 2012	September 6, 2012
The Gujarat (Right of Citizens to Public Services) Bill, 2013	April 1, 2013
The Goa (Right of Citizens to Time-Bound. Delivery of Public Services) Bill, 2013	May 2, 2013

Source: Right to Public Services legislation, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Right_to_Public_Services_legislation (accessed on 16 June, 2015).

Punjab Right to Service Act 2011

This comprehensive Act is a vital initiative by the Government of Punjab to introduce governance reforms. The Government of Punjab, with a motive to deliver essential services to the people of the state within stipulated time, notified the Punjab Right to Service ordinance on 14th of July, 2011. The ordinance came into effect, w.e.f, 28 July, 2011 when 67 services were notified under its provisions. Soon after, Punjab Right to Service Act-2011(PRTS Act-2011) was passed by the State Assembly and thus it came into effect on 20th October, 2011 as per Department of Legal and Legislative Affairs, Punjab, Notification: The 20th October, 2011 No.37-leg/2011.

As of now, 351 public services by 28 government departments including revenue, transport, health, agriculture, food and civil supplies, police, personnel, housing, local government and home etc. have been notified under the Act. There is a provision in the Act according to which more services can be notified later, if needed.

Punjab Right to Service act 2011 contains the following provisions[3] :

1. Citizen's Charter/Display Boards: The Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 requires public authorities to publish a citizen's charter or put up display boards at SUWIDHA Centres within six months of enactment of this Act containing the following details such as:

    •   Logo of Right to Service Act
    •   Serial number
    •   Stipulated time
    •   Designated officer
    •   First appellate authority
    •   Second appellate authority

---

[3] See Right to Service Commission Punjab : Act and Rules, rtspunjab.gov.in/Act.aspx, (accessed on 10 May, 2016)

- Telephone number of the helpline. The citizen's charter should specify the services and quality of services to be provided by the public authority. The head of departments will be responsible for disseminating and updating the citizen's charter.

2. Complainants: All people are eligible to obtain the services.

3. Entities to which the Act applies : The Government of Punjab

4. Public authorities and grievance redressal mechanism:

   a) Designated Officer: Designated Officer' means an officer as notified under section 3. In each government department, the government is required to appoint a Designated Officer. A person eligible to avail any service under the provisions of this Act can write an application to the Designated Officer. The Designated Officer shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (I) admit or reject the application within the specific time period. In case of rejection, the Officer must duly record the reason for the rejection and inform the applicant.

   b) Appellate Authority: Appellate authority comes into action if the designated officer fails to provide the service within specified time. Appellate authority may pass an order either it accepting the appeal or directing the designated officer to provide the service to the eligible person within a specified period. According to an appeal made under sub-section (1) , first appellate authority has to dispose off the appeal within 30 days of its receipt and under sub-section (J) , second appellate authority has to dispose off the appeal within 60 days of its receipt. An opportunity of hearing to the eligible person shall be granted by the Appellant Authority.   The first and second appellate authorities have the power of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in order to summon a designated officer and

applicant and in production and inspection of documents and other matters according to this act. If the Second Appellate Authority is convinced that the Designated Officer and/or any other official involved in the process of delivering such service has/have failed to provide service without sufficient and reasonable cause, it may impose a lump sum penalty on the Designated Officer and/or any other official involved in the process of providing such service, which shall not be less than rupees five hundred and not more than rupees five thousand and where the Second Appellate Authority is of the opinion that the Designated Officer and/or any other official involved in the process of providing such service has/have caused undue delay in providing the service, it may impose a penalty at the rate of rupees two' hundred and fifty per day for such delay on the Designated Officer and/or any official involved in the process of providing such service, which shall not be more than rupees five thousand. Provided that the Designated Officer and/or any other official involved in the process of providing such service shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him/them under sub-clauses (a) and (b). The Second Appellate Authority may, by an order, give such amount as compensation to the appellant out of the amount of the penalty imposed under sub-section (I), as may be specified by it, which shall not exceed the total amount of the penalty so imposed. The Second Appellate Authority may, if it is satisfied that the Designated Officer and/or any other official involved in the process of providing such service has/have tailed to discharge the duties assigned under this Act without sufficient and reasonable cause, recommend disciplinary action against the defaulters under the service rules applicable to them in addition to the penalty imposed under sub-section (1).

c) Punjab Right to Service Commission: Punjab was the first state in the country to constitute the Punjab Right to Service Commission (PRTS) after implementing the Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011. Any person who is aggrieved by an order of Second Appellate authority may make an application for revision of the said order to the PRTS Commission within a maximum period of 60 days. The Commission will also listen to revision applications against the commands of the second appellate authority. While deciding the revision petitions or otherwise impose a penalty up to Rs 10,000 per case on the Designated Officer or any other Officer or Official involved in the process of providing service under the Act, if the commission is of the view point that the person concerned has failed without sufficient cause in due discharge of the duty cast on him. Provided that the person concerned shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him. Provided further that the Commission, by an order, give such amount as compensation to the appellant out of the amount of penalty imposed, as may be specified by it, which shall not exceed the total amount of penalty so imposed. (Amendment in Section 17 of Punjab Act 24 of 2011). The Commission was constituted on 23rd November, 2011. The Commission may entertain the application after 60 days in case of logical cause for delay. As per section 12 of the PRTS Act, 2011, there is a provision to constitute Punjab Right to Service Commission (PRTSC) consisting of 1 Chief Commissioner and 10 Commissioners entrusted with the responsibility of making proposal to the state government for ensuring better delivery of services and also to look after the task of making suggestions to the state government. The Chief Commissioner shall preside over the meetings of the Commission as well as exercise and discharge the powers

and functions of the Commission vested in him in accordance with the regulations framed under sub-section (4) of section 17.

Punjab Right to Service Act 2011 and SUWIDHA Centres

The objective of the implementation of the Punjab Right to Services Act, 2011 through SUWIDHA Centres is to reform the administrative set up for ensuring good governance; to fix accountability on a single official accountable for the service; to empower the citizen's to avail the services as a matter of right; to create a single monitoring system for service delivery; to fix stipulated time limit for each service delivery; reduce human interface by use of information technology and to prevent corrupt practices and enhance government efficiencies. SUWIDHA Centres became operational in Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar district (SBS Nagar) from April, 2004. SUWIDHA Centres were registered under Societies Registration Act (xxi of 1860 and as amended by Punjab amendment act 1957) on 22 February 2006. Initially, SUWIDHA Centres were started by the Government of Punjab in SBS Nagar District by providing technical support and adequate funds. Presently they run on self-sustaining revenue model. SUWIDHA Centres are not merely a software solution; it is a concept to bring about perceptible, measurable and qualitative improvement in the delivery of service by removing the bottlenecks in a conventional delivery system. 46 services, provided by 12 departments, are available in the SBS Nagar district under e-district project. Software's used at SUWIDHA Centres in SBS Nagar District are: SUWIDHA, e district, adhaar etc.

SUWIDHA Centres provide major services under Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 as given in Table 1.1. In the various districts of Punjab, mostly 29 services are available under Punjab Right to Service Act 2011 at the 180 SUWIDHA Centres. The Government of Punjab, has notified the mentioned services out of

351 services, designated officers, first appellate authority/ Grievance Redressal authority, second appellate authority/ Appellate authority and the stipulated time limit for the purposes of Section 3 of the Punjab Right to Service Ordinance 2011,[4] in district Shahid Bhagat Nagar as given below in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1

Services Provided in SUWIDHA Centre under Punjab Right to Service Act 2011

S.No	Name of Service	Given Time limit	Designated Officer	First Appellate Authority	Second Appellate Authority
1	Demarcation of land	45 days (Where police help required within 15 days from the date of orders of concerned district magistrate for such police help	Circle Revenue officer (Tehsildar)	SDM of district SBS Nagar	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
2	Certified copies of all kinds of previously registered documents	7 days	Sub-Registrar or Joint Sub Registrar (in case of Sub-Tehsils)	SDM of district SBS Nagar	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
3	Issuance of Income Certificate	15 days	Tehsildar of district SBS Nagar	SDM of district SBS Nagar	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
4	Issuance of Non-encumbrance certificate	3 days	Circle Revenue Officer (Tehsildar)	SDM of district SBS Nagar	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar

[4] Consolidated list of services notified by the Government of Punjab, Department of Governance Reforms under Section 3 of the Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 wide notification issued no: 5/27/2014-2GR-2/425953/1 dated 02/03/2015 and no. 5/27/2014-2GR-2(PF)/668042/1 dated 15/01/2016. Accessed on (11 April 2017)

5	Certified copies of Birth/death certificates –MC Towns	2 days for current year and 5 days for previous years	Local Registrar, Birth and Death of concerned Municipal Corporation	SDM of district SBS Nagar	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
6	Certified Copies of birth/death certificates – Rural Areas	2 days for current year and 5 days for previous year	Local Registrar, Birth and death of district SBS Nagar	Sub-division magistrate/Additional Deputy Commissioner (General)	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
7	Registration of Death and Birth Certificate (after one year of event)	30 days	SBS Nagar concerned Registrar/SBS Nagar Registrar	Sub-division magistrate/ Additional Deputy Commissioner, SBS Nagar(General)	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
8	Birth and death Certificate (Name Entry and new birth certificate)	7 days	SBS Nagar concerned local/District Registrar as applicable	Sub-division Magistrate/Additional Deputy Commissioner	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
9	Correction of entry in birth and death certificate	15 days	SBS Nagar concerned local/District Registrar as applicable	Sub-division Magistrate/Additional Deputy Commissioner	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
10	Issue of residence certificate etc.	15 days	Tehsildar of SBS Nagar Sub-division	SDM of district SBS Nagar	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
11	(a) Sanction of building plans/ Revised building plans (residential)	(a) 30 days	(a)Commissioner of SBS Nagar Municipal Corporation in corporation cities	(a) Deputy Commissioner of the SBS Nagar District in case of corporation cities.	(a) Commissioner of the district SBS Nagar division
	(b) Sanction building plans (other than of residential)	(b) 60 days	(b) Executive officer of SBS Nagar Municipal council in Municipal towns	(b) SDM of district SBS Nagar Sub-division in case of municipal towns	(b) Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar

12	Sanction of Water Supply connection	7 days	Sub-divisional Engineer	SDM of SBS Nagar sub-division in case of Municipal towns	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
13	(a) Sanction of all social security benefits to old age/handicapped/widow (urban areas) (b) Sanction of all social security benefits to old age/handicapped/widow (rural areas)	(a) 30 days for the first time (b) 30 days for the first time	(a) Executive officer of Municipal council/Nagar Panchayat or Sub-divisional Magistrate (b) Child development project officer or district social security officer	(a) Additional Deputy Commissioner (General) of District SBS Nagar (b) Additional Deputy Commissioner (General) of district SBS Nagar	(a) Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar (b) Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
14	Issue of Identity cards to all categories of handicapped persons	7 days	District Social Security Officer	Additional Deputy Commissioner (General) of district SBS Nagar	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
15	Issue of various certificates like caste, OBC etc	15 days	Tehsildar of district SBS Nagar Sub-division(Balachaur)	SDM of the district SBS Nagar sub-division (Balachaur)	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
16	Registration of marriage under Hindu Marriage act	2 days from the expiry of 15 days notice period as provided in the Hindu Marriage act	Tehsildar of the district SBS Nagar Sub-division (Balachaur)	SDM of district SBS Nagar Sub-division (Balachaur)	Deputy Commissioner of district SBS Nagar
17	Renewal of arm license (if the license is presented before the expiry date and the license issuing district is the same where service has been sought	22 days	Licensing authority (Additional District Magistrate of district SBS Nagar/Deputy Commissioner of Police in case of Police Commissionerate)	District Magistrate of District SBS Nagar/Commissioner of Police	Commissioner of the SBS Nagar division/zonal inspector General of Police
18	Addition/Deletion of weapon (If the license issuing district is the same where service has been sought)	7 days from the expiry of the mandatory notice period of 45 days as provided under the arms act	Licensing authority (Additional district magistrate of district SBS Nagar)/Deputy Commissioner of police in case of commissionerate	District Magistrate of District SBS Nagar/Commissioner of Police	Commissioner of the SBS Nagar division/zonal inspector General of Police

19	Extension of purchase period of weapon (within permissible time period and if the license issuing district is the same where the service has been sought)	7 days	Licensing authority (Additional District Magistrate of District SBS Nagar /Deputy Commissioner of Police in case of Police Commissionerate	District Magistrate of District SBS Nagar/Commissioner of Police	Commissioner of the SBS Nagar division/zonal inspector General of Police
20	NOC for use of loud speakers (applicable only in case of SDM. Obtains NOC from the concerned SHO before granting permission)	5 days	Station house officer of the district SBS Nagar concerned police station or Incharge of the community policing Saanjh Centre at the Sub-division	DSP Incharge of district SBS Nagar Sub-division	Commissioner of Police or Senior Superintendent of Police
21	NOC for fairs/ Melas/Exhibitions/Sports/Events etc	5 days	Station house officer of the district SBS Nagar concerned police station or Incharge of the community policing Saanjh Centre at the Sub-division	DSP Incharge of district SBS Nagar Sub-division	Commissioner of Police or Senior Superintendent of Police
22	Character Verification	10 days	Station house officer of the district SBS Nagar concerned police station and designated officer in the office of commissioner of Police or Senior Superintendent of Police	DSP Incharge of district SBS Nagar Sub-division	Commissioner of Police or Senior Superintendent of Police

Source: Punjab Right to Service Act Display Board SUWIDHA Centres in District Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar.

Objective of the Study

• To analyze the service seekers perception regarding the working and services provided by SUWIDHA Centres under Punjab Right to Service Act 2011 in district SBS Nagar.

• To analyze the employees perception regarding the working in SUWIDHA Centres under Punjab Right to Service Act 2011 in district SBS Nagar.

Research Methodology

For this study, a total sample of fifty service seekers those who have availed the services and twenty five employees from total strength of 50 employees was taken randomly from five SUWIDHA Centres of SBS Nagar District. The five SUWIDHA Centres were SBS Nagar (Headquarter), Balachaur (Sub-division), Banga (Sub-tehsil), Rahon (Municipality/town) and Sahiba (Village). The selection of both the service seeker and employees samples was done by using random sampling technique. In order to garner views about the satisfaction level of employees and service seekers regarding SUWIDHA services and working, a separate structured questionnaire was administered to employees and service seekers to ascertain their opinion. Those respondents who faced difficulty in understanding questions were explained in simplified language or Punjabi.

Secondary data has been collected from the website of Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar and published and unpublished documents of SUWIDHA Centres of district Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar. Selective study of relevant journals, books, newspapers, abstracts, periodicals, articles, internet, published and unpublished literature related to the topic was also carried out.

The data collected was analyzed and interpreted by using suitable statistical tools and techniques. Descriptive and qualitative analysis regarding the responses of the respondents

was done. The data collected was presented and analyzed by using tables, figures and percentages depicting the employees and service seekers perception regarding the implementation of Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 in SUWIDHA Centres.

The findings of the collected data with the inferences made have been furnished below in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3

Table 1.2

Employees Perception Regarding Implementation of Punjab Right To Service Act 2011 in SUWIDHA Centres Responses of Employees

S.No.	Questions	Yes	Do not Know	No
1.	Do you think providing services to the service seekers under Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 is a challenging job?	0 percent (0)	12 percent (3)	88 percent (22)
2.	Do you agree Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 has made you more accountable towards service seekers?	100 percent (25)	0 percent (0)	0 percent (0)
3.	Do you agree Punjab Right to Service Act 2011 promotes transparency on your part in delivering services to the service seekers?	100 percent (25)	0 percent (0)	0 percent (0)
4.	Do you think inadequacy of IT infrastructure (hardware and software) at SUWIDHA Centres comes in way of delivering timely services to service seekers according to Punjab Right to Service Act 2011?	20 percent (5)	0 percent (0)	80 percent (20)
5.	Do you think internet connectivity at SUWIDHA Centres needs to be improved?	24 percent (6)	8 percent (2)	68 percent (17)
6.	Do you think power supply system at SUWIDHA Centres needs improvement?	24 percent (6)	0 percent (0)	76 percent (19)
7.	Do you think there is lack of coordination between back-end and front-end office at SUWIDHA Centres?	20 percent (5)	0 percent (0)	80 percent (20)
8.	Do you think training facilities provided to you are adequate in handling your job at the SUWIDHA Centres?	88 percent (22)	0 percent (0)	12 percent (3)
9.	Do you think implementation of e-district project has improved online interdepartmental connectivity with SUWIDHA Centres?	76 percent (19)	0 percent (0)	24 percent (6)
10	Are you satisfied with the overall working of the SUWIDHA Centres scheme in the context of delivering services to service seekers according to Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011?	88 percent (22)	0 percent (0)	12 percent (3)

Source : Computed from Primary data

Table 1.2 highlighted findings are given as:

- 88 percent employees opined that providing services to the service seekers under Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 is not a challenging job. While according to 12 percent employees, they did not know as it depends on higher officials to dispose off the pending cases.

- The study revealed that 100 percent employees agreed with the statement that Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 has made them more accountable and transparent on their part towards service seekers as they have to provide them services within stipulated time period as notified by Government of Punjab. District System Administrator of district SBS Nagar informed that automated SMS and emails are sent to each official daily regarding pending cases and disposed cases. Thus, officials have also become more accountable and transparent in their working with the implementation of Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011.

- 20 percent employees thought that inadequacy of IT infrastructure (hardware and software as well as devices used) at SUWIDHA Centre comes in way of delivering timely services to service seekers according to Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011, especially at the village level. The study mentioned that 68 percent respondents were of the view that internet connectivity needs no improvement in Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar.

- 76 percent employees were of the view that power supply system needed no improvement while 24 percent of employees mentioned that equipments such as invertors and UPS (Uninterrupted Power Supply) were provided but cannot run for long time causing inconvenience to employees and service seekers by leaving the work halfway, particularly at the village level.

- 80 percent employees thought that there is no lack of coordination between back-end and front-end office at SUWIDHA Centres. They opined that forwarding of documents to the back-end departments has improved by virtue of e-district software. During interaction with the employees of SUWIDHA Centres, sometimes interdepartmental coordination with police related department was lacking. Thus interdepartmental online connectivity under e-district project with the Saanjh Kendra's (A single window for police services) for providing timely police related services such as arms licenses, weapons etc should be ensured.

- 76 percent employees thought that implementation of e-district project has improved online interdepartmental connectivity with SUWIDHA Centres but 24 percent employees responded that mistakes occurred during feeding of data entries of service seekers in e-district software which had to be forwarded to the backend officials. These mistakes caused delay in providing services to the service seekers.

- Employees felt that they were recruited on the basis of their technical education (computer degree or diplomas) to work on computers. 88 percent of employees were satisfied with the training facility provided to them. They were of the view that workshops and meetings are conducted for employees of SUWIDHA Centres to make them aware about the latest version of Softwares, devices and new e-governance initiatives. Thus regular conduction of workshops and meetings to make them aware about latest e-governance initiatives by the Government of Punjab is satisfactory.

Recommendations

- It is recommended that adequate financial resources should be provided by the Government of Punjab for development of IT infrastructure, particularly faster internet, for the efficient working of SUWIDHA Centres.

- During the course of interactions with employees, it was observed that cooperation on the part of service seekers is also required and they should come with proper documents while availing services from SUWIDHA Centres to get timely services which will also reduce their number of visits. It is suggested that online coordination between front end and back end office with police services department and cooperation on the part of service seekers is also required. The cooperation can also be ensured by displaying the lists of documents intended for particular complaints.

- As the role of uninterrupted power supply is vital for efficient working in any organization, it is proposed that generator facility should be provided at these SUWIDHA Centres.

- The study highlighted that high speed internet services for doing faster work should be provided in all SUWIDHA Centres to enhance efficiency which would help in delivering timely services to service seekers according to the Punjab Right to Service Act. Server problems and inadequate internet facility were also mentioned by employees in the SUWIDHA Centres at village Sahiba and town Rahon.

- It is proposed that e-district software needs improvement so that there are no repeated mistakes by the back-end departments while feeding the service seeker's data entries.

Table 1.3: Service seekers Perception regarding Implementation of Punjab Right To Service Act 2011 in SUWIDHA Centres Services

Responses of Service seekers

S.No.	Questions	Yes	Do not Know	No
1.	Are you aware that SUWIDHA Centres is only a channelizing agency for securing government services?	100 percent (50)	0 percent (0)	0 percent (0)
2.	Are you aware about all the services provided at SUWIDHA Centres?	70 percent (35)	30 percent (15)	0 percent (0)
3.	Are you aware about the website of SUWIDHA Centres?	50 percent (25)	50 percent (25)	0 percent (0)
4.	Do you check online status of your queries from the website of SUWIDHA Centres?	50 percent (25)	50 percent (25)	0 percent (0)
5.	Are you aware about the Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011?	64 percent (32)	36 percent (18)	0 percent (0)
6.	Do you think SUWIDHA Centres provide services to service seekers within the stipulated time as per Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011?	64 percent (32)	36 percent (18)	0 percent (0)
7.	Do you think implementation of Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 has resulted in saving of service seekers time?	64 percent (32)	36 percent (18)	0 percent (0)
8.	Do you think implementation of Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 has reduced corruption in administration?	62 percent (31)	38 percent (19)	0 percent (0)
9.	Are you aware of the procedure for lodging complaints against an official in case of non-providing of service by SUWIDHA Centres as provided under the Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011?	66 percent (33)	34 percent (17)	0 percent (0)
10	Do you know that your grievances can be redressed by entering complaints through PGRAMS portal on Government of Punjab website?	10 percent (5)	90 percent (45)	0 percent (0)
11	Do you receive confirmation sms through mobile phone from SUWIDHA Centres regarding the service?	70 percent (35)	0 percent (0)	30 percent (15)
12	Are you satisfied with the overall services provided by SUWIDHA Centres?	80 percent (40)	0 percent (0)	20 percent (10)

Source: Computed from Primary data

- Only few 10 percent service seekers knew that their grievances can be redressed by entering complaints through PGRAMS portal on Government of Punjab website. During the course of interaction with employees, it was observed that majority 90 percent of service seekers were not aware about PGRAMS portal to register their complaints.

- Majority of service seekers or 70 percent of service seekers opined that they received confirmation SMS through mobile phones from SUWIDHA Centres regarding their attended service. While availing services from SUWIDHA Centres, service seekers receives an acknowledgement slip with a unique 6 (six) digit number called the Guarantee of services to Service seekers (GSC) number by concerned service provider employee.

Recommendations

- It is recommended that more advertisements through television should be given in local languages (e-kranti programme on e-governance initiatives which is telecast on Doordarshan). Publicity through movies, public notice boards, seminars, workshops, newspaper, electronic media and door to door campaign is also required so that people become fully aware of the services provided at SUWIDHA Centres. The Government of Punjab should make endeavors to improve e-literacy and literacy rate among the service seekers which is a vital tool to survive in the present digital age and to promote e-governance cognizance and awareness about their rights.

- The contact numbers of First Appellate authority, Second Appellate authority, Chairman, Member and Secretary of PRTSC should be displayed at SUWIDHA Centres so that people can approach the authorities to make complaints or appeals.

- It is suggested that service seekers should be made aware about the concept of service seeker charter in a comprehensive manner under which SUWIDHA Centre are providing services. They can be made aware of Punjab Right To Service Act 2011 through workshops, publicity of citizen charters in newspapers, and websites, advertisement in television etc.

- In a true democratic setup, it is very necessary to provide effective complaint redressal machinery such as complaint boxes, helpline numbersand online mechanisms etc. for feedback from the service seekers so as to know their grievances and to deliver them efficiently, timely and hassle-free services at SUWIDHA Centres.

- The study also revealed that suggestion boxes, helpline, and other mechanisms were difficult to locate, especially at sub-division, tehsil and village level. Thus, it is suggested that grievance redressal machinery should be improved so that more service seekers can lodge their complaints, if not satisfied.

- It is proposed that service seekers should be aware about PGRAMS portal on website of Punjab to register their online complaints by publicizing PGRAMS portal.

- It is recommended that service seekers should be encouraged to give their mobile numbers at the time of registrations to avail services so that they can be intimated about the interim status of their applications. With the aid of the six digit number, service seekers can also view the status of their application by clicking on the e-district status on the website (http://www.nawanshahr.gov.in/). And also service seekers should be made aware about the e-district application available on the right hand side in the official website of district SBS Nagar (http://edistrict.punjabgovt.gov.in/EDA/VerificationSt

atus.aspxto) which track the current status of their application. The repeated visits of service seekers will be reduced if they track their applications online. The Government of Punjab should also introduce alternative tracking mechanism for those service seekers who do not have a mobile or are not able to utilize the website for tracking their applications.

Conclusion

We can say that despite some challenges, through SUWIDHA Centres as an e-governance initiative the Government of Punjab is attempting to provide hassle free citizen/services, check delays in providing services to service seekers and control corruption in government functionaries.

Transparent, timely and responsive service to service seekers builds trust in the government functioning and enforces government's dedication to deliver public services on time.

On the basis of this research study, we can say that active participation of service seekers is required for the successful running of SUWIDHA Centres. The proper implementation of Punjab Right to Service Act through SUWIDHA Centres would help in guaranteeing timely and quality services to the common citizens/service seekers. The government should also actively consider the demand for adding more services under the ambit of the Punjab Right To Service Act, 2011. Many service seekers during the course of informal interviews also expressed the view that more SUWIDHA Centres should be opened in their areas as many of them have to travel a long distance for reaching the SUWIDHA Centres and availing their services. The new proposal of the Government of Punjab Sewa Kendras for every population of 10,000 (approximately) in rural areas and covering 1.5 to 2 Sq. Kms (approximately) in urban areas has been launched in Punjab. The reforms in the administration are a continuous process. Thus

implementation of Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 through SUWIDHA Centres/ Sewa Kendras will surely ensure the enhancement of the faith of masses in government service delivery mechanism and will promote good governance.

References

Khanna, M. R. (2015). 'Effectiveness of Right to Service Act : The law came into force in 2011, but fails to ensure accountability for delayed services', The Chandigarh Tribune, 29 June.

Legislative Brief PRS, available at www.prsindia.org, (accessed on 5 April, 2016).

Promoting e-governance Department of Administrative Reforms, available at https://darpg.gov.in/sites/default/files/ promoting_egov11.pdf, (accessed on 4 April, 2016).

Punjab government nod for 'Right to Service Act' States,available at http://post.jagran.com/punjab-government-nod-for-right-to-service-act-1307511005 (accessed on 10 May, 2016).

Right to Public Services legislation, available at https://en.wikipedia. org/wikiRight_to_Public_Services_legislation, (accessed on 8 May, 2016).

Right to Service Commission Punjab : Act and Rules, available atrtspunjab.gov.in/Act.aspx (accessed on 10 May, 2016).

Shahid Bhagat Singh Nagar, Punjab CSI Nihilent Awards, available at http://www.csinihilent-egovernanceawards.org/projects09 _10/Section4/Sec4-Chapter39.pdf, (accessed on 15 April, 2016).

Consolidated list of services notified by the Government of Punjab, Department of Governance Reforms under Section 3 of the Punjab Right to Service Act, 2011 wide notification issued no: 5/27/2014-2GR- 2/425953/1 dated 02/03/2015 and no. 5/27/2014-2GR-2(PF)/668042/1 dated 15/01/2016.   accessed on (11April 2017

Article

Urban Migrants and Informal Community Leadership: Insights From Ludhiana

Suraj Thapa*

Abstract

The present study is based essentially on primary sources, the bulk of findings are based on qualitative data collected through long interview schedules conducted with respondents in Ludhiana city of Punjab.[1] The study primarily attempts to explore the emergence as well as nature of informal community leadership among migrants and identify various levels at which leadership gets formed. The paper describes informal leaders as those who do not have formal power as well as designation. Their authority was based not on holding a formal office or designation, nor on laws and rules, but on respect and admiration they received from their followers because of their knowledge, skills, experience, benevolent attitude, and righteous conduct. This description fitted quite well in the case of migrant leaders who in the common parlance of the migrant community were known as Pradhans. Further, the paper argues that solidarity groups/ networks were

*Assistant Professor- Political Science, Post Graduate Government College(PGGC), Sector 11, Chandigarh.

constituted by migrants from common native background or ethnic ties, they provided a natural platform for informal leadership to grow among urban migrants. Moreover, factors like long duration of stay, good education, contacts with local authorities and economic resources helped in gaining leadership status.

Keywords: Urban Migrants, Leadership, Solidarity Groups, Networks

Introduction

Migration is a long journey. It is long not merely because migrants travel a long distance from home to settle in an alien land, but also because even when they settle down, having found work and a place to stay, there lies ahead of them a long journey of struggle and compromise, of coping with a combination of apathy, hostility, humiliation and exploitation. Being poor and lowly educated, they desperately need help and guidance in negotiating the arduous and treacherous path. Who would provide such guidance and help? There is no going back to leaders they left behind in their native lands, nor can they lean on local leaders whom they find apathetic if not hostile. Migrants must seek help from within their own fold, they must find leaders from among themselves as they organize themselves into social networks and solidarity groups in the new land of livelihood. Given this context, the present paper focuses on such migrant leadership, seeking to bring out its specific nature and nuances. Who become migrant leaders? How do they emerge? What lends them legitimacy? What qualities must they possess? What needs do they satisfy? What roles do they play?

    Based on insights from the field, the present paper tries to answer these questions and   identify various levels at which migrant leadership gets formed through individual engagement and social networks. More specifically, the paper focuses on the

process through which *Pradhan,* a particular kind of migrant leader, emerged and gained influence among the migrants.

This paper is divided into five broad sections (i) Nature of Migrant Leadership (ii) Socio-Economic profile of *Pradhans* (iii) Qualities of migrant *Pradhans* (iv)Role and Functions of *Pradhans* and (v) Social Networks as Platforms of Solidarity.

I

Nature of Migrant Leadership

Migrant leaders may, in the first instance, be described as 'informal leaders', a term used in literature to designate those who exercised influence without wielding any formal power[2]. Their authority was based not on holding a formal office or designation, nor on laws and rules, but on respect and admiration they received from their followers because of their knowledge, skills, experience, benevolent attitude, and righteous conduct. This description fitted quite well in the case of migrant leaders who in the common parlance of the migrant community were known as *Pradhans*. The nomenclature may have arisen from the fact that in their native places, the head of the *Gram Panchayat* (village council) was known as *Pradhan*.

A *Pradhan* was often simply a proactive member of the community. He was neither elected nor does he hold any office. But he was the one to be approached by members of the community if they faced a problem and needed help. When a particular individual's interests were threatened, he too would approach the *Pradhan*. The *Pradhan* must appear approachable and accessible at all times. He could refuse help when help was sought. He must also appear dependable, and seen as making a sincere effort to resolve problems even if he did not succeed every time. Faith was thus an important ingredient of the relationship between a *Pradhan* and the community. While a *Pradhan* should have comprehensive knowledge of the interests of his followers, he must also be alert to the fact that his community could have

changing needs over a period of time. Constant communication must occur between the two. If such communication snaps, the *Pradhan* could lose his prominence in the community quickly.[3]

In the course of our fieldwork in Ludhiana city, we found that even though *Pradhans* enjoyed a prominent and distinct position in their concerned localities, it was quite impossible to count their exact number. No official estimate of their number was available either. This ambiguity stemmed from two factors. First, several persons could be known as *Pradhans* in a locality. Their number could go up to five even in a street of a colony. Secondly, the permanent settlements of migrants started coming up about 20-25 years ago, but majority of the migrants' settled in them only later. Different *Pradhans* were active during different segments of this period. Some emerged early but disappeared with the passage of time. Some had died, some had moved back permanently to their native places, some had given up the role of a *Pradhan* because of old age, some did not possess sufficient stamina to cope up with the strenuous demands and some had to give up due to their domestic compulsions. Remaining active thus, has become an important aspect of remaining a *Pradhan* which is reflected in the following statements of a respondent:

> It is very important to remain active in today's world. If there is a demand for some work, one has to respond immediately because if you don't do so, nobody will get back to you again. If one is active, only then people associate themselves with you.[4]

We did not include any of these former *Pradhans* in the scope of our study. We studied only those who were active and whose names were mentioned or recognized by migrants during our fieldwork. 'Being active' was judged on the basis of given parameters. A *Pradhan* was active if he showed eagerness when a migrant went to him with some difficulty. He had to be proactive in addressing problems faced by his community. He had to be conversant with various developments taking place in the society. His was an ongoing job that underwent changes with the passage of time, and

a *Pradhan's* performance was constantly judged. A *Pradhan* had to secure and retain recognition at many levels. The sources of recognition of a *Pradhan* could change so that he had to reorient his activities accordingly. Thus, communication link between him and his community had to remain alive constantly. If even one link between the two snapped, that would reflect on the caliber of the *Pradhan*. That meant that the *Pradhan* would lose his prominence in the community. Recognition and appreciation of his services by migrants were vital for a *Pradhan* to retain his position.

Two Intrinsic Domains of Migrant Leadership

As informal leaders, *Pradhans* address two distinct but equally important needs of the migrant community. First and foremost, they fulfilled the need of newly settled migrants to access and engage with Civic, Public and Social institutions. We would use the acronym CPS for them. As it was found during the fieldwork that migrants had built their houses on what was officially classified as agricultural land, the most daunting task was to have this land converted into residential land. Then they had to approach local administration so that basic civic amenities like water, power and roads were made available to them. Poor, illiterate, and alien to the land, the migrants could not make much headway on their own when they approached relevant authorities. They found that local officials tended to exploit them, asking them to pay bribes. But most of the times, their work was not done despite such payments. Visiting offices in this futile chase, migrants lost a lot of time and had to forego work and wages. One of the *Pradhans* talked about the difficulties faced by the migrants' administration and effective role played by them:

> When migrants from outside the region, particularly from UP and Bihar approach the administration to get their work done, either it is delayed or dismissed. In such situations, they then start looking for someone from the community who can get their work done. These days however, rather than approaching the administration

independently, they first approach the local *Pradhan* for a
quick redressal.[5]

To extricate themselves from this difficult situation, migrants
looked for capable and dependable persons of their community
who could provide guidance and help, working as a bridge and
mediators between them and the CPS authorities. Migrants did not
trust Punjabis for the simple reason that mostly Punjabis were
employed in government offices and it is they who harassed and
exploited the migrants.

The second domain of needs *Pradhans* attended to had to do
with Religion, Caste, Region and Culture. We will use the acronym
RCRC for them. Living in a culturally alien land, most migrants felt
the need to remain connected with their own roots. This motivated
them to form groups based on religion, region, caste, customs and
traditions. As they tried to replicate the social life that migrants had
in their native place, such groups became the medium through
which they articulated their feelings of oneness, solidarity and
brotherhood. A *Pradhan* said the following in this regard:

> I try to organize people coming from different states so
> that they can celebrate their own respective festivals being
> away from home. Such gatherings are significant as it
> helps people connect with others from the same region.
> They express their views, emotions and anxieties with
> each other.[6]

The migrants found that local Punjabis were utterly insensitive to
the subtleties of their cultural backgrounds. They were blind to the
variations within and across migrant subcultures. All migrants'
were summarily and disdainfully called 'bhayias', and treated as
'outsiders'. Even though inflicted on them, migrants soon
internalized this indiscriminate identity. That brought dissimilar
migrants together, so that all of them began to act jointly vis-a-vis
the local population.

The RCRC needs thus found expression at two levels: one, as
non-Punjabi migrants vis-a-vis local Punjabis, and two, within

migrants, as specific communities based on religion, caste, region and culture. For these twin expressions, the migrants needed common platforms. Certain people took the lead in the formation and development of these platforms. Thereby, they also got recognized as *Pradhans*.

Third Route to Leadership

It should be easy to see from the foregoing discussion that two separate domains of migrant needs opened up two distinct routes to emergence of leadership. Indeed, in the initial years of migrant settlement, there were only two kinds of informal migrant leaders addressing these needs. However, there was a third route to leadership as well. It became increasingly important once the migrant community was firmly settled. Based on their everyday experience, the migrants realized that, beyond a point, their community could advance its interests only if they acted as a political pressure group. As they started taking interest in local politics, they became familiar with leaders and activists of political parties.

At the same time, established political parties and locally influential independent political leaders began to take interest in the migrants as a political constituency and a potential vote bank. They therefore began to look for those migrants who could provide them access to the larger community. We found that the parties which took keen interest in forging links with the migrants were not only those which had been historically prominent in Punjab - such as the Shiromani Akali Dal(SAD), Congress, BJP and the Communists-but also the parties which were prominent in the native states of the migrants, namely BSP, SP, RJD and JDU. As regards seeking political patronage, one of the *Pradhans* argued:

> I decided to join CPI (M) after I came to the city because that is the only party which fights for the rights of the laboring class. Gradually over a period of time I worked hard and looking at my commitment and hard work and

> also being an educated person, the party offered me the post of Secretary.[7]

Pradhans which emerged taking this route were launched directly through political patronage. We will use the acronym PP for them. Most of them got formally affiliated with political parties and were given official designations. Identity cards are issued to them. At the same time, powerful independent politicians too sponsored some PP *Pradhans*.

All PP *Pradhans* worked in partisan political interest. It is true that they also engaged in activities of CPS or RCRC nature, but the underlying motive was always to create vote banks, and thereby mobilize maximum number of votes in favour of their party or leader. They ensured, first and foremost, that eligible migrant settlers got their voting cards. This enabled an ever-increasing number of migrants to participate in local politics.

Pradhans who were directly appointed by political parties or leaders were more likely to be loyal to them. In contrast, a CPS and RCRC *Pradhan* did not feel irrevocably bound to the party that gave him political patronage. His primary concern was his own constituency and his influence therein. He could change sides if his interests, or the interests of his constituency, were not being served to his satisfaction.

II

Socio Economic Profile of Pradhans

An important aspect of our study was to investigate if the three routes to leadership required *Pradhans* with three different kinds of socio-economic backgrounds apart from their possessing different kinds of skills and temperaments. In order to answer this question, we considered their social and economic profiles at the time when they gained recognition as *Pradhans*. In the discussion below, we first discuss the profiles separately for the three categories and thereafter attempt a comparative analysis.

Civil, Public and Social (CPS) Pradhans

Our data shows that many of these *Pradhans* were able to get first recognition while still quite young, with an average age of 34 years. Younger *Pradhans* belonged to second-generation of migrants. About 70 percent had been *Pradhans* for an average of 13 years at the time of our survey. More than 90 percent *Pradhans* were male. Thus women were severely under-represented given the fact that they were nearly half of the total migrant population.

More than 90 percent of the *Pradhans* were born outside Punjab, but almost all of them migrated to Ludhiana in their youth. Those who were born and brought up in Ludhiana were less than 10 percent of the total number. An equal number of migrants from the two states of UP and Bihar were included in our study. We found, however, that *Pradhans* from UP were roughly twice the number of those from Bihar. More importantly, nearly 70 percent of the *Pradhans* belonged to the *Purvanchal* region, which comprises of districts from eastern UP as well as western Bihar. This indicated that region was more important than administrative boundaries of states. Nearly all of them came from rural areas, those with urban background being less than 4 percent.

All *Pradhans* were found to be Hindu. This was not surprising because the Census of India 2011 showed that Muslims constituted no more than 3 percent of the total population of the city. A vast majority of *Pradhans* (69.2 percent) belonged to the upper castes. In comparison, OBCs were 23 percent, and SC *Pradhans* were a negligible 7.7 percent.

As for educational qualifications of *Pradhans,* we found that more than 70 percent of them were at least matriculate at the time of getting recognition while nearly one quarter of them were in fact graduates. On the other end, less than 4 percent were found to be completely illiterate. We also found that nearly all *Pradhans* were married. Their spouses were from their native states and area. The small number of unmarried *Pradhans* (less than 4 percent) belonged to second-generation of migrants.

At the time of recognition, nearly 60 percent of the *Pradhans* were employed as skilled workers in factories in Ludhiana. Less than 20 percent were self-employed, running their own shops. Another 20 percent were owners of small household manufacturing units and employed one or two workers. A small number worked as labour contractors, supplying labour to the industries in the township. We observed at the time of the survey that upward economic mobility was discernible among these *Pradhans* since their recognition. Factory workers had been reduced to 46 percent while those who were self-employed were now 31 percent.

As for the occupation of their fathers, nearly 60 percent were engaged in agriculture. The remaining were self-employed or worked as employees in non-agricultural sectors. About 65 percent of their fathers were small farmers possessing landholdings up to 5 acres. A little more than 10 percent were medium-size farmers who had upto 10 acres of land. About 15 percent did not have any agricultural land and worked as farm workers. By the time of their recognition, these *Pradhans* had been able to acquire some immovable assets in Ludhiana. Majority of them (73 percent) owned between 50 to 100 sq. feet of land. This was double the size of what an average migrant in the city owned. More than 25 percent *Pradhans* owned plots ranging between 100 sq. feet and 200 sq. feet. We observed that the major part of these land holdings was covered with constructed houses. By the time this survey was held, the *Pradhans* had added an average of 33 percent to their earlier landholdings.

Additionally, all *Pradhans* owned moveable assets such as motorcycles, bi-cycles, television sets and refrigerators. A very large majority owned desert coolers, while a substantial number also owned computers, air conditioners and even cars.

Regional, Caste, Region and Cultural (RCRC) Pradhans

A large majority i.e. 71 percent of these *Pradhans* were recognized at

a very young age, ranging between 18 and 35 years. The remaining were middle aged but mostly no more than fifty by the time of recognition. At the time of this survey, these *Pradhans* had held their positions were an average of 14 years. All *Pradhans* were male. We did notice the presence of some street-level associations of women. They mostly organized *Satsangs* (spiritual congregations).

Pradhans from Bihar turned out to be slightly greater in number compared to those from UP. Nearly 60 percent these *Pradhans* were from *Purvanchal* area. More than 95 percent came from rural areas. Hindus had over-whelming majority among *Pradhans*. More than 90 percent of them were Hindus. Muslim *Pradhans* were less than 10 percent. Upper Castes Hindu *Pradhans* dominated with 62 percent. In comparison, OBCs were about 24 percent and SCs just over 14 per cent.

In terms of education, more than 76 percent of these *Pradhans* were at least matriculate. Nearly 5 percent were graduates. None was found to be illiterate. More than 95 percent of these *Pradhans* were already married when they gained recognition. Their wives belonged to the same places as these *Pradhans*.

At the time of attaining recognition, nearly half of these *Pradhans* were small manufactures, who were working from their homes and had employed between two to five workers. Less than 25 percent were self-employed, managing their own small shops. Pradhans who were working as skilled workers were less than 20 percent. If we look at the occupations of the fathers of these *Pradhans*, approximately 57 percent were agriculturists in the native states. The remaining were non-agriculturists, employed with private or public institutions and offices. Among the agriculturists, some 81 percent were small farmers, less than 15 percent were medium farmers, and the remaining were landless agricultural workers.

At the time of gaining recognition, all *Pradhans* owned plots of land in Ludhiana. These could be divided into four categories. In

the first category of more than 71 percent, *Pradhans* had land from 50 to 100 Sq. feet. In the top category of 10 percent, *Pradhans* owned more than a 1000 sq. feet each. It should be noted that by the time this survey was conducted, the average size of land ownership had more than doubled. In addition, these *Pradhans* had acquired considerable moveable assets. All of them owned motorcycles, bicycles, smart phones, televisions and fridges. A substantial number of them also had desert coolers, air conditioners, computers and cars.

Political Patronage (PP) Pradhans

Nearly 80 percent of the *Pradhans* of this category were between 18 and 35 years of age at the time of recognition. The remaining was middle aged, with the maximum age of 42 years. The average age of the *Pradhan* at the time of recognition was found to be 30 years.

Though an overwhelming majority (90 percent) of these *Pradhans* was men, yet it was only in this category that there was some representation (over 10 percent) of women. One noticeable factor was that women who made a mark in the local politics had filial relations with the political leaders. Moreover, they had strong political backup in their native places. Thus, it can be concluded that these women acquired political education and training from their families.

Our study found that 75 percent of *Pradhans* were from *Purvanchal* areas of UP and Bihar. Nearly 95 percent of these came from rural areas. More *Pradhans* belonged to UP than Bihar . The reason might be that people from UP started migrating first and migration from Bihar took place much later. Secondly, the two main parties of UP, namely Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), were active in the city of Ludhiana from the decade of 1990-2000. On the other hand, the political parties from Bihar became active only 2000 onwards.

It was found that all *Pradhans* were Hindus. As has been mentioned earlier, Muslims were a small minority in Ludhiana and hence failed to get any traction initially. But with the increase in their number, political parties had more recently realized that they would be able to play significant role in local politics. Muslim *Pradhans* may start getting recognition from the political parties.

In terms of caste, almost half (approximately 50 percent) of these *Pradhans* belonged to the upper castes. The percentage of Scheduled Castes was 37.5 percent. The OBC *Pradhans* were just 12.5 percent of the total number. The SC and OBC representation was higher in this segment due to the fact that political parties such as SP, BSP and RJD engaged in caste-based politics.

The study found that approximately 89 percent *Pradhans* were married at the time of getting recognition and their wives too belonged to their native places. The remaining 11 percent were unmarried and these belonged to the second generation. Approximately 75 percent of the *Pradhans* were at least matriculate. Over 5 percent of them were graduates.

The study revealed that 60 percent of the *Pradhans* were small manufacturers or labour contractors. Some 20 percent were employed as skilled workers, and the equal percentage were self-employed, running small shops in the city.

As for the occupation of their fathers, 66 percent were involved in agriculture, and the remaining 33 percent were employed with public as well as private institutions. In terms of their landholdings, about 68 percent agriculturists were small farmers, 10 percent were medium farmers, and more than 20 percent were landless.

At the time of gaining recognition, these *Pradhans* had acquired immovable assets in Ludhiana city. Over 73 percent *Pradhans* had land between 50 sq. feet to 100 sq. feet. More than 20 percent had over 1000 sq. feet. In terms of moveable assets, all *Pradhans* had motorcycles, bi-cycles, smart phones, televisions, and fridges. A substantial number had desert coolers, computers, air conditioners and cars.

　　　A profile comparison of three *Pradhans* leads us to make an argument that CPS route emphasized personal qualities and dedication. It favoured those who had received medium to high education and gained long experience of working in the field. Obviously, the relatively young Ludhiana-born, second-generation migrants did not favour ascriptive roles and leadership. The category put no premium on personal economic resources of a person to promote him. The RCRC route on the other hand put more emphasis on traditional, ascriptive identities of religion, caste, region and culture. Rather than subsuming them, it provided minority group platforms to articulate their identities and aspirations. At the same time, being conservative in orientation, it discounted youth and women. It welcomed those who had economic resources of their own to invest in RCRC work. Finally, PP promoted the second-generation, Ludhiana-born, urban youth and women to make inroads into their voting constituencies. It promoted SC background for the same reason. At the same time, it also preferred activists who were economically resourceful.

III

Qualities of Migrant Pradhans (Leaders)

We asked migrants and their *Pradhans* separately as to what qualities a Pradhan should possess. We found that the qualities that he was expected to possess were of two types: those related to his personal attributes[8], and others that concerned his work ethics and style of functioning[9].

Table 1. Qualities of Pradhans

Essential Qualities of Pradhans	Responses of Pradhans	Responses of Respondents
Personal Attributes	50	25
Work Ethnic &Style of Functioning	50	75

The answers revealed considerable commonalities of perception but also some differences. Overall, the migrants seemed to attach more importance to the work ethic and style of functioning while the *Pradhans* themselves attached much greater importance to their personal attributes and qualities. Regarding the qualities of *Pradhan* that they seek for, following was the response of a respondent:

> I look for a person who has a temperament to cooperate and is willing to help people in getting their work done. And this is possible if he has contacts in different places including administration. He should believe and work towards forging unity and brotherhood among migrant communities.[10]

Thus one half of the *Pradhans* laid emphasis on their own personal attributes while only a quarter of migrants thought that personal attributes of Pradhans were of primary importance. Response of a *Pradhan* as to why he was recognized as a leader:

> I am always available to the concerns of the people from the migrant community. I don't even give time to my family when it comes to addressing their problems. I do not discriminate with anyone at any level- caste, class or religion. I work selflessly for the community.[11]

A vast majority of migrants believed that work ethics, style and efficiency were far more important than personal qualities. Our finding in this regard may be summarized as follows. An overriding factor was that the *Pradhan* must belong to the migrant community. He could not be a Punjabi resident of the locality. This was so because migrants felt more at par with a *Pradhan* from their own community. He could be argued with, admonished, and hauled up in a gathering of migrants if he was negligent or wrong. In this regard a respondent said:

> It is always better that *Pradhan* is from the same community as ours. This is because if he fails to keep his

> promise we can pull him up in front of the community, we can rebuke him. This we cannot do if the Pradhan is a local guy– a Punjabi as it would lead to conflict. [12]

Good educational qualification turned out to be a major concern. One half of the *Pradhans* believed that they must be well educated. On the other hand, most migrants thought that more than formal education, a *Pradhan* should have good knowledge and understanding of the local government offices. He should have good rapport with their officials. They held that rather than having to depend on politicians; a *Pradhan* should be able to get things done on the basis of his personal reputation, charm, skills, knowledge, and contacts in the courts, police, banks, and schools.

A *Pradhan* must have the capability to work for the collective interests of community. All migrants insisted that their *Pradhans* should ensure basic amenities and development of their respective areas. They should be able to procure for migrants their ration cards, voter cards and other documents and certificates. Almost all the migrants placed this quality at the top while 50 percent of *Pradhans* held that this quality was most paramount.

A *Pradhan* should take care of the poor and the needy in particular. He should help in arranging free medical checkups, schoolbooks for children of poor families, financial help for the marriage of poor girls, and the cremation of the destitute, etc.

Among the personal qualities, nonpartisan and selfless attitude of *Pradhans* was considered very important. Nearly all *Pradhans* and migrants agreed that as and when someone approached him for help, a *Pradhan* must extend his helping hand without considerations of caste, creed, religion or region. A *Pradhan* should have no ulterior motive and must not be exploitative. The other most sought after attribute in a *Pradhan* was his good behavior. *Pradhans* and migrants agreed on this. Helpful disposition, respectful and considerate language, and complete absence of conceit and arrogance are very important. On this, a *Pradhan* responded:

> I do not delay or postpone a work or a problem and try to
> solve it as fast as possible. Honesty is very important if you
> want to be a good leader. I don't eye people's money which
> they have earned with great difficulty.[13]

The foregoing discussion provides a general picture of the attributes and qualities a *Pradhan* should possess. However, as we delved into greater details, we discovered that significant differences existed when we compared *Pradhans* who addressed two different kinds of needs.

Let us first look at the *Pradhans* which facilitated migrant access to CPS institutions. The main purpose of such leaders was to safeguard the material interests of their community, maximizing facilities and relief available to them from within the existing public allocation systems. Such *Pradhans* needed to be more pragmatic, practical, flexible and adaptive as they sought to bridge the vast socio-cultural gap between fellow migrants and the local officialdom. Their influence depended on proving their practical usefulness rather than some culturally defined uprightness. Secondly, their domain was at once narrower and wider than that of the other type. It was narrower territorially because their concerns and their influence were limited the particular localities in which they operated, but it was also wider because they catered to the needs of followers who were often diverse in their ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Thirdly, age and experience counted more than enthusiasm and adventurism in the case such as a *Pradhan*. He was normally one of the earliest migrant residents of the area, more conversant with its history and in better touch with other migrants of senior age. Finally, this category of *Pradhans* got an early start in climbing the leadership ladder because they addressed the more immediate needs of survival.

Now let us compare these qualities with those of the other type of *Pradhans* whose primary domain was RCRC which were symbolized and cultural than material. Their influence was narrower but deeper. Each such *Pradhan* catered to migrants of only a certain caste or region. This excluded the possibility of his

spreading his influence beyond narrow confines of such identities. But his influence was deeper because it appealed to primordial and instinctual loyalties. In this sense, his influence was essentially supra-territorial even though a *Pradhan* operated within a well defined territory. Seniority of age was not relevant to *Pradhans* of this kind. Youthful energy could often be greater attribute in their case.

<div align="center">IV</div>

Role and Functions of Pradhans

Table 1.1 below clearly indicates that at least initially, when they got first recognized as *Pradhans*, the CPS and the RCRC leaders engaged in mutually exclusive sets of activities. In the first column we have *Pradhans* focusing on civic, public, and social issues. We find that none of them engaged in religious or cultural activities of the community. In complete contrast, we have in the second column RCRC *Pradhans*. We discover that none of them engaged in civic, public or social issues. The two activities required fairly different kinds of skills, temperaments and engagements, so much so that even if at a later stage the two kinds of *Pradhans* diversified into one another's domains, there were clearly discernible limits to such expansion. On the other hand, the leaders taking the PP route were pragmatic and eclectic, undertaking activities in both domains simultaneously as per the conditions prevailing in 'constituencies' where they desired to gain influence.

Functions of CPS Pradhan: When we studied the primary activities of the *Pradhans* in their colonies, we found that a majority (approximately 75 percent) of them played an active role in bringing basic amenities to the concerned areas. *Pradhans* exerted pressure on public institutions and officials for the installation of electric transformers and electricity poles for regular power supply. On the issue of functions which *Pradhans* undertook, following have been the response from the field:

Table 1.1.

Nature of the Activities Undertaken by Three types of *Pradhans*

Nature of Activities	CPS	RCRC	PP
Arranging Basic Amenities	65.4	0.0	5.3
Governance Issues	7.7	0.0	47.4
Economic Issues	19.2	0.0	21.1
Social Issues	7.7	0.0	10.5
Social Work	0.0	33.3	10.5
Cultural and Religious activities	0.0	42.9	0.0
Purely Cultural activities	0.0	23.8	5.3

> When the colonies started coming up, there was only 'rural electricity connection' and the supply was only for few hours in a day. For getting a 'meter fixed under urban category, people had to make several rounds to the government offices and local politicians. However all these did not yield any result. Later, I intervened and it was due to my personal contacts with concerned people and offices that I managed to get things done. I also mobilized the community for 'dharnas' and rallies for getting electricity fixed in the colony.[14]

They also worked for construction of metaled access roads to colonies. Some of them got tube wells installed for fresh drinking water. *Pradhans* persuaded employers as well as local administration to attend to financial problems of colony residents. Also, in cases where colony residents were arrested after they engaged in violent disputes among themselves, the *Pradhans* would intervene and have these residents freed from police or judicial lock up. Thus, *Pradhans* play an important role in solving disputes among migrants in the colony which is reflected from the following narrative of a *Pradhan:*

> Women in the colony tend to fight with each other in the colony and most of these fights are regarding water related issues, alcoholism among men, children etc. At times these fights become so severe that it reaches the police station. In order to resolve these issues I have to leave my work and other engagements for days together.[15]

Some of the associations took up social welfare activities for the benefit of poor residents in the colony. They strove to organize free medical camps, get poor girls married, supply uniforms and books to the poor children, and perform the last rites. These activities won the hearts of migrants, who felt indebted to their *Pradhans.*

We interviewed 26 CPS *Pradhans* in the course of our fieldwork. The activities they undertook showed the range as well as the relative weightage they assign to these functions. All mentioned providing access to, and mediating with, government officials, police and courts. All mentioned undertaking social work. About 20 mentioned ensuring basic amenities such as water, power, roads, streetlights, etc. About 3 mentioned struggling for workers rights such salary, allowances, working hours, medical claims, compensations in accidental injuries etc. Only 2 mentioned procuring various documents and certificate such PAN cards, voter cards, house registration, ration cards and depots, licenses, Aadhaar cards. Only 1 mentioned issues such as fighting against social discrimination and organizing *dharnas.* It is interesting to note that only one of them mentioned organizing religious and cultural functions such as *Satsang, Janamashtami, Bhayia Dooj and Chhath Puja.*

Functions of RCRC Pradhan: This set of *Pradhans* gained recognition for planning and organizing religious or cultural functions. The nature of these religious functions varied considerably. Most of the *Pradhans* were Hindus. So a majority of them organized functions associated with their own religion

such as *Ram Lila, Dusehera,* discourse on the *Bhagvad Geeta,* and celebration of *Janam Ashtami.* Besides this, they made arrangement for holding of Jagran (night-long singing of religious hymns). It is interesting to note that *Jagran* is not observed very frequently in UP and Bihar. However, once the migrants settle in Punjab, they start holding it with the same religious zeal and fervor as the Punjabis do.

Some of the *Pradhans* focused more sharply on religious festivals and functions popular in their own states. It is well known that in the Purvanchal area, which straddles UP and Bihar, the main festivals are *Durga Puja, Chhath Puja, Saraswati Puja, Jetia* and *Holi Puja.* Out of all these festivals, Chhath Puja is considered the most important by the people of Bihar. *Pradhans* of SC sabhas organized *Bhagwan Valmiki Puja* and *Dr. Ambedkar Jayanti.*

Pradhans of some associations undertook construction of temples or *dharamshalas* in their colonies. They got consecrated altars for *Shani Devunder* a Pipal tree, and a temple for the worship of *Radha Krishan,* Goddess *Durga* and *Lord Shiva.* Similarly the Muslim minority got a mosque constructed. For this purpose, the *Pradhans* collected donations from the people of colony through their associations. On the completion of construction, people appointed these very *Pradhans* as the presidents of these temples.

Some *Pradhans* focused on social work for the poor. They arranged books and tuitions for children, provided ration and winter clothes, helped in marriage of daughters, organized medical camps and free medicines, undertook cremation of the dead, provided widows with sewing machines, and fought against drug use.

We interviewed 20 RCRC *Pradhans* in the course of our fieldwork. All of them mentioned undertaking community activities. There were 12 *Pradhans* who wished to build solidarity among community members. At least six people said they wished to preserve native culture of migrants and provide them with homelike cultural milieu. Creating awareness and pride was mentioned by two *Pradhans.*

Functions of PP Pradhans: PP *Pradhans* were a very different kind insofar as they were foremost known for their political affiliations, connections and influence. They were promoted by political parties such as Shiromani Akali Dal, Indian National Congress, Bahujan Samaj Party, and Samajwadi Party among others. Some of them were Presidents or Secretaries of the district units of their political parties. Others were associated with Municipal Councilors. Still others were associated with former as well as existing sitting MLAs of Punjab. A few were close to those political leaders who fought independent election at various levels. PP *Pradhans* were in search of influence and legitimacy. As such, they undertook whatever kind of activities could get them such legitimacy and votes. The following narrative shows how political patronage and connections helped a person to establish herself as *Pradhan*:

> In the area where I live I am working for the benefit of women who are senior citizens so that they can avail old age pensions scheme. These women in fact tend to approach me as they are aware that I have a direct connection with municipal councilor of the area and I also have links with political party in power. All these have helped me to emerge as a *Pradhan* here.[16]

We interviewed 14 PP *Pradhans* in the course of our fieldwork. All of them said that they were helping migrants get access to public offices to procure documents such as voter cards, ration cards, Aadhaar cards, pension cards, blue cards, ESI cards, licenses, house registration, caste certificate, residence proof, birth certificate, school certificate and colony resident certificates etc. They mediated with police on their behalf, fought against social discrimination, helped needy migrants, and fought for workers' rights regarding working conditions, salary, allowances, pension medical claims, and compensations. They worked among Dalits and women. They helped with organization of cultural activities as well.

V

Social Networks as Platforms of Solidarity

Most crucial link between members of the migrant community and their *Pradhans* was provided by the vast array of social networks. A network was variously named as a society, *sabha, samaj,* committee, *sangathan, parishad, samiti, dal,* front, or even *sena.* But in essence it was a group comprising of 50 to a 1000 members. Most networks operated at the level of a migrant colony, or less commonly at the level of municipal ward. Rarely do we find networks which operated at the level of the city. The most noteworthy aspect of these networks was that they did emerge spontaneously or organically from the ground. Rather, a network was consciously created by an activist who was either already recognized as an informal leader or was actively working towards gaining such recognition.

During the fieldwork, we pointedly asked *Pradhans* why they felt the need for building such networks. Their answers varied considerably, but most would mention what could be called the need for creating 'horizontal' as well as 'vertical' unity. The purpose of 'Horizontal Unity' and solidarity was to get together migrants regardless of their differences of caste, creed, religion, region and language in order to achieve overall unity. *Pradhans* told migrants that such traditional identities might have mattered while they were in their native places, but they had only one identity while they are in Punjab. They left their lands and families to come to Punjab to earn their livelihood. They have laboured hard and deserved all that they had achieved. Locals did not like their progress, which is why they discriminated against them. If the migrants wished to face the local majority boldly and confidently, they had to act as 'one' against local prejudices, pressures, discrimination, shaming and violence. *Pradhans* also believed that 'horizontal' unity and solidarity provided numbers that built pressure on the local administration and made it possible to get work done more easily.

Mostly, a 'horizontal' association operated only in the limited area of a colony or a ward. *Pradhans* as well as the members were located there. *Pradhans* worked according to the profile and needs of the persons of their colony. They also arranged cultural activities according to the preferences, tastes, likes and choices of the persons residing in the colony. Although there were some exceptions, we found that there as a close linkage between CPS *Pradhans* and the setting up 'horizontal' networks. We found that the 26 CPS *Pradhans* had set up 23 networks. While 14 of them were at the colony level, only 4 each were found at ward and city levels. As many as 12 of these were named after a specific locality such as *New Sunder Nagar Welfare Society, Shiv Nagar Sudhar Committee, Makkar Colony Welfare Sabha, Maha Maya Nagar Welfare Sabha, Maha Dev Gram Panchayat Raj Samaj, Sukhdev Nagar Welfare Sabha and Mohalla Prem Nagar Sudhar Committee* etc. Others were named after composite identities such as *Akhil Bhartiya Puruvanchal Vikas Parishad,* or after a workplace such as *Hero Cycle Majdoor Sangathan.*

It is important to note that these networks would also take up cultural activities if there was sufficient socio-cultural homogeneity in the concerned locality. In heterogeneous social conditions, they would take up those cultural activities which were either secular or composite in nature. They would avoid identification with divisive identities based on a particular religion or caste. It is for this reason that we found that most such networks were named after the locality in which they worked. Exceptions to the rule were *Bharatiya Dalit Samaj,* Dr. Ambedkar Mohalla Sudhar Committee and Swami Vivekanand Welfare Sabha etc.

On the other hand, 'Vertical Unity' had a very different nature and was sought for very different reasons. We have already noted that the number of migrants had increased tremendously over the years. They fought for the same employment and income opportunities. This had led to competition and conflicts among the migrants themselves. Cases of discrimination by one migrant

group against another had also surfaced. The consequence of this was that the *Pradhans* started dividing people on the basis of religion, caste, language and region. Religious differences had thus far not played a major role because most migrants were Hindus, and Muslims were a very small minority among the migrants. We found that more than 95 percent associations were involved in 'cultural activities' which were closely associated with Hindu religion. Out of the total 20 networks, four were concerned with organizing *Jagran,* four with *Durga Puja,* three with *Ramleela,* and one with *Chhath Puja.* Muslim associations were just two in number, namely *Mileteney Insaniyat* and *Muslim Garib Nawaz Committee.*

The important division among 'vertical' networks was based on caste. *Dr. Ambedkar Navyuvak Dal* and *Bhagwan Valmik Club* were exclusive to the Dalit castes. It had been observed that while Dalits participated in the activities organized by Hindu networks, non-Dalit Hindus did not participate in any manner in Dalit network activities. Finally, there were three networks named after the *Purvanchal* region. They were however mainly into welfare activities focused on the poor rather than on questions of cultural assertion of any kind. Once again, with some exceptions, most 'vertical' networks were associated with RCRC *Pradhans.* As many as 18 of the 20 RCRC networks worked at colony or ward level. There were only two which operated at the city level.

Finally, when we looked at the associations floated by PP *Pradhans,* we discovered that they were a curious mix of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' kinds. There were locality based committees that were horizontal in character, but there are also 'vertical' networks focusing on Dalits or Kashatriya castes. There were some like *Manav Samaj Sewa Sangathan* and Perfect Anti-Corruption and Human Rights Front, which engaged migrants and non-migrants alike; there were others like the *Parvassi Bhallai Board* which focused only on migrants. Then there were some which focused only on *Purvanchal* is like *Purvanchal Majdoor Sangathan, Puruvanchal Nav Nirmaan Sena, Puruvanchal Vikas Parishad* and *Purvanchal Jan Kalyan Sangathan.* Then we found

associations which focused on children and women, as some focused on religious congregations. It was obvious that PP *Pradhans* are guided by only pragmatic considerations.

Networks as Vehicles of Personal and Political Ambition

Our foregoing discussion might create the impression that we single out PP *Pradhans* for making instrumental use of networks for personal promotion. That however is not the case. Our fieldwork revealed that most CPS and RCRC *Pradhans* too used networks to increase their own visibility and social clout. Also, as we shall see later, many of them eventually make forays into the political arena.

Let us consider, for example, the manner in which a colony *Pradhan* organized a religious function such as *Jagran*. Big banners announcing the *Jagran* were put up in the colony as well as in the neighboring localities. These banners prominently carried the name and picture of the *Pradhan*. On the day of the function, the *Pradhan* invited a chief guest. The chief guest invariably was an influential local political figure. He might be an M.L.A or a Municipal Councilor. After honouring him, the Pradhan listed before him the problems faced by the residents of the colony. In the presence of all, the chief guest assured the *Pradhan* that the problems he mentioned would be sorted out on priority.

This public display of rapport between the two obviously raised the importance of the *Pradhan* in the eyes of his association members and others. The political leader was also delighted to see the gathering. He recognized that a sizeable number of people were associated with the *Pradhan*. For him, they were his prospective voters and the *Pradhan* was held the key to this 'vote bank'. It has become imperative that he won over the *Pradhan*. To gain hold over him, he actually got some work done for the colony. The *Pradhan* acknowledged the help thus rendered and calculated that remaining associated with this political figure would facilitate accomplishment of tasks in future as well. The last step was when

political leader procured the assurance of the people that their votes would be cast in his favour. This established a barter system of votes for work. In this manner a *Pradhan* who had emerged on the basis of CPS or RCRC finally ended up having recognition of a semi-political character.

We found that about 90 percent of the CPS and RCRC *Pradhans* got political recognition in this way. However, it was not a one-way traffic. We have already noted that PP *Pradhans* were, in a manner, 'outsiders' who must strive to become 'insiders' in the migrant community. Even though they were the choice not of the people but of political parties, they had to gain popular legitimacy. They could carve a niche for themselves in the community only through networks. We found that more than 90 percent PP *Pradhans* gained popular approval through community networks.

An analysis of the associations formed by these PP *Pradhans* showed that two-thirds of them were connected with religion, culture, caste, and social welfare while the remaining were for improvement of amenities in the colonies. This seemed to indicate that RCRC networks were the preferred route because they yielded easier and quicker mobilization. Our study shows that CPS *Pradhans* took more time in making entry into formal politics than did the *Pradhans* who had emerged on the basis of RCRC.

It is also interesting to note that even those *Pradhans* who first gained public recognition for CPS work eventually diversified their activities over time and sought public recognition a second time through the RCRC route. Our analysis shows that this applied to more than 66 percent of CPS *Pradhans*. They had realized that access to public institutions was easier if they could bring people together and exert their collective pressure. Thus the unity and solidarity of the community was important, and the best way to generate this solidarity was through religious-cultural activity. Therefore CPS *Pradhans* of colonies began to organize religious-cultural associations in their areas. When they proposed the formation of such associations, people asked them to lead them as

well because they were already quite impressed by their skills and experience. These newly formed associations served the twin purpose of forging solidarity - be it in the name of locality, religion or caste –and equally importantly, they put a stamp of recognition on the CPS *Pradhan* as a religious-cultural leader.

Be that as it may, it can be seen that just as CPS and RCRC reached for political patronage, those who are launched politically had also to fall back on the time-tested channels of community networks to reach people. An inextricable link between material interests, cultural identity and political connectivity of the migrant community came into existence. Both migrants and their leaders eventually got keenly and deeply involved in politics.

Conclusion

Informal leadership that emerged from the ranks of newly settled migrants in Ludhiana could be divided into three groups. The first group addressed the material interests of the migrants by mediating on their behalf with the civic, political and social authorities. The second group helped migrants preserve their ethnic and cultural identity by creating platforms for its articulation. Both groups sought to provide protection to migrants against their harassment, exploitation, discrimination, and humiliation at the hands of local majority population. While these two groups grew organically from the ground, the third group was launched through political patronage, and gained influence in the community by adopting a broad-based approach covering both sets of migrant needs. Designated by acronyms CPS, RCRC and PP respectively in this study, the three groups of leaders revealed some significant differences in terms of their socio-economic profiles. These differences helped them play the specific roles expected of them. All the three leaned heavily on social networks they created for forging solidarity among different sections of migrants. They also used these networks for increasing their own visibility and clout.

References

[1] Ludhiana is the biggest industrial centre of Punjab. It is a hub of numerous small-scale industries, producing sugar, textile, knitting, spares parts and hosiery. The phenomenal expansion of the industry in the Ludhiana city has earned it the titles of "Osaka of India" or "Small Scale Industrial capital of India". The city therefore attracts the largest numbers of migrant workers in Punjab. There are more than 4 millions migrants in Punjab, out of which Ludhiana alone is the home to around 2 milions migrants. A vast majority of these migrants have settled permanently in the city. They have established their own colonies. There are quite a large number of colonies in the city, in which about 80 to 90 per cent of the residents are migrants. These migrants also have their own 'societies' and *sabhas* based on regional, occupational or caste identities. Thus the migrant settlers at present are more visible, institutionalised and organised in Ludhiana than anywhere else in the state. (Field work, 2014)

[2] See further details: Saumitra, Jha, Vijayendra Rao and Michael Woolcock (2007), 'Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums', *World Development*, Vol.35, No.2, pp 230-246; Anand Inbanathan, and D. V. Gopalappa (2003), 'Fixer, Patronage, 'Fixing' and Local Governance in Karnataka', *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. 52, No. 2 Sept., pp 164-185; James Manor (2000), 'Small Time Political Fixers in India's State: Towel over Armpit', *Asian Survey,* Vol.40, No.5, Sept.-Oct. pp 816-835.

[3] Regarding the qualities of *Pradhans* is based on inferences drawn from the field.

[4] Interviewed on February 2014.

[5] Interviewed on March, 2015.

[6] Interviewed on May, 2016.

[7] Interviewed on June, 2015.

[8] Personal attributes means good behavior, educational qualification, ability to motivate, honesty, given importance to welfare activities, contact with government officials, wisdom, and knowledge how to execute a task.

[9] Work ethic means stand with people in every situation (Sukh and Dukh), no exploitation of community people, capacity to do any nature of work and must belong to migrant community (Field Work, 2014).

[10] Interviewed on July, 2014.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Interviewed on August, 2014.

[13] Interviewed on August, 2016.

[14] Interviewed on March, 2016.

[15] Interviewed on June, 2015.

[16] Interviewed on February 2015.

In the Name of Marriage: A Study of Bride Buying in Haryana

Nirmala Devi*
Aditya Parihar**

Abstract

Haryana happens to be the lowest ranked state in India, in terms of sex ratio, thus pointing at the subtle phenomenon of gender discrimination, manifesting most evidently in the rampant sale and purchase of women in the name of marriage. Contrary to the expectation that declining sex ratio in the State would probably lead to a status enhancement of women, there has been a systematic commercialization of women brought from other states. Such brides have been termed by various authors as "cross regional", "across regional", "long distance", "import" or "purchased" brides (Kaur, 2004; Chaudhry and Mohan, 2010; Mishra, 2013; Darling, 1928). These women are brought from distant states to Haryana, through channels which have now been institutionalized. Most of these women are from very poor

*Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 143005. Email: nirmala.socio@gndu.ac.in

**Guest Faculty, Centre for Social Work, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 160014. Email: adityapu2@gmail.com

families. There is paucity of comprehensive empirical studies to capture the life experiences of these women, who are brought to distant places in the name of marriage, but are seldom able to enjoy a respectable status within the family and larger community. Based upon an extensive field study, this paper, divided into three sections, examines the phenomenon of bride buying in Haryana. The first section captures the factors leading men to look for women in return for money, as marriage partners, from other states, often completely unfamiliar with the local language and culture, besides examining the reasons for driving girls and their families into contracting such marriages. In the second section, the experiences and problems faced by these brides after such alliances are discussed. The last section brings out the summary and concluding remarks.

Keywords: Sex Ratio, Marriage, Brides, Buying, Phenomenon.

Introduction

Men and women are inseparable pillars of any social structure. Their parity, compatibility and unison are the basic requirements for the propagation of the human race. It is said that in ancient India women enjoyed equal status with men in all fields of life. In fact a woman was considered superior to her male counterpart. However, during the course of history, due to political, social and economic factors women no longer enjoyed their honoured place. The majority of women led a life of dependence that did not give them distinguished self - identity. It is pertinent to note that social deterioration in the form of ethics, morals, values and culture is the root cause of the decaying role of one of the pillars of the society i.e. women. In the Gender Gap Report 2013, out of 136 countries surveyed, India's ranking was 101[1].   In 2014, India's ranking

---

[1]World Economic Forum. (2013). *Global Gender Gap Report, 2013.* Geneva, Switzerland

further went down and stood at 114, out of 142 countries surveyed.[2] In 2018 and 2017, India ranked 108th in the gender gap report published by World Economic Forum.[3] Further, India has been ranked 112th in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Index 2020, out of the 153 countries across the world.[4] Hence it can be said that despite years of rapid economic growth, the Indian women, have faced some of the world's most abominable disparity in access to healthcare, education and work. Within the country the situation has also deteriorated to a great extent, especially in Punjab and Haryana.

Sex-ratio is an important social indicator to assess the level of existing equity between men and women in a society at a given point of time. Changes in sex ratio mainly mirror the underlying socio-economic and cultural patterns of a society in different ways. Haryana is one of the few states in the world where the male population outnumbers the female population. The moribund sex ratio is a matter of great worry, as it leads to serious demographic disparities and unfavorable social consequences. Marriage remains universal and socially compulsory in India, but marriage requires that both the sexes should be available in equal proportion. The sex ratio in the state of Punjab and Haryana is nearly 800 women per thousand men, which implies that there were only four women available for every five men (Kaur, 2004). According to the Census of India, 2001 in the age group of 15- 59 years age group, the number of never married males in Haryana was 2,068,085 (32.28%) while the number of never married females was 9, 18,888 (16.27%).[5]

[2]World Economic Forum. (2014). *Global Gender Gap Report, 2014.* Geneva, Switzerland

[3]World Economic Forum. (2018). *Global Gender Gap Report, 2018.* Geneva, Switzerland.

[4]World Economic Forum. (2020). *Global Gender Gap Report, 2020.* Geneva, Switzerland.

[5]

As the pool of the eligible women has shrunk, the men especially those who are unemployed, poor and suffering from some deformities are not proficient to get brides in the local marriage market. To meet this shortage, different tactics are used by families in the rural areas of Haryana. Therefore, this skewed sex ratio continues to impair the institution of marriage cynically. Consequently, the families adopt various strategies to cope with the shortage of brides. Importing a bride from other regions is one of the strategies adopted by these eligible bachelors and their families to meet the shortage of brides.

In the villages of Punjab and Haryana marriage is no more a holy union of two persons. Nowadays, it has progressively become a trade, whereby brides are obtained from far-off states of India for meager price. The business of bride buying is so lucrative that locals are turning into agents (*dallals)* for sourcing brides for families seeking partners for their bachelor/ widower/deserted sons. Agents procure girls and young women from different states in India, promising them employment or husband and then they are sold to brokers in Haryana.[6] This process of buying girls for marriage from other states is called Bride Buying. In earlier studies such brides were interchangeably called as "cross regional", "across regional", "long distance", "import" or "purchased" brides (Kaur, 2004; Chaudhry and Mohan, 2010; Mishra, 2013; Darling, 1928.). But, in this study the brides are called as purchased brides, ample evidences from the field sites were available from which it can be said that these girls are purchased as brides.

With this backdrop, this study is undertaken to explore in detail the phenomenon of Bride Buying in Haryana, with the objectives of examining the factors for which men have purchased brides from other states. An attempt has also been made to identify the motivating factors driving girls and their families into contracting such marriages. The literature sufficiently highlighted

---

[6]Marzouqi, F. A. (2015). Inside India: Bride shortage Drives Men to Look far Afield. *The National.* Retrieved February 11, 2018.

that these brides are discriminated by the family and the community members and a lot of problems are faced by them. Hence, an effort has also been made to examine their experiences and problems of these brides after their marriages.

The study was exploratory in nature due to the limited availability of literature. Further, due to the nature of the phenomenon under study, qualitative research methods were used. In the view of the qualitative nature of the research issue, the data were obtained by using methods such as personal interviews, narratives, observations and focused group discussions. An Interview Guide was also prepared for collecting data from the field. The data were finally analyzed using appropriate methods which would not only give a multidimensional perspective, but also add to the quality of research being undertaken. The study was executed in the state of Haryana, because this phenomenon of brides is in public eyes these days in Haryana. Respondents in the present study include purchased brides (respondents), their husbands, family members, men and women of different age groups from the respective village communities, and social activists. Conversational interviews were conducted with diverse kinds of respondents in order to extract in-depth and authentic information, with the help of interview guides specifically designed for different kind of respondents.

During the review of literature it was found that the phenomenon of Bride Buying was not new to this region and was prevalent in Haryana (part of Punjab) during colonial period also. After analysis of secondary sources (magazines, journals, books and gazetteers) it was analysed that with time there were some change and continuity in this phenomenon when compared to historical phenomenon of bride buying. The change and continuity in this phenomenon with respect to time are, as;

Table: 1.1.1, Change and Continuity in Bride Buying

Changes		
1.	Earlier it prevailed only amongst the lower caste people , as evident from the existing literature.	Now this phenomenon is prevalent among all caste categories.
2.	The mode of payment was not hard Cash at that time	In the majority of cases the payment is in the form of hard Cash these days.
3.	At that time women were imported from neighbouring states like Rajasthan and Kangra etc.	Women are sourced from distant states like Bihar, West Bengal, Assam etc.
Continuity		
1.	The phenomenon wa s prevalent in all the religious groups at that time	At present time also it i s prevalent in all the religious groups
2.	It was a phenomenon of Rural Areas	Now, also it is a phenomenon of Rural Areas
3.	Such marriages were prevalent in Lower-Class.	At present also such alliances are present in Lower-Class.

Section I

Factors Responsible for Bride Buying

The first section of the article highlights the socio-economic profile of respondents (purchased brides), their husbands and their family background. This section tries to underscore the factors that are responsible for such kind of marital alliances. The section also tries to answer the question that why purchased brides were not able to get suitable match in their local area. It is pertinent to find out the reasons why these purchased brides are not able to find a suitable match in their local marriage pool and under what circumstances these women enter such kind of marital alliances where the matrimonial families are so far away from their native villages

Table: 1.1.2: Factors for Entering into Such Marriages

(For Purchased Brides)

Factors	No. of Respondents
Exorbitant Dowry Demand	14
Trafficking	6
Deserted	8
Dark Complexion	2
Father was an Alcoholic	2
Runaway	1
Less Educated / Illiterate	2
Cheated by Relatives	1
Widowhood	4
Over age for Marriage	1
Total	**41**

Source: Fieldwork for Ph.D. thesis

Table 1.1.2 very clearly indicates that in thirty-four, i.e. fourteen cases the family members of the brides were not able to meet the hefty dowry demands of the grooms' side. The finding was also substantiated by Blanchet (2003) where she found that parents' inability to pay for dowry comes on top of the list among the factors given for such marriages in Uttar Pradesh or elsewhere in north India. Eight respondents were not able to get grooms in their local area because they were deserted by their earlier husbands and in-laws family. In India, desertion of a woman is a stigma and no one wants to marry a woman who has been

deserted. Such cases were found where the deserted women were not accepted by her maternal family members and out of compulsion they have to opt for such kind of marriages. There were four cases (out of forty-one), where such women were found to be widows accompanied by children from their earlier marriages. Their family members tried hard to find suitable matches for their respective second marriage in their native areas but all in vain. Thus, at the end they had to opt for such kind of marriages. In nearly fifteen percent of cases, it was found that girls were kidnapped, abducted and then trafficked to Haryana by the mediators and then sold in the local marriage market. There were cases where the respondents were found to be of dark complexioned, not much educated and in few cases fathers were alcoholic. In one of the cases, the respondent ran away from her own home and became a victim of trafficking before entering into such marital alliance. So it was also analyzed during the study that the girls out of compulsion opted for such kind of marriage alliance not out of consent.

It was found during the field work that the potential bachelors in Haryana were not able to get suitable match in their local area. Under what circumstances these men enter such kind of marital alliance which is far away from their native villages. Why the potential bachelors in Haryana were not able to get suitable match in their local area? During fieldwork the researcher was able to categorise some of the factors which compel potential grooms in Haryana to purchase girls from other states.

Table: 1.1.3: Factors for Entering into Such Marriages
(For Husbands of Purchased Bride)

Factors	No. of Husbands
Over Age for Marriage	4
Not able to get Girl through *Satta Batta*	3
Alcoholism	3
First Wife Died/ Deserted by first Wife	8
Mentally not Stable/Handicapped	4
No/ Less Land	13
Illiterate /Unemployed	2
Not Good looking	1
Left his first wife	2
Preference for Son	1
Total	**41**

Source: Fieldwork for Ph.D. thesis

Table 1.1.3 very clearly indicates that in thirty two percent, i.e. thirteen cases, the grooms have very less and no land so they were not able to get brides in local marriage market. In nearly nineteen percent of the cases the husbands were deserted by their first wives or their first wives were dead and were not able to get bride in their local areas. In ten percent of the cases the husbands highlighted that they were over age for marriage in the local areas so no one wants to give their daughter to them as bride. In another ten percent cases (four cases out of forty-one) the researcher found that two of the husbands were mentally unstable and two were handicapped, therefore they were not able to get brides in local

areas of Haryana. Culture of 'Satta Batta'and alcoholism were also highlighted as reason for not getting bride by nearly fifteen percent of the husbands.

Findings of the present study illustrate that in majority of cases, i.e. ninety-five percent of the respondents belonged to the rural areas. There were few exceptions, i.e. only two respondents belonged to urban areas. Further, it was noted that individuals in the rural areas were not aware of trafficking for marriages and the agents (dallals) took advantage of this situation. They trap girls from the poor and under developed rural areas. Also, the husbands of these women were found to be from rural areas of Haryana. Thus it could be said that the phenomenon of Bride Buying was mainly a phenomenon of rural areas.

Further in the rural areas the phenomenon was prevalent in the two main religious groups of Haryana, i.e. Hindu and Muslim. Among Hindus, it was found that the skewed sex ratio, fragmentation of the agricultural land, unemployment and the substance abuse were the major reasons. Among Muslims, there were two communities (Gujjars and Meos), in both the communities it was quite interesting to note that Gujjar and Meos tries to find a suitable match for their children within their own community. Among both the communities, there is a culture of 'Satta –Batta', so men who have no sisters for exchange, are not able to find brides in the local area. The men, who are widowers or separated from their first wives, are also not able to find brides in their local areas.

The findings also highlight that the buying of girls is not restricted to one or two particular caste groups. There is an ample evidence of these marriages occurring amongst all castes among i.e. landowning castes, Brahmins, Backward and Scheduled Castes. In the present study these marriages were reported among all the caste groups. It was found that most of the marriages were inter-caste marriages. The caste from which the brides hailed was Sheik, Ansari, Qureshi, Pathaan, Kumhar Ravidass, Bhumij, Teli Julaha, Rajput, Gaddi etc. The two brides were not able to tell their

castes. Mishra (2013) validated this finding and highlighted that there were a few inter- religion marriages but mostly all the marriages were inter caste marriages. It was found that these brides were invariably labeled as inferior, lower caste and 'others' who did not belong to Haryana. Since, they belonged to other region/state/area they are discriminated and excluded by the community members once they enter into such kind of marriage.

Further, it was also found that majority of the prospective grooms (twenty- five out of forty-one) who entered such kind of marital alliances were educated up to middle standard and twelve out of forty-one were illiterate. On the other hand it was also found that the majority of the purchased brides were illiterate, i.e. twenty- one out of forty-one. In forty-six percent of the cases the prospective brides were educated up to middle standard. There was only one case in which the respondent was educated up to higher standard. It was found that eleven (26.82% of the total) husbands of the respondents were working as unskilled labourers and seven were skilled labourers. Six of the respondents were active in the field of agriculture but they were small farmers with very small land holdings (from 0.5 to 5acres of land). Four of the spouses were not active in any kind of employment out of these four, two were mentally not stable, one was handicapped and the remaining one was an alcoholic. From the results, it was also evident that majority of the families belonged to low income group, i.e. fifty- six percent of the families had income lower than Rs.10,000 per month. While looking at the family profile of these purchased brides it was very difficult to get the exact information about the income level of the maternal families of brides but from the information provided by them (about the occupation of father and brothers of these brides), it was quite evident that they too belonged to low income group and majority of their families were not able to fulfill the hefty dowry demands of the grooms' families. From the above discussion it was found that the grooms and the prospective brides belonged to the lower income groups, cutting across their caste and religion.

Therefore, from the discussion it was found that exorbitant dowry, trafficking of girls and desertion from first marriage was the major factors which coerce these girls to enter such kind of marriages. On the other hand no/ less land, desertion of first wife and over age for marriage were the major factors that compel these men to enter such kind of marriages.

Section II

Problems faced by Purchased Brides

The second section deals with the experiences and problems of these brides after their marriages. From the findings it was found that in most of the cases, the women don't know that they have been trafficked by agents *(dallals)* and the money in exchange has been paid by their prospective grooms. In nearly half of the cases, brides told that their husbands revealed them about their purchase after marriage. Further, it was found that in such marriages the migration of a bride from the source area to destination was not just simple migration but ample evidences are available from where it could be said that most of the cases were the cases of human trafficking. During the study it was found that the process of transportations in case of bride buying is divided into three main steps, source area, transit and destination area.

Fig. 1.1: Steps in the Process of Transportation

It was noted that women are bought from the source states to transit point, i.e. Delhi, Palwal, Karnal, Kalka and Ambala and sent onwards to the buyer husbands. During the discussion with such brides, it was revealed that trains and trucks were the main sources through which these girls are transported from one place to another. According to husbands of these brides and agents, the

money was paid in the form of hard cash or sometimes indirectly by spending on wedding ceremonies. Therefore, it is found that the process of transportation of these girls/women is a structured one and the organized gangs are available both in source and destination areas who indulge in such kind of activities.

The next part of this section deals with the problem and discrimination faced by these brides in their matrimonial homes. It was quite interesting to note that despite the immense contribution of purchased brides within and outside their homes, they faced lot of problems and discrimination. First and foremost, they have to face a totally different environment, culture, language, food habits and dress code etc and the onus of adjustment to this environment is totally upon these brides only. Derogatory names are also given to them. '*Paro*'(outsider*), 'Biharo'*(outsider*)* and *'Molki'* (purchased in money*)* is few of the derogatory names assigned to them. The discrimination does not end here, the off springs of these purchased brides are also given names such as'*Paro Ka* '(off spring of outsider) and '*Daasi ki Aualad'* (off spring of a slave).

It was noted that in cases of purchased brides the situation was quite different in terms of rituals being conducted on the day of wedding; there were only few cases where ritualistically wedding ceremony had taken place. It was pragmatic to observe during the field work that the wedding of such brides was a type of illusion created by the agents (*Dallals)* and family members of the grooms, through this illusion they cheat these brides, their family members and the local administration. In reality no wedding ceremony was performed and in many cases (Hindu religion) only the exchange of garland had taken place, as informed by some brides. A study by Khan (2013) found that the marriages in which brides were purchased were not accepted as normal marriages. This type of marriages are labeled as *'Jugaad Marriage' (*temporary arrangement*)* in the rural areas of Haryana. During field work in the Mewat region of Haryana, it was found that in most of the cases where women were trafficked at a very young age, no marriage ceremony had taken place. In case where there was multiple purchase of same woman, in those cases also it was found that no

such ceremonies had been performed. Such marriages are legally not even registered. Hence, it can be inferred that these marriages have no social and legal status.

During fieldwork, it was found that these women are normally treated as labourer/servant by their matrimonial families. They are made to work throughout the day within the households and in fields too. It was noted that these women are purchased only to perform certain tasks like to perform household chores, field and agricultural work, to give a son to the family and to fulfil the sexual needs of the men of the family. In village Morkhi, district Jind, a R.M.P in the village narrated that, *"Yeh jo aurtein bahar se aati hain dono taraf ka kaaam karti hai bahar ka bhi, aur andar ka bhi …hamari aurton se zada kaam karti hai"* (these woman who come from outside Haryana, do two fold work, the fieldwork and household work... they work more than our own women folk). So these women had to take responsibility. Another respondent narrated, "*Yahaan to bahar ka kaam bhi to karna padta ha"*[7] (I have to do fieldwork here as well). This finding of using these brides as labourer by their family members was also substantiated by Khan (2013) in his article 'Bride Trafficking with in India' and found that these women are imported to fulfil the sexual gratification of men and they also work as wage less labourers. Further he found that they are sent to do the daily farm work while the local brides seldom go to the field.

Another problem faced by these women due to their distant matrimonial homes was that their family members, especially parents and brothers were unable to attend the wedding of their children. This was the major difference found among the local brides and these women from distant lands. This ceremony of '*Bhaat Bharai'* was totally absent in the marriages of the off-springs of such brides. On the other hand, in north India during the

---

[7]Interview with a respondent from Village Jataanwala, District Yamunanaagar, Haryana.

marriage of son/ daughter there are certain functions in which the maternal uncle's (*mamma*) participation is very important. But, the maternal families of these brides are poor and in some cases they are totally cut-off from their maternal families, so no one from the maternal family is available to participate in such kind of customs/ rituals. Also, in rural areas of Haryana there is a tradition of giving some gifts to the daughter of families on some special days like *Teej, Diwali* etc. But, in cases of such alliances researcher hardly found any case where the bride was receiving any gifts from their maternal families. During the field work, cases were found where the women had forgotten their real names and also the name of their native village. In such cases no one from the maternal family of the women could participate in such rituals. Villagers in rural Haryana think that these women are not able to celebrate such old age customs and the number of such alliances is on increase in rural Haryana, as a consequence of which day-by-day the culture and traditions of Haryana is heading towards an end and these purchased brides are playing an important role in this.

Women respondents further told that the food-eating habits of Haryana folks is totally different from their native places. Many of them complained that they used to have rice in their meals at their parental home but once they came to Haryana, *Roti* (Chapatti) has become an integral part of their diet. Few of them especially from West Bengal and Assam told that fish and rice was their staple diet in their native places but as they came to Haryana, it has been replaced by strict vegetarian diet that too with chapattis. According to the study of Chaudhry (2018), eating non vegetarian diet at their native place is also one of the reasons of discrimination with these brides which is evident from the statement:

"*People differentiate with women who come b har se (outsider) because in their native states they ate eggs, meat and fish. When I got married, my relatives would say, 'your mother-in-law is from there, she will eat fish and rice everyday'. Here we do not even touch eggs. For this*

reason, I do not tell anyone that she is b har k . I do not feel bad that she is from there. I even eat food cooked by her. She has been here for so many years yet there are some people who do not accept food from women like her because they think it is not clean." [8]

There were few exceptions also, in one or two cases, the husbands of these brides changed their food-eating pattern according to these women from which it can be said there were men in few cases also who change their diet according to the need of their wives.

The findings revealed that in all the districts of Haryana it became really tough for purchased brides to converse with family and community members whereas the community members too felt this problem. [9] In majority of the cases from the accent of these brides, one could easily realize that, they do not belong to Haryana. These women belonged to distant places i.e., Bihar, Jharkhand, Assam, Hyderabad, and West Bengal and their culture and language are totally different from the people of Haryana. So, the major problem they faced when they reached here as brides, was that of language. During discussion with the spouses of these purchased brides it was narrated by one of the husbands that not only the wives adjust to the changed language and culture but the husbands also faced the same problems when they visit their matrimonial homes. According to C.J.M. cum Secretary D.L.S.A, Mewat,

"*Education and Language barriers make it almost impossible for these fragile women to get justice".* [10]

Yet, there was bright case, in which a bought woman in Mewat told that her husband was very adjusting and when she

---

[8]Chaudhry, S. (2018). 'Flexible' caste boundaries: Cross-regional marriage as mixed marriage in rural north India. *Contemporary South Asia*,1-15. Retrieved December 27, 2018.

[9]During the discussion with the Coordinator of Khap Panchayats, Rohtak, Inder Jeet Hooda.

[10]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VulRaK1i6qo

came here, he helped her in learning Hindi and she helped her husband in learning Bengali language. It was noted that very few such women were leading their lives with respect and dignity. As the word purchase or buying is attached with them, therefore they are often taken as a commodity only. A commodity you can buy in the market at a lower price like that of a buffalo in the market. Once they satisfy the desire of their family members then these women are thrown away or sold again to other men who are in need of women. *Majority of such cases were found in the district Nuh (Mewat), where these women were found to be sold number of times. According to Jagmati Sangwan a social activist from Haryana,*

"In a few cases, if she fulfills the desire of a son and the family members feel that this woman is not good for their social status, then the son is forcibly taken from her and she is again resold in the marriage market".

Also, Protection-cum-Prohibition Officer, Kaithal narrated that,

"Agar incase koi widow ho jati ha to, ya to wapis chali jaati hai ya aga bech diya jatta hai".

In case a woman becomes a widow, either she goes back to her native area or she is resold again in marriage market. Therefore, multiple selling of these brides is also the issue faced by them. The agents from the field told that, the value [in monetary form] of these brides keep on decreasing with each consecutive selling. Further, multiple selling of these brides devalued their social status in the community also.

Traces were also found in some of the cases that these brides were shared by men of the family. This finding is also substantiated by article written by Sarbjit Dhaliwal in 2003 in his writing in The Tribune. He in his article further refers to Mr Bhupinder Singh, Head, Department of Sociology at Punjabi University, where he says that in poor families, only one son used to be married. This practice was followed in order to avoid fragmentation of land in Punjab. In the same article he also referred

to Professor Ajmer Singh Aulakh, a playwright, has extensively dealt with this issue in his play — '*Ik Ramayan Hor*'. During the study, it was found that the traces of such practices were also found to be normalizing in the rural areas of Haryana. In one of the cases of district Jhajjar the brother in law (*devar*) of such bride narrated that since he has no money to buy a bride so he was living with in elder brother's family and now he realized that he did not need a wife, because his all needs are fulfilled by his sister in law (*Bhabi*). During the discussion with Head, Department of Sociology, Maharashi Dayanand, Rohtak substantiated this finding by saying;

" *Bride sharing ka concept Haryana main pahla sa hi chala a raha ha. Iska peecha main factor ya ha ki Haryana main Army main bahut log hain. Aur ya natural ha ki agar admi army main jata ha, to ek do saal ka liya bahar rahta ha. Aur wife peecha ghar pa hi rahti ha. Is tarha sa devar, aur jeeth sa uska physical relations establish ho jata tha.To historical hi is culture ki Haryanvi society main acceptance ha."* (Many people in Haryana are in armed forces. It is a natural phenomenon, that in army he would be away from home for 1-2 years, and wife would be left behind. When wife stays alone with elder or younger men she develops relations with elder or younger brother of the husband. Historically this culture is acceptable in Haryanvi society).

The word *'Paro'* and *'Molki'* are well known today in regions of Haryana, Punjab, western Uttar Pardesh and Rajasthan. *'Paro'* is a name given to purchase brides in Mewat Region of Haryana and 'Molki' is also a derogatory name of such brides in Jatland of Haryana. During fieldwork, it was noted that these women were often addressed as *'Kharidi hui'* (Purchased with money from poor districts of Bihar, Chattisgarh, Assam, West Bengal and Hyderabad etc.). Since they belonged to other region/state/area they are discriminated and excluded by the community members once they enter into such kind of marriage. During the discussion with one of the Sociologists from Maharashi Dayanand University, she told that, "in the rural areas of Rohtak, Haryana such kind of brides are called '*Dusri*' (other)." According to her, there may be two

meanings of this word *Dusri, 1) vo dur ki hai, (*she belonged to faraway place) *2) vo kisi dusra samaj ki hai (*she belonged to other society*).* In one of the villages of district Jind, the *chaukidar* of the village called such a bride '*Bahara ki'(outsider).* Then he describes that since these women are from other community, so they are called as *Bahara ki (outsider)* in Haryana. From which it can be analyzed that they are considered as 'others' who do not belonged to this society. Sociologically the concept of the 'Other' (and its verbal noun form 'Othering') defines classic sociological concepts such as "discrimination", "exclusion", and "marginalization", by adding a psychoanalytic dimension to them (Ino kuchi & Nozaki, 2005). *Othering* marks and names the other, providing a definition of their otherness, which in turn creates social distance, marginalizes, dis-empowers and excludes(Weis, 1995).[11]

Also during the fieldwork it was told by the villagers that these brides were also called as '*Bihari'* or '*Bhaya Rani',* which does not means that they belong to Bihar but means that they are of Dark Complexion(Light Skin).During the discussion with the daughter-in-law of one such bride in village Jattanwala,Yamunanagar she narrated that*, "Main ta chuddy bhi keh dain ha chamari bhi keh dain" (*I call her as a members of lower caste, i.e. *Chuddy* and *Chammari*). Kukreja (2017), claimed that issues of caste discrimination, internal racism and colourism or skin tone prejudice practiced by conjugal families and communities against dark skinned, purchased brides.[12] A ccording to Chaudhry (2018) villagers comments about skin colour to mark difference and attribute lower caste status to these Brides.[13]

---

[11] Weis, L. (1995). Identity Formation and the Process of "Othering": Unravelling Sexual Threads'. Educational Foundations.

[12] Kukreja, R. (2017). Caste and Cross-region Marriages in Haryana, India: Experience of Dalit Cross-Region Brides in Jat Households. *Modern Asian Studies,52*(2), 492-531. Retrieved December 15, 2018.

[13] Chaudry, S. (2018). 'Flexible' caste boundaries: Cross-regional marriage as mixed marriage in rural north India. *Contemporary South Asia,*1-15. Retrieved December 27, 2018.

The findings also revealed that these purchased women have faced the problem of isolation from their maternal family members for years together. Cases of brides have been found where they not even remember the village and the place to which they belonged. In one of the cases, it was noted that the husband didn't let his wife to visit her parental home for the delivery of child because he nurtured a fear that she might not come back after delivery. In that particular case, it was the husband's second marriage because he wanted to have a son. Even after giving birth to children very few respondents visited their parental homes. There were extreme cases too, where these women didn't even remember the name of the village to which they belonged. In few of the cases, it was found that the districts mentioned by them were found to be in other states when it was searched by the researcher. From which it was clearly visible that they have not visited their maternal homes for last many years and the matrimonial families of such brides always panicked that if she visits her home or talk to stranger, she never came back. This finding also substantiated the findings of earlier studies which say that most of these marriages are forced marriages because if these marriages were consensual marriages they never ran away from their matrimonial homes. In two (one from Nuh and other from Jind) of the cases, the research found that the brides visited their native places to meet their parents but they never came back. On the contrary there is a variation in the view of community members and they said that, the economic conditions of their matrimonial families and the distance of their maternal homes are the factors that they are not able to visit their native places.

During the discussion with these brides, their family members and community members it was found that these brides were not able to enjoy equal status in comparison to their local counterparts. During discussion with Kiran (fictitious name), one of the purchased brides in village Bibipur of Haryana she told that, "the women of other regions are treated like outsiders, I never want that any girl from the other state should come here, girls from other states are not honoured by the people of this area". During the field

work in Haryana some factors were found on the basis of which one can said that discrimination is there between a local bride and the purchased bride. Due to this discrimination they compared themselves to the local brides from Haryana, they feel underprivileged in a material or immaterial way. They feel anger or dissatisfaction because of her discrimination in relation to the better situated others (in this particular case Local Brides). To study the relative deprivation experienced by these brides the approach of sociologist Sameul Stouffer[14] is the most appropriate approach. Sociologist, Samuel Stouffer, developed the Relative Deprivation approach while studying social psychology during World War II. Relative deprivation theory refers to the idea that feeling of deprivation and discontent is related to a desired point of reference (i.e., reference groups). In the cases of bride buying purchased women came to Haryana as brides but when they enter into their matrimonial families/ villages they were not given the status equivalent (desired point of reference) to the local brides (reference group in case of bride buying).Therefore, these brides feel deprived and discontented due to the discriminatory behavior of society and family members towards them. There are other factors also which contribute to the lower status of these women which range from lack of financial support, moral, family support, the vast cultural difference and racist perception of the society towards them.

Section III

Conclusion

In ancient India women enjoyed equal status with men in all fields of life. In fact a woman was considered superior to her male

[14] Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., Devinney, L. C., Star, S. A., & Williams, R. M., Jr. (1949). The American soldier: Adjustment during army life. *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II.* Oxford, England: Princeton Univ. Press.

counterpart. However, during the course of history, due to political, social and economic factors women no longer enjoyed their honoured place. Sex-ratio is an important social indicator to assess the level of existing equity between men and women in a society. Haryana happens to be the lowest ranked state in India, in terms of sex ratio, thus pointing at the subtle phenomenon of gender discrimination, manifesting most evidently in the rampant sale and purchase of women in the name of marriage. Contrary to the expectation that declining sex ratio in the State would probably lead to a status enhancement of women, there has been a systematic commercialization of women brought from other states. Changes in sex ratio mainly mirror the underlying socio-economic and cultural patterns of a society in different ways.

Findings revealed that factors like no/less land, unemployment, death/desertion by the first wife, over-age and not able to get bride through *'Satta- Batta'* were the major factors for which men in Haryana were not able to get brides in the local areas. On the other hand exorbitant dowry demand, trafficking of girls and desertion of wives from the first marriage were the main factors that girls were not able to get grooms in the source areas.

The study highlighted that such kind of marriages were found in lower class rural families and is one of the major outcome of this study. Findings revealed that it is not restricted to one or two castes in source and destination areas but is operational in almost all the castes of both the areas. The majority of the purchased brides were illiterate and their marriages were not consensual. They were far away from their native villages and considered culturally and linguistically outsiders as evident from the findings. As strangers they face lot of problems and the burden of adjustment within the family or community. The onus of adjustment in such marriages is totally upon such brides. Since, they are purchased so their status within their matrimonial family is like of a commodity. Findings also revealed sexual sharing by all the male members of the family, multiple selling, discrimination and abandonment are some of the

major problems faced by these purchased brides. This phenomenon targets poor women, with a different language, culture and entirely different food eating patterns. Therefore, these women are completely marginalized and more vulnerable to all kinds of exploitation.

Since these brides are totally dependent on their husbands and once they migrated to other state after their marriage, the women have no parental support, no awareness, and little resource to take action and learn that the situation they were in is not what they were promised or had anticipated. Thus once enticed to leave their maternal home to commence a new life with a husband, women involved in this phenomenon of bride buying are powerless to change their situation, and have few resources available to empower them. Therefore, the problems of these brides are very serious and the immediate intervention from the government and civil society organizations is the need of the hour.

References

Blanchet, T. (2003). *Bangladesh Girls Sold as Wives in North India* (pp. 1-56). Dhaka, Bangladesh: Drishti Research Centre.

Chowdhry, P. (1996). Marriage, Sexuality and the Female "Ascetic" *Economic & Political Weekly,* 2307-2322.

Chowdhry, P. (2014). Masculine Spaces. *Economic & Political Weekly, XLIX* (47), 41-49.

Chowdhry, P. (2011). *Political Economy of Production and Reproduction* (1st Ed.). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Chaudhry, S. (2018). 'Flexible' caste boundaries: Cross-regional marriage as mixed marriage in rural north India. *Contemporary South Asia*,1-15. Retrieved on December 27,2018 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328916596_'Flexible'_caste_boundaries_Cross-regional_marriage_as_mixed_marriage_in_rural_north_India.

Chaudhry S. & Mohan, T. D. (2010). Off Marriage and Migration Bengali and Bihari Brides in a UP Village. *Indian Journal of Gender Studies*, 18(3), 311-340.

Darling, M.L. (1928). *The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dhaliwal, S. (2003). Bride-buying an Old Practice in North India. *The Tribune*. Retrieved December 22, 2017.

Kaur, R. (2004). Across Regional Marriages. *Economic & Political Weekly,* 2595-2603.

Khan, S. R. (2013). *Bride Trafficking with in India*. In V. Mishra .(Ed.), *Human Trafficking: The stakeholders Perspective.* New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Kukreja, R. (2017). Caste and Cross-region Marriages in Haryana, India: Experience of Dalit Cross-Region Brides in Jat Households. *Modern Asian Studies,52*(2), 492-531. Retrieved December 15, 2018.

Marzouqi, F. A. (2015). Inside India: Bride shortage Drives Men to Look far Afield. *The National*. Retrieved February 11, 2018.

Mishra, V. (Ed.). (2013). *Human Trafficking The Stakeholders Perspective.* New Delhi, India: Sage Publication Pvt.ltd.

Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., Devinney, L. C., Star, S. A., & Williams, R. M., Jr. (1949). The American soldier: Adjustment during army life. *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II.* Oxford, England: Princeton Univ. Press.

Weis, L. (1995). Identity Formation and the Process of "Othering": Unravelling Sexual Threads. *The Journal of Educational Foundation.* 9(1), 17.

Global Gender Gap Report, (2015). Switzerland: World Economic Form. pp. 1-377. doi:http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap report2015/?doing_wp_cron=1545298114.2511320114135742187500

Changing Contours of India-Nepal Relations under Modi Regime: A Critical Appraisal

Jaskaran Singh Waraich*
Harmanpreet Singh**

Abstract

India shares a special relationship with Nepal as both the countries have open borders, common culture, people to people contact, etc. but both the countries have witnessed many ups and downs in their age-old relationship, for one or the other reasons. Under the 'neighbourhood first' policy P.M Modi invited SAARC leader's in 2014 and BIMSTEC leader's in 2019 in his swearing in ceremony. In August 2014, he visited Nepal in his first ever state visit and addressed Nepal's constituent assembly and met leadership of Nepal. It was presumed that India-Nepal relations are going to touch new heights. But after almost a year the relationship got strained when India objected to Nepal's new constitution and supported Madhesis opposition to the constitution. China offered to help Nepal in the wake of Nepal blockade and rescued Nepal

*Assistant Professor, Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh.

**Assistant Professor (Guest Faculty), Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh.

from the crisis. Nepal is also trying to use China to counter India's hegemony in Nepal. The growing China-Nepal closeness has raised alarming concerns for India, as India considers Nepal as a part of its northern security system. This paper attempts to analyse the relations between India and Nepal under Modi regime while also highlighting how the approach and attitude of Nepal government has changed because of growing Chinese influence. The paper also reflects the ambitious exchange of bilateral visits by leadership of India and China to Nepal and vice-versa for their competing interests the Himalayan state.

Introduction

Since its independence, India shares a special relationship with Nepal, the Himalayan state, which is embedded with open borders, people to people contact, common culture etc. The idea of open-border symbolized the deep-rooted socio-cultural, emotional and economic inter-linkages among the people of two sides (Shukla, 2006, pp. 355-374). Nepal shares about 1850 km border with five Indian states in West, East, and South, while in North it shares around 1414 km border with Tibet Autonomous Region in People's Republic of China. Nepal has for long been a buffer state between India and China (Chandran, 2017). The India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship in the year 1950 forms the base of the special relation that India and Nepal share with each other. Both the nations have provided facilities and opportunities to the citizens of each other at par with their own citizens (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017b). Agreements signed by both the countries on trade, commerce, security etc further strengthened the relations. Nepal occupies an important strategic position in India's northern security system because of the presence of a number of passes at China-Nepal border and China's assertive

nature towards India. Nepal being a land locked country depends upon India for providing ports for its overseas trade, but now Nepal is exploring the option of China to reduce its dependence on India for its interaction with the outer world. Every relation relies upon some demand-supply, trust-mistrust, give and take formula where clashes of interest may exist. Despite these things, interdependence is one of the most important factors that have been helping to normalize the relationship between the two countries. Moreover, both the countries have deep cultural links that can never be underestimated and these ties are one of the most important factors in sustaining their relationship.

The geographical situation, being a land locked state, compels Nepal to depend on its neighbouring states. Topographically Nepal can broadly be divided into three regions: (1) The Himalayas, (2) the Central Hills and Valleys; and (3) the Terai. The close ties between Nepal and India are basically connected through Terai regions (Patel, 2017:pp. 73-79). Both countries have good economic relationship as well. India's economic interest in Nepal lies in the utilization of water resources, promotion of trade and transit which have determined the relationship between the two countries (Shukla, 2006). India has had a major role in the development of their projects. The bilateral trade that was 29.8 percent of Nepal's total external trade in 1995-96 reached 66 percent in 2013-14. Exports from Nepal to India increased from INR 230 crores in 1995-96 to INR 3713.5 crores (US$ 605 million) in 2013-14 and India's exports to Nepal increased from INR 1525 crores in 1995-96 to INR 29545.6 crores (US$ 4.81 billion) in 2013-14 (Patel, 2017:pp 73-79). Indian firms are the biggest investors in Nepal, accounting for about 38.3 percent of Nepal's total approved foreign direct investments. Till 15 July 2013, the Government of Nepal had approved a total of 3004 foreign investment projects with proposed FDI of Rs.7269.4 crores. There are about 150 operating Indian ventures in Nepal engaged in manufacturing, services (banking, insurance, dry port, education, and telecom), power sector and tourism industries. Despite this closeness, there are many irritants between both the countries. There are many

issues that have created anti-India sentiment in Nepal and most of them arose due to misconceptions and lack of mutual understanding. The 1950 treaty is not the only controversial treaty but there are other treaties as well. Nepal feels being at the receiving end because of two more water treaties namely, Kosi and Gandak. Some experts believe that the Integrated Mahakali treaty is another case of discord between India and Nepal. The Kosi and Gandak treaties are vehemently criticized by Nepal for causing floods inside Nepal, while the Mahakali is seen as a treaty that yields more benefits from the export of hydro-energy to India than that Nepal receives for its own use (Patel, 2017:pp 73-79).

A comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in 2006 that ended the decade long insurgency in the country and paved way for interim constitution and constituent assembly to write Nepal's Constitution (Crisis Group, 2006). Nepal abolished Monarchy in all its forms in 2008 and made Nepal a Democratic Republic (Rashid, 2008). Second Constituent Assembly elected in November 2013 promulgated and passed new constitution of Nepal in September 2015 (SBS, 2016).

P.M. Modi's Maiden Visit to Nepal

P.M Modi invited SAARC leaders in 2014 (Swami, 2014) and BIMSTEC leaders in 2019 in the swearing in ceremony after his win in general elections respectively as part of his neighbourhood first policy (Mohan, 2019). On both the occasions the leaders of Nepal were invited. Under his Neighbourhood First Policy P.M Modi's first state visit was to Nepal as compared to his predecessor who paid none in spite of being in office for a decade. This showed his resolve to improve ties with the land locked country. During P.M Modi visit to Nepal in 2014 he addressed the Constituent Assembly and Legislature Parliament of Nepal and also met the leadership of Nepal's political parties and business community of Nepal.

P.M Modi and former P.M of Nepal Mr Sushil Koirala welcomed the decision to establish an Eminent Persons Group on Nepal-India Relations (EPG-NIR) to look into the totality of Nepal-India relations from independent, non-governmental perspectives and suggest measures to further expand and consolidate the close and multifaceted relations between the two countries. Government of India had also announced a soft credit line of US$ 1 billion for the execution of infrastructure development and energy projects as identified and prioritized by the Government of Nepal(Ministry of External Affairs, 2014). Numerous other steps were also taken by both the nations to strengthened the relations and everything was going smooth until Nepal promulgated and passed new constitution of Nepal in 2015 and Indian government opposed it.

New Constitution of Nepal and India's Response

Nepal got its seventh and new constitution on 20th September 2015. New constitution has been enacted after eight years of interim constitution. It has 308 articles, 35 parts and 9 schedules (Kumar, 2015). It was adopted by overwhelming majority of 507 out of 598 members of the constituent assembly. The constitution enshrines the principle of republicanism, federalism, secularism and inclusiveness. It incorporates the proportional representations to ensure that women, untouchables and marginalized groups like Janajati's and the Madhesis find representation in the national assembly. It also grants fundamental rights, freedom to its citizens and there would be an independent judiciary, nominated by judicial commission. In spite of having such good features, it became a controversial document disapproved by different groups like Madhesi, Janajati etc. Each group has its own reasons for its disapproval. Main agitating groups were the Madhesi parties, women, Janajati group, splintered extremist Maoist, Hindu fundamentalist and monarchists (Muni, 2015:pp 15-19).

India was not much excited about the new constitution of Nepal as it did not fulfil the demands of the marginalized groups of

the country particularly Madhesi. According to the official statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs of India on 20 September 2015 it says "*Throughout the process of Constitution making in Nepal, India has supported a federal, democratic, republican and inclusive Constitution. We note the promulgation of a Constitution in Nepal today.*" India just 'noted' but did not 'welcome' it (Kumar, 2015). Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had paid visit to Nepal and invited Nepali leadership like Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress and Prachanda of the Maoist to India for consultation of Nepal draft of constitution and strengthened India-Nepal relations. Both the leaders promised to take Madhesi and other groups along in the process but new constitution was totally different from what it was promised. Indian government felt betrayed when the Nepali leaders did not honour the promises, they had made to them in the official meetings rather, when agitations started in the Terai region, Nepali leadership started blaming Indian government for inciting disturbance in the region (Muni, 2015:pp15-19). Indian government denied all the allegations of imposing any blockade and said that blockade is due to the internal disturbance in Nepal's own territory (Pokharel, 2015).

Issue of Madhesis and Nepal Blockade in 2015

Madhes is a geographical entity of the Terai region of Nepal. Madhesis are the non-Nepali speaking people and who have caste and ethnicity similar to eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar states of India. Most of the Madhesis are educated in India and in large number of inter-state marriages between the families from either side of the border. Madhes covers 22 districts, 17 percent of country's area and home to around 50 percent of Nepal's population. This is the agricultural and industrial hub of Nepal, still deeply discriminated by Nepal authorities. They are always deprived of many government schemes like poverty alleviation program, unemployment benefits, health facilities etc. (Ghimire, 2015). Madhesi people feel they are being discriminated by the

different rulers of the state and were never part of the mainstream national politics or economy. Proportional representation in state-power, identity and recognition, nationality and citizenship, language and culture are some of the problems faced by Madhesi in Nepal. After the declaration of Nepali as the official language of Nepal in 1956, it took away the employment opportunities from the non-Nepali speaking Madhesi's and the Madhesi students were affected the most as the medium of instruction was in Nepali Language (Deysarkar, 2015:pp 686-692). Madhesi's formed different organisations and political parties to fight against the discrimination of the Nepalese state since 1950's.

Blockade was started by the Madhesi ethnic group in a protest against the new constitution of Nepal, as this constitution does not address the concerns of the Madhesi ethnic group. Madhesis demanded two states of Madhesi majority in the Terai region of Nepal (Bhattacherjee, 2016). Nepal's government blamed India for the blockade and termed it as "Unofficial Blockade" by India. They were of the view that Indian leaders were helping Madhesi because they were ethnically, linguistically and culturally bonded to the people of Indian States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Pokharel, 2015). Blockade had a negative effect on the day to day life of Nepali people. All the daily used items were out of stock and the prices of available items shot up; daily wage workers lost their jobs and blockade brought the country to a standstill. Major concerns were of oil and gas for which Nepal was dependent on India, although Nepal signed an agreement with China to supply 1.3 million litres of petrol to Nepal as grant (Jha, 2015). But real question was for how long China will supply oil as grant. Nepal blockade was lifted by United Madhesi Democratic Front (UMDF) after months of blockade but threatened to re-launch it if their demands are not considered by the Nepal government. Mr K.P Oli's Nepali Government also promised to do amendments in the Nepal's constitution to increase Madhesi representation in the government, politics and Society (Bhattacherjee , 2016).

India-Nepal Engagements under Modi Regime

During Prime Minister Modi's first term in his office four P. M.'s of Nepal paid their visits to India during their respective tenures of office. In February 2016 Nepal Prime Minister Mr K.P. Oli (12 October, 2015 to 4 August, 2016) made his maiden foreign visit to New Delhi after assuming charge for holding talks on various issues with his Indian counterpart Mr Narendra Modi. According to the External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Vikas Swarup, issues of citizenship for Indian-origin people and the concern to make Nepalese New Constitution more inclusive to address the affairs of Indian-origin Madhesi Community were addressed. Nepal's Prime Minister K.P. Oli was accompanied by the high-level delegation and had extensive discussions on entire gamut of bilateral relations (Hindustan Times, 2016). India and Nepal signed six agreements which included three Memorandum of Understanding on Post- earthquake reconstruction assistance, strengthening of road infrastructure in Nepal and in field of performing arts; letter of exchange on transit routes and rail transportation; Inaugural of Muzaffarpur-Dhalkebar transmission line. Both sides also agreed on establishing Eminent Persons Group to review bilateral ties (Ministry of External Affairs, 2016a). This visit of Prime Minister K.P. Oli gave boost to India-Nepal relationship and some misunderstandings that occurred due to Nepal blockade in 2015, were resolved.

Prime Minister of Nepal Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal after taking over as P.M. of Nepal (4 August, 2016 to 7 June, 2017) was invited by Mr Narendra Modi Prime Minister of India on a state visit from 16-18 September 2016. This was Mr Pushpa Kamal Dahal's first foreign visit after assuming office in August 2016. In spite of being a communist himself, he chose India over China for his first foreign visit. The two Prime Ministers agreed that frequent visits and meetings between the dignitaries and officials will strengthen the relations and expand the multi-dimensional cooperation. After the first meeting of Eminent Persons Group in Kathmandu in July 2016, both the leaders were confident that the group will work

intensively and suggest measures to consolidate and expand the ties between India and Nepal. Prime Minister of India Mr Modi and Prime Minister of Nepal Mr Dahal discussed different facets of bilateral relations and had a vision to take bilateral relations to new level (Ministry of External Affairs, 2016b). Both the countries also signed three MoU's (Memorandum of Understanding) for post-earthquake reconstruction, road infrastructure in Terai and Line of Credit (Ministry of External Affairs, 2016c).

Similarly, Nepal Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba with his delegation was invited by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi on a state visit to India from 23-27 August 2017. This was his first visit abroad after assuming office in June 2017. The two Prime Ministers discussed various aspects of bilateral relations. The regular high-level visits had given new momentum to the bilateral cooperation. He also had interactions with the business community of India at a joint function hosted by ASSOCHAM, CII and FICCI. Both the Prime Ministers were very happy with the progress made by the Eminent Persons Group on India- Nepal relations and they were hopeful that group will submit its report on time and take India-Nepal bilateral relations to new heights. Other issues discussed by Prime Ministers of both the countries were of defence and security cooperation, sustainable development, infrastructure development, ongoing projects in Nepal in different areas, trade and investment, cultural and people to people ties. India and Nepal also signed eight MoU's in different sectors (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017a).

Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli paid a state visit to India from April 6-8, 2018 after taking oath as Prime Minister of Nepal and this visit was seen as an effort to reset the ties between both the nations after 2015 inevitable circumstances (Pasricha, 2018). Mr. Oli emphasised that his government attaches high importance to further strengthening ties with India and expressed his desire to develop bilateral relations in a way so as to benefit from India's progress and prosperity for economic transformation and development. Both the Prime Ministers highlighted the need for expeditious implementation of bilateral projects in Nepal and to

reinvigorate the existing bilateral mechanisms to promote cooperative agenda across diverse spheres. Mr. Oli's visit had imparted new dynamism to the multifaceted partnership between India and Nepal (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018).

P.M Narendra Modi also paid visit to Nepal little more than a month after Nepal's P.M K.P. Sharma Oli visited New Delhi, in a bid to consolidate ties strained by a disagreement over Nepal's 2015 constitution. This visit of P.M Modi to Nepal was seen by the strategist as a course of correction in ties with the aim of keeping Nepal within India's political and diplomatic fold in South Asia where China has been making deep inroads through its Belt and Road Initiative (Roche , 2018). Both the leaders emphasised to regularly convene the bilateral mechanisms, including Nepal-India Joint Commission at Foreign/External Affairs Ministers level, to review the overall state of bilateral relations, and for the expeditious implementation of the economic and development cooperation projects and also underlined the catalytic role of connectivity in stimulating economic growth and promoting movement of people; take steps to enhance the economic and physical connectivity by air, land, and water. Both the Prime Ministers also took to the social media platform and tweeted the visit as a success (Langeh & Sahay, 2018).

At the fourth Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Summit held in Nepal from 30-31st August, 2018, India and Nepal signed a Memorandum of Understanding to build a strategic broad-gauge railway line between Kathmandu and the border town of Raxaul in Bihar after talks between Nepalese Prime Minister K.P. Oli and his Indian counterpart Mr Narendra Modi in Kathmandu. P.M. Modi also tweeted that he had a discussion with Mr Oli about several aspects of Indian ties with Nepal and ways to further deepen India's economic, trade and cultural ties (Scroll, 2018).

India and Nepal are having very good trade relations and in fact India is Nepal's largest trading partner and the largest source of foreign investments. India also provides Nepal a transit through

Kolkata and Vishakhapatnam port to do trade with the third country (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017b). According to the official Data of Government of Nepal, India and Nepal trade was US dollar 4858.3 million in 2015-16. During 2015-16, there was a dip in the trade between both the countries due to Nepal earthquake and Nepal blockade of 2015 but in 2017-18 it reached to US dollar 8205.6 million (Embassy of India, 2018). India is a leading investor in Nepal through Foreign Direct Investment and large number of Indian private sector companies and Public Sector Undertaking are operating in Nepal's manufacturing, services, power sectors (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017b). India and Nepal had signed a number of MoU's and agreements to enhance trade between both the countries.

China-Nepal Relations: Emerging Trends

The analysis of the history of China-Nepal relations reveals that their ties were largely limited to that of 'Good Neighbour' only but, more recently, Chinese attitude towards Nepal seems to be changing fast. While Nepal has also started looking towards China to fulfil its desire to have an independent foreign policy and an alternative to her dependence on India, but the 'Nepal Blockade' issue provided a fertile ground to Nepal and China to inch closer as never before. Nepalese and Chinese leadership are regularly paying visits to each other's countries taking the relationship to next level. Nepalese Prime Minister K.P. Oli (12 October, 2015 to 4 August, 2016) paid a state visit to China from March 20 to 27, 2016. This was his first visit to China and during the visit Nepal and China also signed ten agreements and Memorandum of Understanding. The agreements and Memorandums of Understanding include much hyped transit transportation agreements with China, bilateral free trade agreement, construction of a regional airport in Pokhara which is 200 km from Kathmandu. China also pledged a soft loan of $216 million for the construction of an airport, both sides will also explore oil and gas in Nepal, China's commercial bank will open its office in Nepal and

Nepal's banks can also open their branches in China. China will help in installations of solar panels in 32,000 households and construction of a bridge in far west of Nepal in Hilsa to connect Nepal and Tibet. Nepal will open Consular General Office in Chengdu, China (First post, 2016).

Prime Minister of Nepal K.P. Oli also paid a five-day visit to China from 19th June, 2018. He held talks with the top leadership of China. Although, both the countries signed about ten agreements and MoU's in different areas during the visit, but no details were given about the agreements. According to South China Morning Post, agreements worth $2.4 billion were signed in different areas ranging from hydroelectric to water resources project, cement factories to fruit products, railway line connectivity between Tibet and Nepal. China also appreciated Nepal's adherence to the China policy (Times of India, 2018).

Chinese President XI Jinping visited Nepal from 12th to 13th October, 2019 on his way back from Chennai connect, the second informal summit between India and China at Mahabalipuram, Chennai and he also became first Chinese President to visit Nepal in last two decades (Press Associated, 2019). President Xi and Prime Minister K.P. Oli agreed to intensify implementation of the MoU on cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to enhance connectivity and also agreed to maintain the momentum of high-level visits between both the countries. China and Nepal signed agreements on boundary management system and treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and also agreed to strengthen cooperation between the law enforcement agencies on information exchanges, capacity building and training. Both sides agreed to re-energise and strengthen the bilateral relations and advance mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). China also promised to offer hundred 'Confucius Institute Scholarships' to Nepalese students and the Chinese President also announced the support of Nepalese Rupees 56 billion in next two years for the development of Nepal (India Today, 2019).

Majordevelopment in Nepal-China relations was their first ever military exercise "Sagarmatha Friendship 2017" at Maharajgung based training school in April 2017. The ten day long joint exercise was projected as a part of their preparedness against the 'so called' terrorism that has posed a serious threat globally. The focus of the exercise, according to Kathmandu and Beijing, was on counter terrorism and disaster response. This drill was seen as a part of China's Military Diplomacy (Times of India, 2017). Interestingly, Nepal participated in this exercise after snubbing BIMSTEC military drill hosted by India. This event raised many questions on the intentions of Nepal (Giri, 2018). Second edition of China-Nepal joint military exercise "Sagarmatha Friendship-2" was held at China's Sichuan Province in September 2018. The platoon level exercise lasted for ten days and the focus of the drill again was said to be on counter terrorism and disaster management.

Moreover, economic cooperation is one of the most important dimensions of Nepal-China bilateral relations. Nepal-China trade relations have grown since 2015 Nepal blockade. Total trade between Nepal and China in the fiscal year 2014-15 was Nepalese Rupee 101 billion and in the year 2017-18 it was above Nepalese Rupee 131 billion (Rai, 2018). Nepal signed MoU with China in May 2017 on China's One Belt One Road Initiative to boost Nepal-China economic relations. Nepal got commitment from China of heavy investment through Foreign Direct Investment. In 2016 Nepal had also signed Transit and Transport Agreement with China and Beijing had also assured Nepal's access to its territory and sea port for its trade with other countries. A number of MoU's and Agreements were also signed between Nepal and China on different projects which further enhanced their economic relations (Rai, 2018).

Nepal-China Proximity and Implications for India

Nepal has moved closer to China for deeper economic and security

cooperation. China is second largest trading partner of Nepal and for last few years. China is also the largest source of Foreign Direct Investment in Nepal (Xinhuanet, 2018). Nepal Blockade of 2015 gave much awaited chance to China to enter Nepal as a saviour. China smartly used the opportunity and started appeasing the Government of Nepal. Newly elected Government under the leadership of K.P. Oli, following Communist ideology, is pro-Chinese and tried to improve ties with China. According to the Nepali Government, Chinese asked the Nepal's leadership to come up with a clear roadmap for long-term friendship goals with China to incentivise the Nepal's rescue by Beijing from any hardship inflicted on them by India (Baral, 2016). Prime Minister K.P. Oli Government signed Transit and Transportation Agreement with China in 2016 after months-long Nepal blockade of 2015. Further boosting their strategic ties in the year 2018, both nations agreed on the text of protocol to Transit and Transportation Agreement, which will allow Nepal to have access to four seaports and three dry ports for trading with third countries. This agreement ended Nepal's sole dependence on India for trade with third countries. Nepal had already signed MoU on Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative on 12 May 2017 in Kathmandu in order to upgrade its vital infrastructures, enhance cross-border connectivity with China and boost people-to-people relations under this initiative (Mohan, 2018).

Nepal had already signed number of agreements with China for infrastructure development, hydroelectric and water resources project, cement factories, fruit products, railway line connectivity between Tibet and Nepal, construction of airport, exploration of oil and gas in Nepal, China's commercial bank entry into Nepal and Nepal's bank entry into China etc (Sigdel, 2018). The graph of trade between Nepal and China is gradually growing in spite of the fact that they have geographical hindrance. If China builds road and rail network through Himalayas as agreed by both the countries then trade between Nepal and China will take a future leap (Adhikari, 2018). China has offered zero-tariff treatment in 2010 to sixty percent products of Nepal, further China has also started

reducing trade deficit with Nepal which will further encourage Nepal to have more trade with China and limit its import and export with India (Singh & Shah, 2015).

On the other hand, India also tried its best to restore its relations with Nepal after 2015 fiasco but the output has been below expectations as Nepal's proximity with China is still growing. India considers Nepal as a part of India's northern security system because of the number of passes which are located at China-Nepal border. India is also equally concerned about China's assertive and aggressive posture towards India (Shukla, 2006:pp 355-374). Moreover, if India considers Nepal as a part of India's northern security system, the Himalayan State, of course, is needed to be dealt accordingly while keeping their concerns also in loop. For long, Nepal had grievances towards India and at the same time there were anti-India sentiments in Nepalese public also. India, instead of looking into their grievances and changing anti-India sentiments of Nepalese public, it acted authoritatively. Consequently, Communist political parties of Nepal started encashing on the anti-India sentiments and ultimately helping them to gain power. After 2015 Nepal blockade, when Nepal was going through tough times because of shortage of essential supplies and which affected the day to day life of Nepalese, Indian Govt knowingly exhibited its reluctance to help Nepal while giving China an ample opportunity to rescue Nepal which totally changed the game upside down for India (Hardnewsmedia, 2017).

Although India tried to do damage control by signing various agreements, Memorandums of Understanding and paying High-level visits, but all these steps could not prevent growing proximity between Nepal and China proving to be a major setback for Indian diplomacy. Nepal, on the other hand, has started using China card to counter India whenever India takes hard stand against Nepal. Nepal had extended red carpet welcome to Chinese President Xi Jinping in his recent visit to country and both the countries also signed twenty agreements which were mostly in favour of China. President Xi also stated that Nepal and China are

strategic partners. This clearly depicts that China is successively attempting to fill the vacuum which was created because of 2015 Nepal Blockade (Jha H. B., 2019).

The Road Ahead

The Modi Govt. needs to give serious rethinking on the issues impinging on the India-Nepal relations while also thoroughly analysing the factors contributing towards the growing proximity between Nepal and China. Nepal had a lot of grievances with India, starting from Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship to trade deficit between both the countries. Moreover, the Eminent Persons Group on Nepal-India Relations has also suggested to review the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Indian leadership may also give serious thinking to introduce a new Nepal friendly economic, developmental and infrastructural policy which can address Nepal's basic demands. This new approach may help in changing the Anti-India perception of Nepalese people while restoring of their lost faith and confidence in India. There are around 1,27,000 pensioners and thousands of serving Indian armed forces personnel living in Nepal who can be India's brand ambassadors in Nepal's every nook and corner (Deshpande, 2017). Since Nepal-China relations are also not fully absolved of the various vulnerabilities, like the so called 'China's Debt Trap Diplomacy', which Modi government may identify for fostering India's competing interests in Nepal.

Conclusion

India-Nepal relations had seen ups and downs since Nepal's adoption of new constitution in 2015. Madhesi issue and Nepal Blockade of 2015 became a triggering point of strained relations. After Nepal Blockade, when Nepal was short of supplies for days, China came to Nepal's rescue, as China was waiting for a chance to enter Nepal. On the other hand, Nepal got a communist Prime Minister K.P. Oli who was pro-China and used anti-India

sentiments of Nepali people to come to power. During this period China-Nepal also signed number of agreements and Nepal also signed China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Nepal did military exercises with China after snubbing BIMSTEC military exercise hosted by India in September 2018. Nepal- China trade is also growing gradually as both the countries signed transit and transportation agreement. China's construction of road and rail connectivity with Nepal will further give boost to China-Nepal trade.

On the other hand, Modi government also tried to mend sore relations with Nepal but this did not stop China from trapping Nepal. India also needs to review its policy towards Nepal and have to approach Nepal more cautiously. Nepal's grievances towards India should be addressed at the earliest and anti-India stance of local population of Nepal should also be changed. If India considers Nepal as part of its northern security system, then it is in India's favour to have Nepal on Indian side than Chinese side. India must crop cordial relations with all the major political parties of Nepal and must use serving and retired Gurkha soldiers as good will ambassadors of India to Nepal so as to gain public support for India. India under the leadership of Modi needs to identify and highlight vulnerabilities of China-Nepal relations and reap benefit out of it.

References

Adhikari, J. (2018, November 19). *Is Nepal falling into a Chinese debt trap?* Retrieved January 23, 2019, from www.qz.com: https://qz.com/india/1466287/is-nepal-falling-into-chinas-belt-and-road-debt-trap/

Baral, B. (2016, March 2). *India's 'Blockade' Has Opened the Door for China in Nepal.* Retrieved January 25, 2019, from www.thewire.in: https://thewire.in/ diplomacy/indias-blockade-has-opened-the-door-for-china-in-nepal

Bhattacherjee , K. (2016, February 8). *Madhesis end Nepal blockade.* Retrieved November 5, 2018, from www.thehindu.com: https://www.the hindu.com/news/international/madhesis-end-nepal-blockade/article 8210239.ece

Chandran, N. (2017, December 28). *It looks like the India-China rivalry is spreading to another front.* Retrieved January 4, 2019, from www.cnbc.com: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/27/nepals-new-communist-government-could-push-it-closer-to-china.html

Crisis Group. (2006, December 15). *Nepal's Peace Agreement: Making it Work.* Retrieved January 1, 2019, from www.crisisgroup.org: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/nepal/nepal-s-peace-agreement-making-it-work

Department of Customs. (2018). *Nepal Foregin Trade Statistics.* Kathmandu: Department of Customs, Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal. Retrieved January 6, 2019

Deshpande, V. (2017, February 17). *Gorkhas of the Indian Army and India-Nepal Relations.* Retrieved January 31, 2019, from https://idsa.in/: https://idsa.in/idsacomments/gorkhas-indian-army-and-india-nepal-relations_vdeshpande_140217

Deysarkar, S. (2015). The Madesi Citizenship And The New Constitution: Emerging Questions. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress.76*, pp. 686-692. Indian History Congress.

Embassy of India. (2018, November 12). *About Trade and Commerce.* Retrieved from Embassy of India, Kathmandu, Nepal: https://www.indembkathmandu.gov.in/page/about-trade-and-commerce/

First post. (2016, March 21). *Nepal, China sign first-ever transit treaty; agree to have rail link to end dependency on India.* Retrieved January 10, 2019, from www.firstpost.com: https://www.firstpost.com/world/nepal-china-sign-first-ever-transit-treaty-to-end-dependency-on-indian-sea-port-2687860.html

Ghimire, Y. (2015, October 5). *Who are the Madhesis, why are they angry?* Retrieved January 4, 2019, from The Indian Express: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/who-are-the-madhesis-why-are-they-angry/

Giri, A. (2018, september 17). *Nepal, China begin joint military exercises.* Retrieved January 13, 2019, from www.hindustantimes.com: https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nepal-china-begin-joint-military-exercises/story-cqFFKTZQrSuuTp7SgwPCyN.html

Hard News Media. (2017, November). *Aftermath of the 2015 blockade in Nepal.* Retrieved January 28, 2019, from www.hardnewsmedia.com: http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/content/aftermath-2015-blockade-nepal

Hindustan Times. (2016, February 19). *Nepal PM? KP? Oli starts his 6-day India visit today.* Retrieved January 11, 2019, from Hindustantimes: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/nepal-prime-minister-kp-oli-to-start-his-6-day-india-visit-on-friday/story-WLpQB1mvM1Fw2U0WPEV

Z3.html

India Today. (2019, October 14). *Chinese President Xi Jinping promises NRs 56 billion to Nepal for development programmes*. Retrieved from India Today: https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/chinese-president-xi-jinping-promises-nrs-billion-to-nepal-development-programmes-1609054-2019-10-14

Jha, H. B. (2015, November 3). *Impact of Economic Blockade in Nepal*. Retrieved December 7, 2018, from www.vifindia.org: https://www.vifindia.org/article/2015/november/03/impact-of-economic-blockade-in-nepal

Jha, H. B. (2019, October 21). *Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Nepal: Is it a diplomatic victory for China?* Retrieved from Observer Research Foundation: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinese-president-xi-jinpings-visit-to-nepal-is-it-a-diplomatic-victory-for-china-56821/

Kavitha, K. (2016). The Changing Paradigm of India-Nepal Relations: Problems and Prospects. *Journal of Research in Business and Management, 4*(5), 10-15.

Kumar, A. (2015, October 1). Nepal-Salient Features of the New Constitution. *Indian Council of World Affairs*. Retrieved December 23, 2018, from https://icwa.in/pdfs/IB/2014/NEPALSALIENTFEATURESiib102015.pdf

Langeh, A., & Sahay, C. D. (2018, May 17). *Commentary: PM Modi's Visit to Nepal - the Beginning of a New Chapter*. Retrieved from Vivekananda International Foundation: https://www.vifindia.org/2018/may/17/pm-modi-s-visit-to-nepal-the-beginning-of-a-new-chapter

Ministry of External Affairs. (2014, August 4). *Joint Press Statement on the Visit of the Prime Minister to Nepal*. Retrieved November 17, 2019, from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India: https://mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?23807/Joint+Press+Statement+on+the+Visit+of+the+Prime+Minister+to+Nepal

Ministry of External Affairs. (2016a, February 20). *List of Agreements and MOUs exchanged during the State Visit of Prime Minister of Nepal to India (February 20, 2016)*. Retrieved January 3, 2019, from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of Inida: https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26376/List_of_Agreements_and_MOUs_exchanged_during_the_State_Visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_Nepal_to_India__February_20_2016

Ministry of External Affairs. (2016b, September 16). *India-Nepal Joint Statement during the State visit of Prime Minister of Nepal to India*. Retrieved January 7, 2019, from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27407/IndiaNepal_Joint_Statement_during_the_State_visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_Nepal_to_India

Ministry of External Affairs. (2016c, September 16). *List of MOUs and agreements exchanged during the State visit of Prime Minister of Nepal to India.* Retrieved December 27, 2018, from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm? dtl/27406/List_of_MOUs_and_agreements_exchanged_during_the_St ate_visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_Nepal_to_India

Ministry of External Affairs. (2017a, August 24). *India-Nepal Joint Statement during the State Visit of Prime Minister of Nepal to India (23-27 August 2017).* Retrieved December 20, 2018, from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28885/IndiaNepal_Joint_Statement_during_the_S tate_Visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_Nepal_to_India_2327_August_2017

Ministry of External Affairs. (2017b, November). *India–Nepal Relations.* Retrieved January 4, 2019, from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.: https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Nepal_ Bilateral_Brief_for_MEA_website_-_Oct_2015.pdf

Ministry of External Affairs. (2018, April 7). *Joint Statement during the State Visit of Prime Minister of Nepal to India (April 07, 2018).* Retrieved December 6, 2019, from Ministry of External Affairs, Governement of India: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29791/ Joint_Statement_during_the_State_Visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_Nepal_ to_India_April_07_2018

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2019, October 13). *Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People's Republic of China.* Retrieved from Ministery of Foreign Affairs, Governement of Nepal: https://mofa.gov.np/joint-statement-between-nepal-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2/

Mohan, G. (2018, September 9). *Nepal-China transit agreement ends sole dependence on India.* Retrieved January 27, 2019, from www.indiatoday.in: https:// www.indiatoday.in/world/story/nepal-china-transit-agreement-ends-sole-dependence-on-india-1335863-2018-09-09

Mohan, G. (2019, May 27). *Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan among honoured guests at Modi's swearing-in ceremony on May 30.* Retrieved from India Today: https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/bimstec-leaders-kyrgyzstan-president-mauritian-pm-invited-for-modi-s-swearing-in-1536112-2019-05-27

Muni, S. (2015, October 3). Nepal's New Constitution Towards Progress or Chaos? *Economic and Political Weekly, 50*(40), 15-19.

Pasricha, A. (2018, April 7). *India, Nepal Seek to Reset Ties During Nepalese PM's Visit.* Retrieved from Voanews: https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/india-nepal-seek-reset-ties-during-nepalese-pms-visit

Patel, S. (2017, September). A New Journey in the New Context: Nepal-India Relations. *IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 22*(9), 73-79.

Pokharel, K. (2015, November 26). *The Two-Month Blockade of Nepal Explained.* Retrieved December 20, 2018, from blogs.wsj.com: https://blogs. wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/11/26/the-two-month-blockade-of-nepal-explained/

Press Associated. (2019, october 12). *Xi Becomes 1st Chinese President in 2 Decades to Visit Nepal.* Retrieved from Voanews: https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/xi-becomes-1st-chinese-president-2-decades-visit-nepal

Press Information Bureau. (2018, May 28). *Curtain Raiser: India-Nepal Joint Battalion Level Exercise SURYA KIRAN-XIII.* Retrieved January 2, 2019, from press information bureau, Government of India: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ PrintRelease.aspx?relid=179508

Rai, S. (2018, June 11). *Chinese Investment: Nepal -China economic relationship.* Retrieved January 24, 2019, from www.karobardaily.com: https:// english.karobardaily.com/news/opinion/328

Rashid, H. u. (2008, june 13). *Why did Nepalese people abolish monarchy?* Retrieved January 2, 2019, from www.thedailystar.net: https://www.thedaily star.net/news-detail-40866

Roche , E. (2018, May 2). *Narendra Modi to visit Nepal for course correction in bilateral ties.* Retrieved from livemint: https://www.livemint.com/Politics/ HMrr4JSB4ERfWVgu4iXLsL/Narendra-Modi-to-visit-Nepal-next-week.html

SBS. (2016, September 2). *Nepal has a Constitution after 8 years of negotiations.* Retrieved December 25, 2018, from www.sbd.com: https://www.sbs. com/radio/article/2015/09/20/nepal-has-constitution-after-8-years-negotiations

Scroll. (2018, August 31). *India and Nepal sign agreement to build railway line between Kathmandu and Bihar's Raxaul.* Retrieved January 11, 2019, from scroll.in: https://scroll.in/latest/892752/india-and-nepal-sign-agreement-to-build-railway-line-between-kathmandu-and-bihars-raxaul

Shukla, D. (2006). India-Nepal Relations : Problems and Prospects. *The Indian Journal of Political Science, 67*(2), 355-374.

Sigdel, A. (2018, October 03). *China's growing footprint in Nepal: Challenges and opportunities for India.* Retrieved January 28, 2019, from www.or fonline.org: https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-growing-footprint-in-nepal-challenges-and-opportunities-for-india/

Singh, B., & Shah, S. H. (2015, December 16). *China`s strategic foray in the post-monarchy Nepal: implications for India.* Retrieved January 18, 2019, from www.revistamisionjuridica.com: https://www.revistamision juridica.com/strategic-foray-in-the-post-monarchy-nepal-implications-for-india/

Swami, P. (2014, May 21). *In a first, Modi invites SAARC leaders for his swearing-in .*

Retrieved from The Hindu: https://www.thehindu.com/news /national/in-a-first-modi-invites-saarc-leaders-for-his-swearingin/article6033710.ece

Times of India. (2017, April 16). *Nepal, China hold first-ever joint military exercise.* Retrieved January 15, 2019, from www.timesofindia.com: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/nepal-china-hold-first-ever-joint-military-exercise/articleshow/58207943.cms

Times of India. (2018, June 21). *China, Nepal sign 14 agreements including key connectivity during Oli's visit.* Retrieved January 12, 2019, from www.timesofindia.com: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ world/china/china-nepal-sign-14-agreements-including-key-connectivity-deals-during-olis-visit/articleshow/64686840.cms

Wani, T. R. (2015, February). India's Prime Minister Narindra Modi Visit to Nepal: Renewing Relations. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 5*(2), 1-2.

Xinhuanet. (2018, November 4). *A new chapter in China-Nepal economic relations.* Retrieved January 23, 2019, from www.xinhuanet.com: www.xinhuanet. com/english/2018-11/04/c_137581454.htm

India's Climate Change Policy: Continuity and Change

Shaveta Chowdhary*

Abstract

India has played a very active role in international climate change debate. It has represented south and has been a savior of south. Its role and response to politics on climate change becomes important due to its large population, emerging nature of its economy and also as a future emitter of Greenhouse Gases. This paper concentrates on the contribution of India in climate change negotiations at the international level. Here how India has responded as a developing country in earlier stages, as a representative of South and now as a newly industrialised country will be examined.

*????????????????

Introduction

Historical emissions are the consequences of the industrialization in the developed world, they have eaten up their carbon space and present global warming scenario can be credited to these historical emissions. Contrary to developed world, developing countries were late in process of industrialization and are now responsible for current emissions. The development in developing countries cannot be thwarted due to their late arrival in process of industrialization. For this, it becomes imperative that India takes position in climate change negotiations to safeguard its interests along with other developing countries.

Beginning of India's Climate Journey

India's participation in international climate negotiations started in 1972 at United Nations Conference on Human Environment. At this conference, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, gave her 'Man and Environment' speech and even at that time cleared the position of developing countries. She stated that developed countries has recklessly used the natural resources for their own prosperity and now telling others to beware of the same methods they have used. They now look development as cause of environmental degradation. In case of developing countries, poverty is more important than environment. She asked 'Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?' (Gandhi,1972:1) She emphasized the need to remove poverty through education, science and technology. There is urgent need to remove poverty to keep check on environmental concerns. Indira Gandhi's speech was a defining moment for the developing world as it gave an alternative discourse to the arguments of developed world that overpopulation and economic development are responsible for environmental degradation.

On Indira Gandhi's speech Maurice Strong rightly sums up:

> Thanks to her leadership, never more could be the environment issue be considered only the narrow context

> of the pollution problems of the rich. It could only be considered as inextricably linked with the development needs and aspirations of the developing countries and the imperatives for new dimensions of co-operation and equity in north-south relationship (Strong, 1999)

Thus India took the position where development is primary concern for upliftment of the poor rather than environment. Here environment was not neglected completely but development and welfare of poor was prioritized over environment which can be perceived through the certain actions taken to safeguard the environment at the national level.

India as representative of developing countries

India has acted as spokesperson of developing countries from the very beginning of the environment debate at international level starting from Vienna Convention, 1991 to Montreal Protocol, 1992. Since then it has continued to ratify every single amendment that has been made to the Montreal Protocol and acted as a forerunner in endorsing the need to thwart the depletion of ozone layer and also take up the case of developing countries in this regard. India collaborated with China as both were important players with one third of the world population and release of Ozone depleting substances (ODS) is directly proportional to the number of people i.e. growing population of several countries. India along with China was not ready to be part of any treaty related to ODS because of the reason that developing countries were not responsible for the consumption and production of Chloro Fluoro Carbons (CFCS)[1] (Rosencranz & Milligan,1990:312-316). It was argued that the ozone depletion has resulted due to the excessive use of ODS by developed countries and developing countries in

---

[1] Developing countries were responsible for merely 16 % of total chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) consumption and India and China specifically contributing 5% out of this share of developing countries.

their course of progress were not even getting sufficient support to create ozone benign substances to substitute ODS. This helped developing countries to echo their concerns related to equity and developmental issues. Not only equity and developmental issues, developing countries thought of such environmental conventions and protocols as obstacle to their industrialization. They were of the view that problem is caused by the developed World and who will pay for shifting cost from present to safer technologies.

Given the situation for developing countries, India and China did not celebrate the passing of Montreal protocol having issue regarding financial assistance and technology transfer. US was the stumbling block in fulfilling this demand by India-China duo for developing countries. But during London meet, US had to bow down to the demands of India and China. This can be credited to the share of ODS both the countries would be producing and without the ratification by these two key players the protocol would be ineffective. After that India and China decide to ratify the Montreal protocol in lieu of London amendment which gave way for technology transfer as well as funds to assist developing countries. Thus India's journey to represent south and take stand for developing country started from Montreal Protocol where it managed to get finance as well as technology transfer for its counterparts.

The bias for developing countries did not end here and it continued with the coming of a report which was published by the World Resources Institute[2] (WRl) in 1990 which made mockery of scientific study and was based more on 'politically motivated and mathematical jugglery' and maintained the inequalities between North and South in the case of sharing of carbon space left in the form of earth's reserves. Here again India took the lead wherein Centre for Science and Environment (an institute dedicated to environmental studies) condemned that report and analyzed that an unjust technique was used to conduct the study which focused

---

[2] World Resources Institute (WRl) is a Washington based private research group.

on the Carbon dioxide and methane emissions leading to global warming. From developing countries rice cultivation and livestock were taken into account while calculating the emissions of above two gases which was an obvious thing to be high as these countries depend hugely on agriculture. On the other hand, fossil fuel aspect of global warming in case of developed world was clearly ignored. Thus overstating the developing world's fraction to the whole of global warming and understating that of developed world. But no effort has been made in WRI's report to separate out the 'survival emissions' of the poor, from the 'luxury emissions' of the rich. Just what kind of politics or morality is this which masquerades in the name of 'one worldism' and 'high minded internationalism.' (Agarwal & Narain, 1991:1) Anil Agarwal and Sunita Aggarwal very rightly commented on the study presented by WRI as the ideas that developing countries like India and China must share the blame for heating up the earth and destabilizing its climate, as espoused in study published in the United states World Resources Institute in collaboration with the United Nations, presented an excellent example of environmental colonialism.The whole incident gives us the idea that studies undertaken by western institutions are very much biased in propagating their own development interests and wrongly projects the emissions by the developing countries in order to shift the responsibility of greenhouse gases emission done by developed countries. Thus developing countries need to buckle up and initiate their own studies related to GHGs emissions for clear and better understanding of the current and past emissions of themselves and developed countries too.

Sensing the need of coalition diplomacy to deal with developed countries, India hosted Conference of select developing countries on global environmental issues. In this conference it managed to gather the support of developing countries on the view that developed countries are responsible for the rising GHGs emissions and it's their responsibility to even help developing countries with finance and technology to tackle the issue of climate change. Thus India organized south against north for their share of

development. Here India strategizes with all the developing countries and used 'coalition diplomacy' to create consensus among the developing countries. This all happened even before the formal discussions on climate change were started and thus shows the gravity and proclivity India had for the issue of Climate Change.

India and Framing of Climate Change Policy

India fought for the 'right to development' of developing countries in the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC) during the framing of UNFCCC. India remained active in order to counter the arguments of developed countries. 'Developing countries pressed for an agreement based, on equity, reflecting the fact that anthropogenic climate change was the, result of cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) originating mainly in the developed countries'. (Dasgupta, 2012:89) There was also an understanding on part of India that it is an emerging economy and has huge dependence on coal. Along with this, development remained main concern for India which was also stated by the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Stockholm. India was vigorous and vocal for sake of its own economic interest and development as a long term strategy. Thus India became leader of developing countries in INC negotiations

This basis of arguments given by developing countries was derived from CSE report that put it in writing that problem of global warming had been caused not by emissions of greenhouse gases as such but by excessive levels of per capita emissions. (Dasgupta, 2012:89) The argument given in this report was simple that the per capita emissions of developing countries are very low as compared to that of developed countries. This very high per capita emissions by developed countries are the main cause of global warming and not very low per capita emissions of poor developing countries. Based on this argument, developing countries was "successful in getting its preferred principles, norms

and conditionalities (on 'equity', 'CBDR'; new and additional finance to cover agreed full incremental costs ; an equitable and balanced financial mechanism) embedded within the UNFCCC to a significant extent. (Sengupta, 2012:106) All these negotiations which held during INC were not uncomplicated and had to face several hindrances like divisions within south and rigid stand of developed countries. But these hindrances were skillfully handled by diplomatic skills of India in the form of climate condition like G-77 along with China, Group of 53 developing countries with China and issuing of non-papers both by India and China which received huge support from developing countries.

India strategized around the structural issue arouse about the appropriate medium to be used for climate negotiations under the convention during the framing of UNFCCC. 'While many developed countries favored using the IPCC itself, developing countries, led by India and Brazil, which had been unhappy with how the IPCC had gone about its work, insisted that the negotiation be conducted under the direct authority of the UN General Assembly.' (Rajan, 1997:106) India opposed IPCC as medium as suggested by the developed countries for the reason that it is a body having majority from developed countries especially US. India wanted UN as the forum for negotiations as it would be place where there will be more universality and legitimacy among all states. India's efforts did prove effective and its accomplishment at INC negotiations can be sensed by the subject matter of Article 3 of UNFCCC which says Countries should protect the climate system on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities which became the core foundational norm of the treaty. (UNFCCC, 1992:9) There was contentment in Indian delegation about the end result of the negotiations in framing of UNFCCC.

India defended equity and differentiation that it negotiated for developing countries during the framing of UNFCCC in the later period of negotiations. The North and JUSCANZ[3] group wanted

to impose emission reduction commitments on developing countries at COP 1 in Berlin. Their argument was based on the notion that 'climate change was a 'global problem' that needed 'broad international participation', they called on the 'more advanced' developing countries (code for China and India) to also accept and mitigation commitment and for the establishment of new categories in the UNFCCC beyond the 'developed/ developing' (Annex 1/non Annex) divide' (Oberthur & Ott, 1999 : 46)

This division in developing countries as demanded mainly by United States and JUSCANZ was highly criticized by developing countries as a plot to create split among them. This act of North to dissect South was implied as 'insidious' by then environment minister Kamal Nath. Also other developing countries like China Brazil, Algeria and Philippines on the behalf of G-77 made a point that the northern demand to shift responsibilities on North would be equivalent to shifting the burden to the sufferers rather than the doer of climate injustice. India used its coalition-building skills to considerable effect at this point to ward off this Northern demand. It showed exemplary capability on the part of India to persuade different groupings to forge an effective climate deal on one hand and defend its own national as well as developmental interests on the other.

The north again raised the issue of commitments on the part of newly industrialized countries like India and China during the Kyoto negotiations focusing on the future flows of emissions and tried to take away the attention of discourse from the past stocks of global emissions for which developed world is responsible. India opposed the commitments on part of newly industrialized countries and also refuse to accept voluntary commitments for developing countries. India's environment minister restated that

---

[3] JUSCANZ stands for Japan, United States, Canada and New Zealand.

> We expect the conference to cast aside any proposal seeking to disturb the present balance of equities in the convention. India categorically rejects ideas suggesting any new commitments for developing countries. Any idea that seeks further to deprive us of our equitable entitlement to grow can never be allowed to take root. (Agarwal, 1999:58)

India strengthened its stand on equity on every platform it got like playing an active role as a host country for UNFCCC in 2002. It emphatically raised voice for rejection of commitments for developing countries and also talked about climate vulnerability of developing countries to negative effects of Climate Change (as projected in third assessment report of IPCC). India maintained its stand and denied developing countries commitment under convention and upheld the CBDR principle. It repeatedly emphasized that burden on environment is the result of over consumption of carbon space by the north and their denial to this imbalance in carbon share is apparent by 'Northern attempts to shift the focus of climate debate from the question of who was responsible for the 'stock' of past global emissions to who would be responsible for their future 'flow'.' (Sengupta, 2012: 108)

The North remained accusing emerging economies like India and China that they are not acting responsibly on climate change. In response to these prepositions for North, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at G8+5 summit at Heiligendamm, Germany cleared the India's positions using 'per capita convergence' approach that per capita emission of India is very low and far from reaching developed world's level. The Indian PM observed that it was not correct time for developing countries to go for targeted emission reduction targets but he made an independent and intended stand that India's per capita emission of Greenhouse gases would never surpass that of the developed countries (Singh, 2007)'This carefully worded pledge was however essentially consistent with India's long standing position that per capita

convergence was the only equitable long term solution to climate change and hence did not reflect a major change in its International stance on this issue.' (Sengupta, 2012: 109)

India's stand based on equity and differentiation continued even when China surpassed America in top greenhouse gases emission list in 2007 and fourth assessment report of IPCC stated that the warming of the earth climate system is unequivocal. These two events gave new dynamism to climate change negotiations. The vulnerability related to climate change was considered undeniable and China becoming top in Greenhouse gases emissions gave north edge to echo for commitment on the part of developing countries. India remained steadfast on the issue and wanted to have very evident distinction between the developing and developed countries. India made submissions about MRV procedures to UNFCCC in the same year and wanted an amendment regarding paragraph 1(b) (ii)[4].

India made submissions to UNFCCC as:

> The Convention does not permit a review of mitigation measures adopted by developing countries. Consistently with the Convention, the verification process foreseen in paragraph 1(b) (ii) of the Bali Action Plan does not apply to mitigation actions of developing countries other than those implemented under a contractual agreement between a developing country and a developed country (or a UNFCCC financial entity) in terms of which the latter 'supports and enables" the developing country, through transfers of finance and/or technology, to take specified mitigation actions.(MoEF,2009)

India managed that MRV procedures would not be allowed for mitigation actions which are not supported by developed

---

[4] 'Paragraph 1(b)(ii) called for nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing countries parties in the context of sustainable development supported and enabled by technology financing and capacity building in a measurable reportable and verifiable manners.'(See UNFCCC, Bali Action Plan, 2007)

countries and are financed domestically. In a way, India maintained distinction between developed countries and developing countries in case of MRV procedures and participated as flag bearer of differentiation principle.

There was continuity in India's stand till 2009 (July specifically). One reason could be basis that was given by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Stockholm conference the poverty not environment is the priority remained crucial for India's stand. Clive Splash puts it as

> Countries like India also have considerable income inequality and an emphasis has been placed upon traditional economic growth as a means to relieving poverty. The concern that economic growth will be capped by emission controls is put forward as a reason for avoiding regulation. (Splash, 2007:489)

Here development and pro poor policies adopted by India remained a vital issue than environment. Dubash describes the people having this orientation as growth first realist. According to them, 'climate change negotiations are a geopolitical stratagem by industrialized countries to contain new and emergent economic powers particularly China but also India Brazil and South Africa' (Dubash, 2012:202)

Other reasons could be general consensus about India's position which is based on equity, also work of various NGOs like CSE which in 1991 given an eye opener to developing world about the wrong calculations done by WRI. At that time Ministry of environment forest and climate change then only had state minister and not cabinet minister and traditional Bureaucracy working since the time of Indira Gandhi thinking themselves as correct and the position taken by them as truth and can't be subject to any change.

Not only this, Sandeep Sengupta pointed out:

> An important structural reason for the continuity seen in India's foreign policy on climate change is the inherent

> nature of the international system itself, where the primary motivation of all states has been to safeguard their own economic competitiveness, and their relative positions in the hierarchy of nations, rather than to collectively and meaningfully address the problem of climate change (Sengupta,2012:113)

This is the most realistic reason as India had its development concerns on its mind and did not want to compromise on that. But at the same time India did not remain in slumber about issue considering long term benefits it can have when the time comes. It can be pointed out that India was not leaving any stone unturned to direct climate change negotiations in its own stride. India was cloaking its national as well as development interests and daggering developed world to go for emission reduction based on differentiation principle.

Shift in India's Climate Change Policy

India became an emerging economy and its emergence as global power put burden on India to show the world its status in terms of responsibility now it has for global good. The change in India's climate change policy was seen when it announced to curb emission reduction targets.[5] This could be credited to the huge international pressure for newly industrialized countries to follow emission reductions and act as an emerging power. This shift was supported by the coming of new Environment and Forests Minister Jairam Ramesh altered the approach of India from 'per capita convergence' to 'per capita plus' to deal with issue of climate change. Jairam Ramesh believed that there is no country more vulnerable to climate change than India, on so many fronts. He talks about four major points of vulnerability i.e. our heavy dependence on the monsoons, Long coastline, Health of our

---

[5] Before Copenhagen, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed MEF leaders' declaration on Energy and climate at a meeting held alongside the G-8 summit in L'Aquila Italy that would take into cognizance the temperature rise and will try to reduce emissions by 2050.

Himalaya glaciers and Dependence on natural resource extraction (Ramesh,2012:xix)

To quote Jairam Ramesh:

> I am convinced that acting on climate change is a national priority — we need to act, for our own sake, not because of or for the sake of anyone else. We need an aggressive domestic agenda that addresses these vulnerabilities — an agenda that produces substantive policy action in the short as well as medium term and an agenda that is delinked from progress in international negotiations. (Ramesh,2012:xx)

But India formed three 'non negotiables' i.e. no legally binding emission reduction cut, no 'peaking year' and last no scrutiny of unsupported mitigating actions. India realised that now is the time to form new alliances in order to balance with shift it had gone in climate change's policy. For that India synchronized with BASIC group and opposed the US position to let newly industrialized countries Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) to accept the mitigation commitments on similar grounds as for north. The north, particularly US, has always wanted to replace Kyoto Protocol with new framework which will treat all countries on an impartial basis. This attempt of North has been heavily criticized by the BASIC countries and all other developing countries as this replacement would leave the negotiations at the spot where it begun and would zero all the progress made in climate negotiations since then. The shift in India's climate diplomacy has been described as 'Current negotiating positions reflect a balancing exercise between its traditional 'constraint driven' approach and the new globalist 'aspiration driven' stance pursued by several political actors.' (Atteridge, 2012:69)

The logic behind shift could also be awareness regarding the climate change issue and high vulnerability of India to it, Alliance with United States, and 'fear of isolation'. The global media put pressure on India portraying it as the problem child of the

international negotiations on climate change. The bellwether of mainstream global opinion, The Economist (2009), labeled India 'obdurate' and clubbed India with America and Russia as obstacles to a global deal.

On shift in India's Climate Change policy, Dubash has rightly argued that

> While exhuming the past can be illustrative, and even entertaining, it is now perhaps time to look forward and anticipate how a principled approach, strategic vision, political acumen and technical expertise can be better combined in India's negotiating approach. (Dubash &Rajamani, 2014).

India and New Climate Concerns

Showing the shift in climate change policy Jairam Ramesh hinted that the voluntary commitments are not enough and countries should take on legal responsibility for greenhouse gases emission reduction year. India played an important role in overpassing the division between developing and developed countries on several issues. He gave a plenary address on position that 'all countries must take on binding commitments in an appropriate legal form' (Ramesh, 2010). Even if India talked about commitments on the part of developing countries but still keeping in view the distinction under CBDR principle.'The US, the EU and other developed countries regarded this separation as having been left behind at Copenhagen, which marked the first time both developed and developing countries signed up under a single agreement to curb their emissions'(Harvey, 2013). India along with like-minded developing countries (LMDCs) alerted the COP to reaffirm the faith in distinction between the 'developed' and 'developing' countries and made all agreements on the basis of original UNFCCC document of 1992 as well as text of Kyoto protocol of 1997 by which developed world has historic responsibility of GHGs emissions and has prime responsibility to

remove GHGs from earth's atmosphere.India robustly carried on to preserve the distinction between developed and developing countries in the INDCs[6] according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) enshrined in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) under which the climate negotiations are taking place. India along with other developing countries has pointed out that there are no serious commitments on the part of developed world so as to give financial support as well technological support. Not only this, the draft text of proposed agreement diluted the CBDR principle based on which negotiations are taking place.

India strengthened its status as leader of global south as Lima talks led to new fervor in form of G-77 and the Like Minded Developing Countries groupings that too before the much awaited Paris deal. India successfully managed to bring the mention of CBDR principle in the text which was earlier missing. But lacuna remained in the form of the clause 'in light of different national circumstances' added to this basic principle which has been picked up by the US- China deal happened around the same time. It would adulterate the CBDR principle hence commitments on the part of developed countries. Harjeet Singh, International Manager for Climate Change and Resilience at ActionAid International said: 'This totally compromises the position of developing countries. Differentiation is at the heart of climate negotiations. Developing countries might have to repent for letting this clause pass.' (The Indian Express, December 14, 2014) Various climate groups and expert were unhappy about the outcome of the Lima describing it as 'weak' and 'unjust'.

India was projected as stumbling block by US in the framing of the universal agreement at Paris even before the inaugural of COP-21. In response to this idea, Environment Minister Prakash Javedkar has said

---

[6]Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, or INDCs were projected to be forming the part of new international agreement, defined as the pledges made by developed as well as developing countries to reduce GHGs emissions

> India cannot be bullied. You can't bully India, the message is clear. Developed countries need to provide carbon space to developing countries. (Sharma,2015a)

However India's main concerns at the Paris talks were differentiation and finance. Whereas G-77 plus China including India strongly projected the belief in the UNFCCC document and need to structure the draft text on its line only. On differentiation issue, PM Modi made a point that 'While batting for differentiation between developed and developing nations in combating climate change, it is clear that India will not be on the back foot as far as its expanding use of coal is concerned' (Sharma, 2015b). He further stressed that climate change is not the product of developing world but that of industrialized countries which have eaten up beyond their share of carbon space. But still the developing countries like India have to face the climate risks prone to farmers, coastline, changes in weather patterns and the intensity of natural disasters. In addition to this, it hammered the developed world about the commitment of $100bn of financial support to developing countries and focused on unfulfilled promises made in terms of finance as well as technological support. As a result of all the efforts put in by India and LMDCs, the differentiation principle has found explicit mention in all the pillars of action in the agreement and also two concepts 'climate justice' and 'sustainable lifestyles' have been located in the preamble of the text. The then environment minister received the final draft as 'balanced' and all the issues taken up by India were resolved.

India demanded for climate justice in the form of receiving finances from developed countries which they have promised but not yet delivered at COP-22 at Marrakech. It informed that it has already started working on its NDCs and it requires an amount of $2.5tn to implement these targets well. India stressed developed countries at Marrakech to make sure that $100 bn be provided to developing countries every year. The pressure put by India is due to the reason that only $2bn contributions have been made so far. Salaheddine Mezouar, President of COP-22, described this

conference as an

> opportunity to make the voices of the most vulnerable
> countries to climate change heard, in particular African
> countries and island states. It is urgent to act on these
> issues linked to stability and security. COP-22 will be one
> of action. (Zhang & Pfeiffer, 2016)

India took a step ahead from the leader of developing countries
and emerged as a global leader on the issue of climate change. It
presented draft framework agreement for the International Solar
Alliance (ISA) under which both developed as well as developing
countries will work to channelize the solar power as an alternative
energy. This initiative by India has proved to be success as 121
countries have joined and affirmed their faith in the idea of
harnessing sunshine.

Further, India showed its diplomatic skills when it managed to
become the part of the group which is last to freeze HFCs use in
Kigali.[7] According to Lekha Sridhar, a policy analyst with the
Council on Energy, Environment and Water, 'India gets to
participate in a positive global climate action, while gaining time to
allow its heating, ventilation and air-conditioning sectors to grow
and refrigerant manufacturers to find a comfortable route to
transition and cost of alternatives to fall.' (Koshy, 2016) After the
agreement India's Environment minister said 'We were flexible,
accommodative and ambitious. The world is one family and as a
responsible member of the global family, we played our part to
support and nurture this agreement.' (Dave, 2016) This statement
shows the ability of Indian diplomacy to get deals done in their
favors for their own interests and simultaneously projecting India
as an accountable member working rigoursly for a better
agreement.

---

[7] In Kigali agreement 2016, three groups of all countries are formed with dissimilar timelines
to reduce HFC emissions. The third group of which India is a part will only be freezing HFC
use by 2028

Although COP-23 at Bonn was aimed to set in motion the preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement but binary between developed countries and developing countries was not imperceptible. As the developed countries wanted to keep the segregation between pre-2020 commitments and post-2020 commitments so as to keep them safe from the pre-2020 i.e. Kyoto-II commitments but India as a part of Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) were hell bent so that these commitments are not incoherent as response to climate change issue. On this, the diplomatic skills of India and LMDCs worked and the suggestions proposed by them found their mention in final decision text at Bonn. The argument of India was based on the logic that 'Failure by developed countries to act on previous COP decisions will undermine the integrity of the UNFCCC process and unduly burden the developing countries to do more than their fair share in the post 2020 era.' (GoI, 2017)

The pre-2020 commitments are crucial for the success of Paris Agreement as the earlier will provide clearer picture to developed countries for their emission assessments as well as the kind of role needs to be played by them to support the developing countries so that they did not reach the emission levels similar to them. At the other level, PM Modi has shown that India is very much concerned about the climate change issue and Paris is just a step to deal with it and not an end in India's climate change policy. 'We must leave for our future generations a climate wherein they can breathe clean air and have a healthy life' (Vishnoi & Chaudhary, 2017). As a part of International Solar Alliance (ISA), India has increased its capacity of renewable energy to 11.3 GW in achieving its goal of 175 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2022. It would be right to point out that 'India stands on the cusp of an energy revolution.'(Walter, 2017)

The kind of position taken by India in COP-23 at Bonn continues to COP-24 at Katowice. Here also India gave strong statement on climate action based on equity and climate justice. India pressed on the developed countries to give stock take on pre-2020 commitments and respect these commitments for proper

initiation to Paris Agreement. Along with this, India stressed that the equilibrium created between the developed and developing countries in Paris Agreement is fragile and it should not be disturbed by diluting the CBDR-RC principle. Hence it was quite evident that the Paris Deal was 'non-negotiable.'

India showed its proactivity on climate change issue by showcasing the voluntary targets achieved by the country early than required. As stated in official statement, "India is guided by its own values and belief in sustainable lifestyles which respects nature, evident from the fact that our share in cumulative historical global GHG emissions is only about 3 percent and our per capita emissions are just about one-third of global average" (GoI, 2018). During the statement at COP-24, India emphasized on the successful enforcement of treaty on ISA as result of signatures by 71 countries and ratification by 48 countries and the United Nations' 'Champion of the Earth Award'[8] conferred to India's PM Narendra Modi for his contribution towards the issue of climate change. In continuation to these efforts by PM Modi in the form of ISA, a joint statement was issued by India and France in August 2019 during PM's visit to France. Out of 34 paragraphs of the statement, 9 were dedicated to the climate change issues. It incorporated the commitments on the part of both the countries to 'enhanced climate actions, their support for new low-carbon technologies, and their ongoing efforts to accelerate development and deployment of renewable energy'(Sinha, 2019). The two countries also decided to frame new plans to curb their GHGs emissions for longer period from 30 to 50 years. As far as India is concerned, a longer- term planning is the latest approach to deal the climate change.

India is doing so much on climate change as discussed in previous section yet it turned down the 'new asks'[9] from UNSG. In response to this, a discussion paper was made public by GoI in which it outrightly rejected any more actions as a part of

---

[8] The highest environmental award of United Nations.

developing countries as India has development as its imperative and has already achieved its targets for emission reduction. In the discussion paper, India has raised the role of developed countries to fulfill the net zero emissions as desired by UNSG and targeted them for their inefficiency in providing climate fund and technology transfer for developing countries. In response to the urgency given to the climate action, India has demanded that 'the same urgency will have to be seen in the scope, scale and speed of climate finance, without which the world cannot achieve the objectives of the Convention and Paris Agreement'. (GoI, 2019: 20) India again made the same point at recent COP-25 at Madrid where in it put pressure on the developed country by linking its climate action to the actions that of developed countries itself. 'It argued that unless a stocktaking exercise of the fulfillment of various pre-2020 commitments by developed countries (such as those made at Copenhagen, Cancun and Kyoto) showed that they were making significant progress, India would not raise its climate ambition for its next round of Paris Agreement targets due in 2020'(Subramanian, 2019).

On the one hand, India is putting pressure on developed world to stick to pre-2020 commitments as well in addition to post-2020 targets. Thus maintaining the distinction between developed countries and developing countries as the leader of the South. On the other hand, India is acting as a global leader where it is even going beyond Paris Agreement in fulfilling emission targets to show the world the kind of power and capacity it holds at global level. India has represented the case of developing countries with same vigor as earlier even if it is accomplishing its emission reduction commitments.

---

[9]   In September, 2019, a special climate action summit was convened by UN Secretary General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres to push the countries to increase climate action to another level.

Conclusion

India's policy on climate change has constantly been characterized by equity, historical responsibility (that of developed world), 'differentiation' in the form of common but differentiated responsibilities i.e. CBDR principle, sticking to the original UNFCCC document and financial support (to the developing countries). Thus India rejected any emission reduction targets in view of its developing character and continually pressed for responsibility of developed countries for problem of climate change.

Year 2009 can be considered as watershed in India's policy on climate change. Earlier to this, India acted as leader of developing countries. It was a constant period in terms of India's climate change policy because of varied reasons like 'domestic consensus', 'traditional bureaucracy', dormant North. India used this period well as it bought time for pursuing development as 'latecomer' in process of industrialization.

Post 2009, India had to loosen its stand on Climate change due to its 'global status' and emerging nature of its economy as it has forever talked about the equity principle. But at the same time India has persisted with the ideas of CBDR, historic responsibility and financial support of developing countries. India has strongly advocated the case of developing countries in all climate negotiations and never vacated its place as leader of these countries.

Even if there is change in India's policy post 2009, India still managed to get in the list of third group of countries in Kigali agreement which have to freeze HFCs at last by 2028. This show the impeccable diplomacy skills on the part of India at international level whereby it is balancing its development interests and emerging nature of its economy. India has focused on its positives like National Solar Mission and formed International Solar Alliance (ISA) to showcase the kind of efforts India is putting in to deal climate change issue whereas simultaneously India is reticent on low carbon pathways(part of Marrakech agreement) &

has put down the lid on its rising coal usage. Thus shifting the focus from weaknesses to strengths i.e. rising coal usage to International Solar Alliance (ISA). The more deeper expertise in diplomatic skills are visible during recent COPs where India, remaining the leader of developing countries, is demonstrating its stature at international level by fulfilling its emission reduction targets and even going beyond that.

References

Agarwal, Anil and Sunita Narain.(1991). Global warming in an unequal world: A case of environmental colonialism, *Centre for Science and Environment*: New Delhi, p.1.

Agarwal, Anil (ed).(1999).*Green Politics*, Centre for Science and Environment: New Delhi, p.58.

Atteridge, Aaron, Manish Kumar Shrivastava, Neha Pahuja and HimaniUpadhyay. (2012). 'Climate Policy in India: What Shapes International, National and State Policy?', *Ambio* 41:68–77DOI 10.1007/s13280-011-0242-5, p.69.

Dasgupta, Chandrashekhar.(2012). 'Present at the creation: The making of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change' in Navroz K. Dubash(ed*.), Handbook of Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance*, Earthscan, Routledge: Abingdon, p.89.

Dave, Anil Madhav.(2016).Environment Minister in a press statement released on 16 October.

Dubash, Navroz and Lavanya Rajamani. (2014). A map and a compass for climate talks, *The Hindu*, 23 July.

Dubash, Navroz.(2012). 'Climate politics in India Three narratives' in Navroz K. Dubash(ed*.), Handbook of Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance*, Earthscan, Routledge: Abingdon, p.202.

Gandhi,Indira. (1972).*Man And Environment*, Plenary Session of United Nations Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm.

Government of India, (2017).Big win for India and developing countries in COP 23, *Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change*, Press Information Bureau, 15 November.

Government of India, (2019). Climate Summit for Enhanced Action: A Financial Perspective from India, Discussion Paper, *Climate Change Finance Unit*, 17 September, p.20.

Government of India.(2018). India Country Statement For Cop-24, Statement on behalf of Dr. Harsh Vardhan, Hon'ble Minister, Environment, Forest & Climate Change, Katowice, Poland.

Harvey, Fiona. (2013),'As the Warsaw climate talks end, the hard work is just beginning' *The Guardian,* 25 November available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/25/warsaw-climate-talks-end-cop19-2015

Koshy, Jacob. (2016)Kigali makes history with HFC freeze, *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 16 October.

MoEF. (2009). Climate Change Negotiations: India's Submissions to the UNFCCC, New Delhi Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India, August.

Oberthür, Sebastian and Hermann E Ott,(1999).*The Kyoto Protocol:International Climate Policy for the 21st Century*, Springer, Berlin, p.46.

Rajan, Mukul Govind.(1997). *Global Environmental Politics: India and the North south Politics of Global Environmental Issues*, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, p.106.

Ramesh, Jairam. (2010) Letter to Members of Parliament on the Cancun Agreements, 17 December.

Ramesh, Jairam.(2012), 'Foreword' in Navroz K. Dubash(ed.*), Handbook . Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance*, Earthscan, Routledge: Abingdon, 2012, p.xix.

Rosencranz, Armin and Reina Milligan.(1990) *"CFC Abatement: The Needs of Developing Countries" Ambio*, vol. 19, no. 6/7, pp. 312–316, available at www.jstor.org/stable/4313724.

Sengupta, Sandeep. (2012) 'International climate negotiations and India's role' in Navroz K. Dubash(ed.*), Handbook of Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance*, Earthscan, Routledge: Abingdon,p.106.

Sharma, Vibha. (2015a). 'On eve of Paris climate talks, India says it won't be bullied' *The Tribune*,New Delhi, 30November.

Sharma, Vibha. (2015b). 'Modi points to historical inequities in energy consumption', *The Tribune*, 1 December.

Singh, Manmohan.(2007) PM's Intervention on Climate Change at the Heiligengamm Meeting of G8 plus 5, 8 June.

Sinha, Amitabha. (2019) How govts set climate targets, *The Indian Express*, August 27, p.12.

Spash, Clive L. (2007).'*Climate Change: Need for New Economic Thought'*, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 6 p. 489.

Strong, Maurice F. (1999) 'Hunger, Poverty, Population and Environment', *Hunger Project Millenium Lecture,* Chennai, 7 April.

Subramanian, Kapil. (2019). Climate Emergency CoP 25: India's mixed role available at https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/climate-change/climate-emergency-cop-25-india-s-mixed-role-68449.

The Indian Express (2014). 'Deal reached at UN climate talks in Peru', 14 December (for news items)

UNFCCC.(1992)*United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, United Nations, p.9.

Vishnoi, Anubhuti and Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury(2017). 'Dismissing Donald Trump's snarl, India vows to stay on the green path', *The Economic Times*, 3 June.

Walter Marina (2017). COP 23 at Bonn: India has resolved to be a strong leader on climate action, *The Hindustan Times*, 10 November.

Zhang, Yanzhu and Alexander Pfeiffer. (2016) 'Can Marrakech's COP22 solve the unfinished tasks of Paris COP21?', *Governance, Cooperation and Law* available at https://blogs.bsg.ox.ac.uk/2016/11/17/can-marrakechs-cop22-solve-the-unfinished-tasks-of-paris-cop21/

Islamophobia As Reflected in Tehmina Durrani's *My Feudal Lord And Blasphemy*

Ghulam Ali Rehmani*

Abstract

The paper ventures into shedding light on Islamophobia, causes of its spread, and its colossal impact on Muslim societies in particular and the world in general. It underscores Tehmina Durrani's understanding of Islam and Islamophobia and what kind of a society she envisions in her novels under study. The paper dexterously puts a dividing line between Islamic and pseudo-Islamic practices for the proper understanding of Islam and Islamophobia. Moreover, it goes on to underline that Islam seeks to establish a peaceful democratic society on the one hand and Islamophobia is the result of pseudo-Islamic practices for which Islam and its rituals are unjustifiably always blamed on the other. Therefore, the paper comes down heavily upon the false or pseudo-Islamic rituals of 'Muslims' in the light of Islamic scriptures; whereby it makes it crystal clear that the pseudo-Islamic practices are the primary causes for the rise and spread of Islamophobia.

*Research Scholar, Department of English, Central University of Jammu, Rahya Suchani, Bagla, Samba, Jammu, J&K, India, 181143

Keywords: Islamophobia, Islam, Tehmina Durrani, Democratic, Pseudo-Islamic, Society.

Introduction

A Tehmina Durrani, one of the celebrated authors of Pakistan, shook the very ground of deception of Muslim society of Pakistan in particular and the world in general with her two monumental novels- *My Feudal Lord* and *Blasphemy.* Although, phallocentric society posed continuous threat to Durrani from the very beginning of her career, but she defied all the threats and exposed the supposed defender of Islam in the light of Islamic scriptures instead. She hits hard at gross social and human rights violence, gender inequality, and false rituals of Muslim society which are providing ammunition to Islamophobia. She firmly believes that manipulation of Islamic teachings has led to the rise of fear towards Islam which is termed as "Islamophobia". Despite displaying the darkest and bleakest face of Muslim society followed by its repercussion, she is confident that a justifiable resistance in the light of Islamic teachings can help to establish a peaceful Muslim society across the world. Apart from shedding light on the causes and rise of Islamophobia, she also dispels Islamophobia's smog from the Muslim society by basing her argument on Qur'an and Hadith. She also paves the way for those oppressed who underwent the hell of pseudo-Islamic practices but never complained or raised their voice. Projecting herself as the mouthpiece for millions of oppressed, she kindles in them the desire to resist the oppression and assert their rights as enshrined in Islam.

Islamophobia:

The concept of Islamophobia emerged in the 1990s and got wider currency around the world with the publication of the celebrated *Islamophobia: a challenge for us all: report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia* (Allen,

2010:3). Islamophobia is composed of an Arabic word Islam (peace) and an English suffix –phobia (fear of something). Taken together it means fear of Islam (peace). The Berkeley University in "*Islamophobia Research and Documentation project*" defines Islamophobia thus, "Islamophobia is a contrived fear or prejudice fomented by the existing Eurocentric and Orientalist global power structure. It is directed at the perceived or real Muslim threat. . . (Berkeley. Edu.)[1]".

Putting the controversy over who used the term for the first time apart, it is generally agreed that it was first used by Alphonse Etienne Dinet and Sliman ben Ibrahim (an Algerian intellectual) in their 1918 biography of Islam's Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)[2]. Originally it was written in French which was later on translated by Robin Richardson not as "Islamophobia" rather as "feeling inimical to Islam (Allen, 2010:5)."

It is generally believed that the meaning and syntactic form keeps on acquiring new forms with the change of time and progress in history. For instance, the word 'Gay' refers to people having same sex relationship in the twentieth century whereas earlier, it used to mean 'full of happiness (Pansegrouw, 1994:305). Islamophobia could not escape this nature of historical development and changes. Etymologically 'Islamophobia' simply meant fear of Islam but due to this development and changes it meant "feeling inimical to Islam" at the hands of Alphonse Etienne Dinet and Sliman ben Ibrahim. Surprisingly, the term got associated with terrorism following the 9/11 attacks in the United States and such association of the term with terrorism left a long lasting imprint on the minds of the people.

The present version of Islamophobia which the author hints at is the outcome of the distortion, selective, and self serving teachings of Islam by certain section of 'Muslims' under the

---

[2] Pbuh- It is an acronym which stands for 'Peace be upon him.' It is used here for Prophet Muhammad as a token of respect.

influence of *Jahiliyyah* civilization. The self styled protectors and defenders of Islam allegedly claim that Islamic teachings have gone outdated and irrelevant to the contemporary realities. Keeping this in view, they want to guide other Muslims of the society in line with the Western civilization. Strangely enough, their attempt has utterly failed and instead of incorporating the civilization of West they fell in the trap of *Jahiliyyah* civilization from which Islam has once rescued people. Chris Allen felt the pulse of the self styled protectors of faith; hence he goes on to say, "Islam is seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities" (Allen, 1994:54).

Jahiliyyah: Understanding the concept

Jahiliyyah is an Islamic concept which refers to the days of ignorance in pre-Islamic period. The question how the age of *Jahiliyyah* could be considered a separate civilization needs to be addressed. In this context Huntington argues, "Human history is the history of civilizations. It is impossible to think of the development of humanity in any other forms" (Huntington, 1996:40). Huntington further seeks to emphasize that *Jahiliyyah* has to be a distinct civilization because any age can be called a civilization if it has a language and a religion (59). If *Jahiliyyah* is put to the test of language and religion it passes because pre-Islamic people were mostly polytheists and they spoke the Arabic language. Hence, *Jahiliyyah* is a distinct civilization by all means.

Islamophobia in *My Feudal Lord* and *Blasphemy:* In her autobiographical novel titled *My Feudal Lord* Tehmina Durrani pours out her traumatic experiences at the hands of her husband Mustafa Khar. Durrani faced the brunt of identity crisis, otherization, commodification, and innumerable injustices. Mustafa Khar, a professional seducer, loves Durrani not as a living being having emotions and feelings rather as an object or commodity which gives carnal satisfaction when consumed. As

Durrani was warned, '"He just loves you because you look good . . . . He likes the package - not the reality" (*My Feudal Lord* 80). Durrani chooses to turn a deaf ear to this warning and falls in the inhuman trap of Mustafa Khar subsequently, "I had fallen into the classic trap of Pakistani woman. The goal is marriage and, once achieved, the future is a life of total subordination. I had no power, no rights, no will of my own" (100).

The author critiques the dubious and subversive elements attached to the very concept of marriage which are notoriously used against weaker vessels to marginalize, and dehumanize them. Moreover, it is a systematic way to push woman on the margin of the society hence "Otherization." Strangely enough, Mustafa even reduced Durrani to the position of a sex slave, hence commodification of sexuality. As she says, "I had completed my duties as a sexual object (185)." This way of bringing woman (Durrani) in the cycle of valuation is nothing but a disgrace to civilized human society. Worst than above, the physical as well as the mental torture were unleashed upon her time and again. She relates one such incident of torture in these words:

> In one swift movement he reached with his right hand, grabbed the barrel and swung it at me. The wooden butt of the gun slammed into my side. I fell, but instinctively scrambled to my feet. I screamed, 'you have destroyed me!' He silenced me with another blow. . . . He struck me repeatedly with the heavy gun stock, aiming for my back, my side, my legs, but he was in sufficient control to attempt to avoid striking me on the head (*My Feudal Lord 163-64*).

Although, the author describes her own traumatic experiences but it implies that this kind of horrible practices are common in the Muslim societies which pass unnoticed.

In yet another novel titled *Blasphemy,* the author relates similar kind of inhuman practices unleashed upon Heer (the protagonist) by Pir Sain (the antagonist). Like Mustafa Khar, Pir

Sain is also a brute in human form. Like Tehmina, Heer is no doubt the epitome of innocence but she meets the same fate as that of Tehmina. Heer was beaten up severely on various occasions but all the time she appears to be the victim of injustice. In one such incident she was sent an 'envelop' through a maid called Terhi by her husband's youngest brother. Pir Sain had some disagreement with him so he does not have any contact with him. She dares not open the letter and left it on Pir's table. Having seen the envelop Pir questioned Heer and consequently she was beaten mercilessly along with Terhi, the maid:

> Terhi was blessed with old age and her punishment was lighter than mine. Ordered to lie flat on my stomach, I obeyed instantly. Two maids held my outstretched arm above my head and another two grasped my ankles. A lighting swing made the *khajji* whip hiss and swish. It was always regulated by his energy, never by how much I could endure . . . . To avoid blood clotting, I was instructed to get up and walk immediately. Wondering what kind of mind could justify such severe punishment for no crime . . . (*Blasphemy* 81:82)

These inhuman and *Jahiliyyah* practices are primarily misunderstood to be Islamic by the common masses unwittingly. Moreover, the facilitators of these practices like Mustafa Khar and Pir Sain are also misunderstood to be the "iconic" figures of Islam. In fact, these people subscribe to *Jahiliyyah* and are its de facto facilitators. The inhuman treatment which the weaker vessels are subjected to is nothing but a reflection of *Jahiliyyah*civilization. Since, in *Jahiliyyah* civilization women had hardly any civil rights and liberty and they were traded like commodity, "Alternatively, when a man did not want to marry his woman captive, he might sell her; in Mecca, there was a market place for selling slaves" (Sulaimani 1986:13). Durrani herself agreed to it, therefore she claims, "They led us back to the time of *Jahalia,* back to the conditions our prophet had freed us from, back to the very reason that had called for Islam" (*Blasphemy 103*). By contrast, Islam

intends to bring parity between the genders instead of fuelling the narrative of commodification. In fact, Islam claims, "And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable; but men have a degree (of advantage) over them" (Qur'an 02:228). Islam never projects woman as a commodity instead it considers women to be an individual having free will to decide on their own. In truth Islam discourages *Jahiliyyah* practice of commodification or taking women as a possession, on the contrary Islam says: "o ye who believe! Ye are forbidden to inherit women against their will. Nor ye should treat them with harshness" (Qur'an 4:19). The self styled leaders, nevertheless are hell bent to replace the Islamic practices with inhuman *Jahiliyyah* practices. Given the above, it becomes explicitly clear that there is a vast gap between Islam and what is being practiced by its misguided followers. This gap remained wide open even today, and it is because of this the threat of Islamophobia is still looming large upon the Muslim as well as non-Muslim societies. The anti-women/*Jahiliyyah* deeds of so called 'Muslims' send out horrible message to the outside world. It is vital to underline here that the *Jahiliyyah practices* are allegedly thought to be Islamic by the outside world whereby people start detesting Islam instead of *Jahiliyyah* which result in Islamophobia. Therefore, Islam is not to be blamed rather the misguided people, who either distort or cherry pick the teachings of Islam to further *Jahiliyyah* practices and also to fulfil their ulterior motives, are to be blamed.

Subversion of Islamic ideals is again one of the crucial issues abetting Islamophobia in *My Feudal Lord* and *Blasphemy*. 'Subversion' is a Latin word (*subvertere*) which refers to an act of undermining or reversing the set patterns, structures, orders, powers, and authority. Since its origin, it has been defined variously, yet the dilemma remains and the users are not sure which definition is more accurate. Regarding the elasticity of meaning of this word Charles Townshed says, "So elastic as to be virtually devoid of meaning and its uses does little more than convey the enlarged sense of the vulnerability of modern systems

to all kinds of covert assaults (Rosenau, 2007:4)." Subversion, as Charles Townshed says, has elasticity in its nature, so it can fit to various fields like subversion of nationality, constitution, ethnicity, ideology, intellectuality, philosophy, science and so on. However, subversion in this paper will be strictly restricted to the Islamic scriptural territory and its implications on the Muslim society. Subversion with reference to Islam and Muslim society has various streams but two specific streams- how Islam subverts the numerous aspects of the society and how its ideals are being subverted-- are very much crucial and integral to Islam. Subversion always leads to some result (effect) either constructive or destructive. Therefore, effect has to be taken into consideration in lieu of subversion. If subversion breeds a constructive fruit then it needs be utilized for the betterment of the society. On the other hand, if subversion brings out counterproductive result then it is essential to address the problems which are instrumental in bringing negative results.

Historically speaking, Islam came in response to *Jahiliyyah* and almost eliminated *Jahiliyyah's* ways of living, thinking, acting; nevertheless even after toiling hard Islam could not exterminate *Jahiliyyah* completely. Remnants of *Jahiliyyah* remained partly active in some forms even after Islam got sway over the life of Muslims across the world. In the words of Michel Foucault *Jahiliyyah* has been, "buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation" with the advent of Islam in seventh century (Foucault, 1980:81). Having scanned history along with the argument of Foucault, the debate came to a conclusion that Pre-Islamic (*Jahiliyyah*) ways of life were suppressed and subjugated but not eliminated in their totality. Therefore, it could be assumed that the proponents of *Jahiliyyah* were not really visible and thoroughly active because they were in disguise in the prevalent (Islamic) ways of life looking for the right time to strike. Tehmina in *My Feudal Lord* and *Blasphemy* shows the resurgence of the proponents of *Jahiliyyah* like Pir Sain and Mustafa Khar who grabbed it vigorously and set out to concretize it. The assertion of *Jahiliyyah* by Pir and Mustafa in *Blasphemy* and *My Feudal Lord*

respectively can rightly be called in Michel Foucault's terminology "*insurrection of subjugated knowledge*" (Foucault, 1980:81).

History bears witness to the fact that the assertion is always accompanied by power. Knowledge in the absence of power is ephemeral and unassertive. Power seems to be the life blood for inscribing and legitimizing any kind of knowledge in the mind of the people. Michel Foucault too agrees and says:

> Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects, and in that sense at least, 'becomes true.' Knowledge, once used to regulate the conduct of others, entails constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice. Thus, 'there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations. (Foucault, 1977:27)

The responsibility for bringing back *Jahiliyyah* on the throne rests on the shoulders of Pir and Mustafa. Pir as well as Mustafa exercise power to ensure the prevalence of *Jahiliyyah. My Feudal Lord* as well as *Blasphemy* professes a typical kind of "domination-repression" relationship between Pir and Mustafa and Heer and Tehmina Durrani respectively. Michel Foucault delved deep into the analysis of power and claims:

> Thus we have two schemes for the analysis of power. The contract-oppression schema, which is the juridical one, and the domination-repression or war-repression schema for which the pertinent opposition is not between legitimate and illegitimate, as in the first schema, but between struggle and submission(Foucault, 1980:92).

The concept of "domination-repression" of Foucault fits in the context of the novel; since both the antagonists (Pir and Mustafa) stand for domination through repression whereas the protagonists Heer and Tehmina stand for the repressed and the dominated.

Tehmina Durrani is well aware of the Pseudo-Islamic forces trying to turn the way of lives of the Muslims' societies upside down through the subversion of Islamic ideals. In her novels *My Feudal Lord* and *Blasphemy* she minutely observed Muslim societies and its practices. The entire observation was ominous for her and this leads her to conclude that Muslim societies pay lip services to paint themselves that they are executing Islamic practices but in truth they are far away from executing; instead they are trampling down the teachings by upsetting the messages of Islam.

Subversion of Islamic ideals in the present world scenario is rampant leading to the rise of false religious and political leaders. Tehmina Durrani felt the pulse of the issue and its hazardous effect and came up with manifold arguments through her novels. She highlights many ideals of Islam and their subversion in the hands of Pir Sain and Mustafa Khar in both the novels. In both the novels several ideals of Islam have been subverted wherein *Jihad* is one of the most seriously and frequently misunderstood, misconstrued and subverted ideals of Islam. The subversion of the concept of *Jihad* is to be found in *Blasphemy* in the hands of Pir Sain.

The word *Jihad* is derived from the Arabic root word *juhd,* meaning to strive and to struggle. The concept of *Jihad* finds its mention in the holy Qur'anat several places: "And strive in His cause as ye ought to strive, (with sincerity and under discipline) (Qur'an, 22:78)." In common parlance, *Jihad* means strict adherence to the will of God in all aspects of life. It also implies the prevention of all obstacles coming in the way of fulfilling God's will-for example, greed for wealth, the desires of the self, ego problems, the will to serve one's own interests, the need for compromise and the compulsion of social traditions. Thwarting all these obstacles and fulfilling the will of God in all aspects of one's life is called *Jihad.* In fact, the word *Jihad* is used primarily in this sense.

Now, one could think that *Jihad* essentially is a peaceful struggle and this fact is concretized in the Qur'anitself in these words: "Therefore listen not to the Unbelievers, but strive against them with the utmost strenuousness, with the (Qur'an) (Qur'an,

25:52)." This verse of the Holy Book does not refer to any violent activities, instead it explicitly implies that Muslims should not involve in physical combat with the unbelievers. The explicit message of this verse is that Muslims must involve themselves in ideological dialogue through Qur'an with non-Muslims and come to common terms.

The meaning and essence of the concept of *Jihad* is now disputed in the present scenario. This Islamic concept is mostly misunderstood throughout the world not only by non-Muslims but also by Muslims. The misunderstanding regarding *Jihad* across the world among Muslims and non-Muslims is due to the lack of knowledge of the concept of *Jihad*. Secondly, people having ulterior motives are trying to present it in un-Islamic way. Samuel P. Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations* equates it with the Christian concept of Crusade, holy war (Huntington, 1996:4). This sort of definition is quite misleading and is nowhere to be found in the Islamic scriptures. Similarly, pseudo-Muslims like Pir in *Blasphemy* are working to dissociate this concept from its true nature, meaning and essence. Pir is the mouthpiece of *Jahiliyyah* and therefore he desires to keep the *Jahiliyyah* spirit going in its full swing so that the sway of true Islamic ideals paves way to *Jahiliyyah*. Having this in mind he pretends as though he is performing *Jihad*, therefore, he gives the impression that he is a *Mujahid.* Although, Pir Sain gives the impression to the outside world that he follows the path of *Jihad* in both letter and spirit, but his activities and actions are nowhere closer to what *Jihad* has to say. As it is clearly mentioned above that the *Jihad* literally means "to strive and to struggle"; so one has to struggle and strive to achieve the goal which *Jihad* implies. *Jihad* implies that one needs to have control over one's desire, evil inclinations and so on to become a true *Mujahid*. Pir Sain must stand the test of *Jihad*, since he pretends to be a *Mujahid*.

As we consider the actions of Pir and the implication of the concept of *Jihad*, it becomes evident that his claims are shallow and inconsequential. Instead of getting control over his desires and evil inclinations, he lets his desires and evil inclinations loose upon

people around by raping the child and beating the innocent. In fact he practices those things which are quite contrary to what *Jihad* implies. The author gives ample evidences which prove that Pir is not a *Mujahid*, but an imposter who does all sorts of evil deeds under the garb of *Jihad*. Instead of executing Islamic concept of *Jihad,* he created and then forced an inhuman tradition upon the people of the society. Through such self-made tradition, the Pir molests virgins of the society. This tradition helps in fulfilling the carnal desire of Pir at the cost of virgin girls of the society. Durrani dexterously points out to this tradition in *Blasphemy*:

...the tradition of the *pir's uthni* to me, which was that the *pir's* she-camel would be left to wonder around the village freely until it chose a house before which it sat down. This signaled that the unwed daughter of the house was to be dressed as a bride and offered to the *pir*. Deflowered, the girl would be sent back home to live untouched by another man for as long as she lived. (*Blasphemy* 1998:147)

Durrani seeks to emphasize on the fact that taking woman as personal property in Islam is forbidden. Islam also forbids taking a woman into marriage without her consent.

The tradition which forces virgins to live as sex slaves is alien to Islam; nevertheless the tradition is being carried out because those girls as well as the society per se are unaware of the true status and position allotted to women in Islam. The practice/tradition of taking women as personal property is an attribute of the age of *Jahiliyyah*. civilization used women merely as a possession of men and worst of all they were inherited by men like property. Islam nowhere encourages this kind of illogical and inhuman tradition, on the contrary Islam says: "o ye who believe! Ye are forbidden to inherit women against their will. Nor ye should treat them with harshness" (Qur'an 04:19),

The verse of the Qur'an quoted above proves Pir to be an imposter, and sequesters the true concept of *Jihad* from the false one. Therefore, one can conclude that Pir is an agent of a perennial *Jahiliyyah* way of life and he subverts Islamic ideals.

The true spirit of *Jihad* is displayed by the protagonist herself in the novel *Blasphemy*. Heer did not try do dissociate the true meaning of *Jihad* like Pir did, instead she vigorously follows the path of resistance in response to Pir's unbridled move. She is well aware of the fact of Islam where it (Islam) says: "Whosoever of you see an evil let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then [let him change it] with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart — and that is the weakest of faith" (Kilinc, 2001:206). Following this way of Islam, she never used violence rather she always tried to highlight the actual form of *Jihad* by resisting and pointing out the misdeeds of Pir. The central motto of Heer is to make the world enlightened about the oneness of Allah (God). She took a strong exception to the 'divine' figure of Pir and she did her best to prove that no one can be equated with God in any case. She further exposed Pir's claim of being a mediator between the wretched people and God. She says the un-Islamic code of middlemen/envoy led "Islam into the palms of pygmies and converted Muslims into grave worshippers" (Durrani, 1998:103). In fact she is hinting at the injunction of Islamic teaching where Islam addresses its believers: "And We have already created man and know what his soul whispers to him, and We are closer to him than [his] jugular vein" (Qur'an, 50:16).

The novelist emphasizes that there is no concept of emissary/envoy in Islam and at the same time she strives to make people aware of their false beliefs and wrong ideals. In order to highlight this anti-Islamic concept still further she asks Allah (God): "Please save this child from becoming an idol, let him be a Muslim" (Durrani, 1998:91). She, in a nutshell, is trying to convince the ignorant people that they are living in a fool's paradise by subverting true Islamic ideals and also tries to make them realize that the commonly practiced "ideals" in the society today are not the cherished ideals a true Muslim should inherit. She exposes the rotten and savage ways of Pir under the garb of God's emissary.

Pretension and hypocrisy are much despised concepts in Islam. Tehmina shows through her novels that Pir and Mustafa

thrive in the society through false ideals like hypocrisy and pretension. Having executed the ideal-resistance (*Jihad*), of Islam she is authorized to claim herself to be a *Mujahid*. Strangely enough she does say: "I was a soldier. This was a jehad" (Durrani, 1998:181). Protagonist Heer is not only displaying the true spirit of *Jihad* but also converted it into practicality. She made it easy for the readers to understand and bring the concept of Jihad in their lives.

This spirit of *Jihad* is to be even found in *My Feudal Lord*. The protagonist of this novel is also well aware of the feudal norms of society which teach their women to become submissive to their men. Tehmina Durrani, the protagonist, is herself subjected to this evil of feudalism. Tehmina submissively put up with the physical assaults and sexual brutality thrust upon by her husband as a part of her destiny, since she has already been trained by conventional and patriarchal set up to endure everything in silence. Having endured all the beastly punishments, she found herself mentally numb; thereafter she concludes that this feudal system is nothing but a mere tool to have sway over women. Although, it claims to be based on Qur'an; in fact, it is far away from the true guidance of Islam. In fact it distorts the true teachings of Islam in such a way which could serve their ulterior motives. This happened several times as the antagonist or husband of the protagonist once claimed that God says: "A woman was like a man's land- . . ." (Durrani, 1995:107). Having learned this misrepresentation of Islam, she finds herself in utter shock but she didn't give up hope rather she took the pain of changing and correcting the society she was living in. For the purpose of bringing change in the society she took the path of resistance (*Jihad*) to throw away the shackles made up of the distorted interpretation of Qur'an, feudalism, convention and patriarchy. Consequently, she comes out victorious in the long run against feudalism where she provides explanation to her husband's misrepresentation of Islam. She says: "To me, land had to be tended and cultivated; only then could it produce in abundance. Otherwise it would be barren" (Durrani, 1995:107). Durrani speaks metaphorically here. She likes to emphasize that

women must get love, tenderness, respect, fair treatment, civilized behavior, affection (which are ideals not only of religion but also of any civilized society) from their husbands, since in absence of love and tenderness life becomes burden and undesirable to live on. On another occasion she resists the projection of Islam as partial to women. The patriarchal society made the code of punishment for women for adultery and projected it as though it is enshrined in Islam. A lot of women were awarded punishment through this unnatural law but men went scot free all the time. As she puts: "Feudal law allows a man to act in such a manner, but for a wife to betray is the supreme sin" (Durrani, 1995:51).

Tehmina Durrani purports to expose the society molded on the basis of patriarchal fancies and the evils inherent in them. At the same time, she stimulates a sense of 'equality' in the readers which is one of the most important ideals of Islam.

Conclusions

The study and analysis of both the novels lead readers to conclude that Muslim societies in most of the cases are steeped in anti-Islamic practices. The novels under study are full of various themes but all the themes in some way or the other are linked with the dehumanization of women. Durrani beautifully projects the protagonists of both the novels as residing on the periphery and the antagonists residing at the centre. Durrani discusses in great detail that there is a vast chasm between the teachings of Islam and the practices of its followers. The unfounded and barbaric practices undercut the true spirit of Islamand create fear in the minds of the people towards Islam which result in Islamophobia. It goes without saying that Islamophobia has already caused much damage to both the Muslim society as well as non-Muslim society, nevertheless, Tehmina firmly believes that peaceful co-existence based on love, fraternity and equality across the world is possible.

References

Allen, Chris. (2010). *Islamophobia*, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Ali , A. Y. (2004). *The Meaning of the Holy Qu'ran*. Amana Publications.

Bano, Shamenaz. Tehmina Durrani's Blasphemy: A Deconstruction of Religious Hypocrisy

Countering Islamophobia. Youtube, 12May,2016,www. youtu.be/6Wzx SW4Nm Vs?t=476

Durrani, Tehmina. (1995). *My Feudal Lord.* London: Corgi.

---. (1998). *Blasphemy: a novel.* New Delhi: Penguin.

Foucault, Michel. (1980). *Power/knowledge:Selected Interviews and other Writings* 1972-1977edited by Colin

Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, et al., New York: Pantheon Books.

---. (1977). *Discipline and Punishment*, London: Tavistock.

Gaud, R. O. (2012). 'Women as Nation in Blasphemy'. India, The Criterion, Vol. 3, Issue. 3.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations: And The Remaking of World Order,* India: Penguin Books.

Horowitz, David and Robert Spencer. (2011). *Islamophobia: Thought Crime of the Totalitarian Future*. USA. David Horowitz Freedom Center.

Iqbal, Safia. (2002). *Woman and Islamic Law.* New Delhi: Adam Publisher and distributor.

Kilinc, Ayse, (trans) (2001). *Islam- The perfect Way of Life,* Ahmet Kilinc.

Khan, M. W. (2000). *Woman in Islamic Shari'ah.* Translated by Farida Khanam, New Delhi: The Islamic Centre.

---. (2002). *The True Jihad: The Concepts of Peace Tolerance, and Non-Violence in Islam.* Goodword Books.

---. (2015). *Peace in Islam.* Translated by Farida Khanam, Goodword Books.

Maududi, S. A. A. (1976). *Human Rights in Islam.* Lahore: Islamic Publication (Pvt.) Ltd.

---. (1960). *The Islamic Law and Constitution.* Translated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad, Lahore: Islamic Publication(Pvt) Ltd.

Mamdani, Mahmood. (2004). *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim.* New York: Three Leaves Press.

Meer, Nasar. (2014). *Patterns of Prejudice.* Vol. 48, no. 5.

Pansegrouw, Louisa. (1994). *Crossword Dictionary,* Maskew Miller Longman.

Rosenau, William. (2007). *Subversion and Insurgency,* RAND: Arlington.

Sulaimani, Faryal Abbas Abdullah. (1986).*The Changing Position of Women in Arabia Under Islam During the Early Seventh Century.* University of Salford: International Studies Unit.

Sivan, Emmanel. (1990). *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics.* London:Yale University press.

Zaidi, N. A. (2013). *Autobiography and women empowerment: Tehmina Durrani's My Feudal Lord.* Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 21, no. 3.

A Diasporic Perspective: Cultural Ambiguity in Jhumpa Lahiri's *The Namesake*

R. Prabhakar*

Abstract

Jhumpa Lahiri's *The Namesake* explores men and women relationships in a foreign country. When a person enters the new culture, he will be in dilemma in the process of accepting the new culture or adhere to the old culture. This causes a bitter conflict which results in the conflicting minds of protagonists in relation to their cultural, social, economical and religious backgrounds against the existing world of reality that too in a foreign land.   *The Namesake* is a shift from cultural translation to hybridity and the 'third space' of transnationalism. At the initial stage house appears to be pivotal where Ashima Ganguli, a first-generation immigrant and the prime female character, aspires to preserve her Indianness and rebuild homeland traditions while bringing up the Indian-American children. But it slowly changes to a transnational space. After the demise of her husband, she desires to abandon any

*Assistant Professor, Dept. of English, Vikrama Simhapuri University, Nellore, A.P. India. Email: prabhakarjoli@gmail.com, 91 8500773553

permanent residence and oscillates between her homeland and her immigrant country.

This article, A Diasporic Perspective: Cultural Ambiguity in Jhumpa Lahri's *The Namesake*, aims to explore the Diaspora perspectives in Jhumpa Lahiri Fiction. It exposes mainly the cross-cultural ambiguity and its reflections in her novel: *The Namesake*.

Jhumpa Lahiri is well known Diasporic writer and a notable contemporary literary champion, who writes about the condition of India Diaspora in USA and themes of sense of exile, alienation and cross cultural conflicts and identity crisis.   In addition, she goes beyond the feelings and paves the new way of thinking as per the new environment.

Lahiri was born in London, England in 1967. She was born to the first generation Bengali immigrants who emigrated from India. It is clear that her family belongs to a class of a largely successful Indian Americans and it is this segment of society which Lahiri records in her fiction. Her sorties are the gateways into the large submerged territory of 'cross-culturalism', and her novels are symbols to share cultures as it is experienced by readers. She received many laurels including the Trans Atlantic "Award from Henfiled Foundation (1993), the O Henry Award for the short story collection *Interpreter of Maladies* (1999).   Her fictional world comprises *Interpreter of Maladies* (1999), a short story collection, *The Namesake (*2003), *Unaccustomed Earth* (2008), and *The Lowland* (1913).

As a prolific writer with an Indian background, she is a representative figure for non-immigrant Americans who do not fully understand what it means to straddle with life between two cultures. Lahiri is a successful writer because she writes for herself.

She does not think of critics or peers when writing. The fiction of Lahiri portrays the expatriate experiences of women in her fictionwhich is replete with Indian women migrants, in particular, who create a mini Bengal in the USA. Though, men in Lahiri's fiction are well educated and professionally sound, they are cumbersome to toe in line with the chosen world and their attachment with the native. They are in dilemma which prevents them from cuddling the western life or even shaking hands with their western colleagues. The eccentricity of bold choices and non-native challenges are causes of discomfort for Jhumpa Lahiri's women characters. Her characters face the conflicts such as struggles with interpersonal relationships and stress of daily existence. Her narrator unfolds the complexity of the Diasporic life in terms of the variations and diversities as also the contrasts and contradictions of human experience. She portrays the uprootedness of her Diasporic characters from their homeland and their loneliness in a foreign geographical location and cultural milieu.

As a Diasporic writer, apart from the other themes, she attempts to deal with the cultural confusion of immigrants. Diasporas primarily experience the identity crisis, dislocation, and alienation. In case of Diasporas, it is not indispensable that the mother land should be real land. It can also be an imaginary land in many instances. It is real that the Diasporas need a land of their own; either it is real or imaginary land. In fact, it is very difficult to portray the Diaspora experiences in an easy way, as it is a complex experience because it explores not only the physical displacement of migrants from mother land, but also psychology of the dislocated persons. To say truly, Jhumpa Lahiri is considered to be the champion in negotiating the troubles faced by the immigrants. Her novels also mirror the reflections of the cross-cultural problems plenty in number. Though the novel moves around the filial bond between father and son, it re-enacts the patriarchal and heteronormative tropes of the term diaspora.

This article aims to explore the Diaspora Perspectives in Jhumpa Lahiri's Fiction.It exposes mainly the cultural ambiguity

and cross-cultural reflections in her novel, *The Namesake*. It also explores men and women relationships in a foreign country. When a person enters the new culture, he will be in dilemma in accepting the new culture or adhering to the old culture. This causes a bitter conflict which results in the conflicting minds of protagonists in relation to their cultural, social, economical and religious backgrounds against the existing world of reality that too in a foreign land.

The first novel, *The Namesake*, was published in as a novella in *The New Yorker* and later changed to a full length novel. The events in this fictional work oscillate between Calcutta, Boston and New York City. It also examines the differences involved in the native and alien cultures. It not only touches the hearts of immigrants of U.S, but also the original settlers in multi levels.

The Namesake (2003) explores many of the themes like cultural alienation and loss of identity tackled in her previous story collection *Interpreter of Maladies* (1999). According to Savita Singh:

> The novel sums up the theme of roots and wings where roots stand for the deep-rooted beliefs, tradition, customs, the identity one is born with one's beginnings, whereas wings stand for freedom scaling new heights exposure for dreams and ambitions of, life. A man is always in pursuit of new wings trying to disentangle. This results in anguish and alienation. The characters in the novel attest to its reality. (The Theme of Roots... p. 4)

The themes are almost the same such as immigration, assimilation, family relations, travelling, and an abiding tension because of habitation between Indian and American cultures leading to reduce the image and identity of individuals.

The Namesake mirrors Indian immigrants in the USA and the lives of first and second generations and how the immigrants face the cultural dilemmas in a foreign land. Lahiri portrays the immigrants in their glee and inclination to cling to their own

cultural belief and traditions, but gradually imbibe and adjust to the cultural ways of the host country too. Their offspring groomed to be 'bilingual' and 'bicultural' face cultural dilemmas and displacement more. In *The Namesake*, Lahiri portrays Gogol, the hero of the novel, who faces multiple problems only because of being an immigrant and who fails to live his life according to his desires. His mother wishes him to be considered an Indian-American, contrary to his desire to be a pure American in any way. Moreover, his marriage is also a failure due to unexpected reasons. He leads his life unwillingly and never lives the life as he desires. Lahiri, while examining the double status and thereby experiencing a hybrid identity, examines the social and psychosomatic stages that Ganguli goes through. In fact, each and every character in the novel takes dual nations' cultures to obtain a sense of recognition in a land which belongs to and strangely which doesn't belong to them.

The migrated couple, Ashima and Ashok, oscillates between India and the United States of America, motivated to be in touch with their Indian background and in a way insisting their children to do the same. Meanwhile, they work towards establishing a good career in the present place. The troubles begin with the place of birth and the cultural differences arise between the two generations. As Phutela Rohit aptly comments on the novel in his work "*Diasporic Trajectory in Anita Desai's Bye-Bye Blackbird and Jhumpa Lahiri's The Namesake*": "The novel is also about the second generation and the need to rediscover itself by rejecting the old and the bitter sweet comprised it makes in pursuit of the American Dream." (Diasporic Trajectory in . . . p. 10)

Therefore, the readers notice Gogol, the hero of the novel, from his mother's womb to the metaphorical womb of his room, into which he returns in the final scene of the novel and finds a link with his father and his Indian roots. The novel often gyrates in the form of pairs such as – two countries – India and America, two continents – Asia and Europe, two major cities – Calcutta and New York and also two cultures, two names and two identities,

everything dual.

In the first scene of the novel, *The Namesake*, Ashima is a symbol of confusion as an emigrant wife. She is married to a student pursuing a Doctoral degree in Electrical Engineering. She holds the hands of her husband and follows his footprints to the United States of America. She feels terribly nostalgic even after eighteen months of stay and hesitates to get adjusted to American ways. Throughout her pregnancy, she yearns for a different mixture of Rice Krispies, Planters peanuts, and chopped onion, to which she adds salt, lemon juice and green chilli pepper. Ashima feels that the life in America is burdensome and conflicting for women immigrants, and it is like a lifelong pregnancy: Lahiri writes, "Though no longer pregnant, she continues, at times, to mix Rice Krispies and peanuts and onions in a bowl. For being a foreigner, Ashima is beginning to realize, is a sort of lifelong pregnancy." (*The Namesake*, p. 49)

This 'concoction', in Lahiri's term, reminds Ashima of a snack she used to buy on Calcutta sidewalks, but it is a 'humble approximation' (*The Namesake,* p. 1), a replacement, because in the American version, "as usual, there's something missing." (*The Namesake*, p.1)

Although immigrants try to repeat parts of India in her kitchen(s) in America, they have to mix ingredients at hand her to prepare well-liked Indian dishes. Roman Alice Bran rightly observes: "These articulations are acts of subjectivity-making and self-assertion, expressions of desire and yearning which participate in a literary tradition connecting the Asian American immigrant experience with a visceral, embodied experience of difference." (*Immigration: 'A Lifelong Pregnancy '* ... p. 78)

Ashima doesn't address her husband by his name, Ashoke, because the Bengali tradition demands a Benagali wife not to do that. In fact,

> Ashima never thinks of her husband's name when she thinks of her husband, even though she knows perfectly

> well what it is. It's not the type of thing Bengali wives do.
> Like a kiss or caress in a Hindi movie, a husband's name is
> something intimate and therefore unspoken, cleverly
> patched over. And so, instead of saying Ashoke's name,
> she utters the interrogative that has come to replace it. (*The*
> *Namesake*, p. 2)

 The American men utter their wives 'I love you'. She never heard such a kind of utterance, nor does she expect to hear from her own husband because "this is not how they are." (*The Namesake*, p. 3)

Ashima experiences cultural conflict on several occasions even after reaching America. One among the conflicts is christening her first born child. The compiler birth certificate in hospital urges to find a name for the baby to be entered in the birth certificate on the fourth day after delivery to discharge from the hospital. Ashima asks her husband to name the child hazily. As such, it is compulsory for the couple to come to an opinion and coin a name for the new born baby. In such a hazy and confused situation Ashok names his child after the Russian writer Nikolai Gogol because he is his fan. The child is neither an Indian nor an American but a Russian named after Russian author. Gagol Ganguli, the hero of the novel, encumbered himself with a pet name. The name appears to be hollow and somehow incomplete to Gogol. This kind of feeling doubles his dilemma and insecurity as an outsider caught in a cob web of two cultures: Indian homeland of parents and America.   Lahiri has successfully portrayed the ambivalence over her identity through the character Gogol, the protagonist of the novel.

The Namesake deals with the story of Gogol Ganguli, the American-born son of India immigrants from his birth to adulthood. For many reasons, he dislikes his name Gogol and to be compared to his namesake, Nikolai Gogol, a Russian writer. In the course of time, on one occasion, Gogol attends a panel discussion about Indian Novels Written in English. There he notices the distinctive definition of the cultural conflict he is facing. He comes

to a clear idea about ABCD, 'American Born Confused Desi', and avoids ABCD friends. "For they remind him too much of the way his parents choose to live, befriending people not so much because they like them but because of a past they happen to share." (*The Namesake*, p. 119)

After joining the graduation, he desires to renounce his old name and rechristen as Nikhil. Therefore, he strives hard to out of his parents' way of thinking. When he has struggling time to become 'American', his parents coaxed him to remain Indian. World famous author Salman Rushdie too says in *Imaginary Homelands*: "Migrant straddle two cultures . . . fall between two stools and they suffer 'a triple disruption' comprising the loss of roots, the linguistic and the social dislocation." (*Imaginary Homelands*, p. 19)

Truly, the title of the novel *The Namesake* portrays the internal conflict of Gogol Ganguli who quest for his identity with his unusual names. He loses first his public name, his 'bhalonam' and then his private pet name, his 'daknam'. Thus he tries to tailor his identity after choosing to rename himself. Gogol wants to get rid of the Bengali culture, that he doesn't know, and live differently. He is immersed with confusion not only about his name, but also the cultural contradiction that he experiences constantly. He dislikes to be recognized with a confused identity, as an outsider. He develops a strong yearning to assimilate and to be one among the American citizens. He strongly believes in that he is an American and wants to flee way himself from everything that is non-American. But, on the one hand, his mother, Ashima, tries to make him to cling to Bengali tradition and culture, and on the other hand she supports him to assimilate in the host tradition and culture for the sake of his career.

When the children are grown up in a foreign land, the cultural conflict takes its root. The question of identity crisis, adjustment, and establishment of their roots in an alien land become difficult. Gogol makes friendship with a girl who looks queer to his parents, but for Gogol it is very late to date with girls since many of his

friends of his age have already dated with girls. His parents with Indian cultural background worry a lot to see Gogol growing in an unwanted way and they try to mend his bent of mind. Gogol observes disappointment of his parents when he brings Maxine, his girlfriend, to his house. It is true that at the age of sixteen, the children are not under the command of their parents in America, as the Americans give priority to an individual's liberty than Indians give. Gogol frequently gets into conflict between his 'American Indian' and Indianised American identity. He thinks that he is born and brought up in America. As such he has the fundamental right to be an American.

The multicultural conflict and ambiguity between first generation immigrants and their children's quest for finding their space in an alien country has been successfully portrayed by Lahiri in her fiction. Finding the children growing up in an unwanted way Gangulis try to inject and impart a few parts of Bengali culture in their children by creating a space to encounter with Bengali gatherings wherein Bengalis discuss the native place, language, the Bengali food and other related issues to Bengali. In such a way, Gangulis try to introduce Bengali culture to their offspring and make them know that their roots are not only here but also there. Lahiri writers: "Still, they do what they can. They make a point of driving in to Cambridge with the children when the Apu Triology plays at the Orson wells, or when there is Kathakali dance performance or a sitar recital at memorial Hall. (*The Namesake*, p. 65)

On the contrary to Indian parents, Americans give importance to the privacy and individuality of their children. Hence Gogol without disapproval from the parents of Maxine enters into her life. On one occasion when Maxine invites him to dinner at her house, he thinks that her parents, Gerald and Lydia, would mind his arrival. But Gogol mind boggles to see Maxine's response in a typical American way: 'why on earth would they mind?' Taking such individual liberty, Gogol and Maxine move hand in hand, and go to movies and dinners as they wish. He sleeps with Maxine,

Gerald and Lydia think nothing of their closeness. Simultaneously, Gogol falls in love with Maxine. "They go to darkened humble looking restaurants downtown where the tables are tiny, the bills huge." (*The Namesake*, p. 136). With Indian cultural ethos, Gogol comes out of the relationship with Maxine because his sense of responsibility ignites his cultural roots after the demise of his father. Maxine, as she hails from different culture, agrees that she can't tranquilize Gogol. The Cultural conflict and dilemma between Gogol and Maxine affect their relationship.

On one occasion, Gogol in his school days visits graveyard as a part of project work which horrifies Ashima and instantly she asks: "What type of field trip was this? Only in America are the children taken to cemeteries in the name of art . . . In Calcutta the burning Ghats are the most forbidden places. (*The Namesake*, p. 70)

The first generation immigrants know about their roots, but the second generation doesn't know it in a state of confusion about their identity. Growing up in an alien country they take in most of its traits but sill they are identified as Indians and not Americans. Though they are labelled as Indians, they don't have firsthand experience of India and this makes their situation even worse. Sense of belongingness continuously haunts them. This quest puts them in a situation that they cannot run away from. Cultural embarrassment is revealed when Moushumi breaks with Graham. As Maxine is for Gogol, Graham is for Moushumi who finds a striking difference between two cultures and decides to get rid of the relationship because she comes to know that these two extreme ends cannot meet together and searching for such relation is futile. Gogol realizes his own need to incorporate both Bengali and American elements into his character. This realization comes to him after immersing himself into entirely Bengali-American relationship with his then-wife, Moushumi.

Cultural conflict plays a pivotal role in the novel *The Namesake*. As in the other novels of Lahiri, in this novel too the male being come to new land for their carrier growth and their wives also follow them and they give birth to the offspring and thus the chain

goes on. Due to geographical shift of location, the woman who immigrates with her husband suffers the insecurity in the culture alien to her but also is caught between the two worlds which ignite a sort of suffocation because of the foreign atmosphere.

> …our physical alienation from India almost in veritably means that we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely those things they were lost; that we will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible one, imaginary homelands, Indians of the mind (*Imaginary Homelands*, p. 10)

Ashima truly follows the conventional Indian mourning way of life, but she is no more a traditional Indian widow. She is not an Indian *sati* (a widow to be burntalong with corpse of her husband on funeral pyre), or a subaltern as per Spivak's definition. On the contrary, Ashima intentionally abandons any sort of permanent residence and oscillates between her homeland and her immigrant country, opposite to the myth of a redeeming homecoming. Therefore, she disposes the house to an American family and decides to split her year into two halves - to stay a half year in India with her relative and another half year in the United States with her children. This is a plan she and Ashoke devised for retirement. "True to the meaning of her name, she will be without borders, without a home of her own, a resident everywhere and nowhere." (*The Namesake*, p. 276).

In this novel, Lahiri has portrayed the psychological and cultural ambiguity between first generation immigrants, Ashima and Ashoke, and second generation immigrants, Gogol, Sonia and Moushumi. The identity crisis and cultural ambiguity is pivotal for the second generation immigrants. As such the first generation immigrants become limbo between the two cultures. They are neither adhered to their cultural past nor find it easier to accept the alien American culture.

References

Lahiri, Jhumpa. (2003). "The Namesake", New Delhi: Harper Collins.

Phutela Rohit. (Ed) (1999). *Diasporic Trajectory in Anita Desai's Bye-Bye Blackbird and Place.* Hamid S Naficy, London: Toutledge: P. 10.

Ramona-Alice Bran. (2014).*Immigration: 'A Lifelong Pregnancy'? An Analysis of Jhumpa Lahiri's Fiction*:, Dortmund: P.78

Salman Rushdie. (1991).*Imaginary Homelands, Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism* 1981-1991, London : Granta: P. 19 & 10.

Singh Savita. (2008). *The Theme of Roots and Wings in Jhumpa Lahiri's The South Asian Diasporic.* Ann Arbor: Proquest: P. 4

Essential Medicines, Availability and Affordability in India: An Analysis of Existing Studies

Manjeet Kaur*
Madhur Mohit**

Abstract

Improving availability and affordability of essential drugs/ medicines is a very important objective at policy level/ universal health coverage plan of the Indian government. The issue attains significance especially because a large chunk of population is characterized by higher out of pocket spending and inadequate healthcare access. This paper undertakes a systematic review to assess the evidence on essential medicines' price, availability and affordability in India. The findings suggests that although the government is procuring essential medicines at efficient prices but low availability of medicines in the public health facilities forces poor patients to buy medicines from private sector at relatively high prices. The evidence available also suggests that generic medicines are affordable for lowest paid unskilled government

*Research Scholar, Dept. of Economics, Panjab University, Chandigarh. Email: manjeet16oct@gmail.com

**Assistant Professor, P.G. Dept. of Economics, GGDSD College, Chandigarh. Email: madhureco@gmail.com

workers, but for many in the labour force who fall under the category of casual workforce the affordability remains a challenge.

Keywords: India, Essential Medicines, Prices, Availability, Affordability

Introduction

India accounts for a substantial part of the global burden of disease, with 18 per cent of global deaths and 20per cent disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) (WHO, 2009). The burden of disease is high due to large-scale poverty, developmental disparities between states, gender discrimination, growing aged population and failure of government policies (Gupte et al 2001). Epidemiological transition due to change in disease patterns is another cause of concern for the policy makers. Traditionally, the acute disease segment held a significant share of the Indian therapeutic segment. This segment will continue to grow at a steady rate, due to issues relating to public hygiene and sanitation. But, with increase in affluence, rise in life expectancy and the onset of lifestyle related conditions, the disease profile is gradually shifting towards a growth in the chronic diseases segment (CII 2010). Although non-communicable diseases like cancers, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases, etc are on the rise due to the urbanization and change in life style; communicable diseases like tuberculosis, malaria, kala-azar, dengue fever, chikungunya and other vector borne diseases, and water borne diseases like cholera, diarrhoeal diseases, leptospirosis etc. continue to be a major public health problem in India (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2015).

The role and relevance of medicines, vaccines and other supplies are critical, as these are considered to be important elements of the health-care system (Bigdeli et al 2013). It is argued that medicines are the most significant tool that society possesses

to prevent, alleviate, and cure disease and a very large part of the world's population has inadequate or no access to essential and life-saving medicines(UN Millennium Project 2005).The concept of essential medicines emerged in 1970s and WHO (2004) defines them as those medicines that fulfil the healthcare needs of the majority of the population and are selected with due regard to disease prevalence, evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative cost- effectiveness. The first WHO Model list of essential drugs was issued in 1975 and it is updated after every two years. In India, the first essential medicine list was notified in 1996 and it has been revised over the period of time according to the disease pattern, prevalence and other factors. The recent (4th) list National list of essential medicines (NLEM), 2015 contains 376 medicines categorized under thirty sections (Central Drug Standard Control Organization 2015).

Indian Pharmaceutical Industry has played a pivotal role in ensuring the sufficient production and supply of essential medicines not only after independence but even much before that. From last few decades, this industry has undergone a metamorphosis from an incompetent and high cost sector to a globally competitive and cost effective industry. Today, India is, globally, the 3rd largest producer of medicines by volume yet 14th in terms of value. The Indian pharmaceutical exports was $16.89 billion with a growth rate of 9.44 per cent during the financial year 2015 whereas the global Pharma market was growing at a very marginal (1-2 per cent) rate (Pharmexcil Report, 2015-2016). In the year 2017- 18 Indian pharmaceutical exports further increased to the tune of $17.27 billion (Pharmexcil Report, 2017-2018). In spite of this progress, millions of Indian households have no access to essential medicines because they cannot afford them (High Level Expert Group Report on Universal Health Coverage for India, 2011).

The assessment of medicine prices, availability and affordability in India is important for three reasons. *First*, the low income levels, lesser purchasing power and foremost out of pocket

spending on medicines by majority of population make them vulnerable. *Second*, changing disease pattern and consequent epidemiological transition in the recent years poses a serious challenge to India as a whole and to the policy makers. *Third*, there are a number of government policies/schemes and initiatives at the Centre and the state level, meant to provide preventive, promotive, curative and rehabilitative services for the better access to healthcare facilities which includes provision of essential medicines at free of cost or at lower prices. The appraisal of medicine prices, availability and affordability in India has significant consequences on the sustainability of health care development and this study presents a critical review of the literature on the subject and also makes recommendations on areas requiring further attention and research.

Review Methodology

A detailed literature review of studies was conducted in September 2018 and March 2019, considering all papers published before this date. Searches were performed for all papers published up to 30 January 2019 in PubMed, Web of Sciences and WHO-HAI's databases. Databases were searched using the terms essential medicine prices, availability and affordability in India. Studies were included if they provided original research findings on the medicine prices, their availability and affordability in India and were written in English. The literature search yielded 533 results, out of them 88 were duplicate records and 355 records were not meant for India and also 32 records were irrelevant for the present study due to their publication type. So a total of 78 records appeared relevant and were screened by abstract review, of which only 26 studies were selected for full text eligibility. In total 16 studies were eligible for inclusion in the analysis and qualitative synthesis (Figure 1).

Type of Medicines Considered in the Reviewed Studies

Five studies (Gitanjali and Manikandan 2011; Pujari et al 2016; Swain et al 2015; KR et al 2012; Ravindran et al 2012) were concerned with the analysis of only child-specific medicines, one was (Kotwani and Holloway 2013) dealing with the analysis of Antibiotics medicines, and one study (Mishra et al 2011) described the availability and prescription of an anti-malarial mono-therapy. One study (Roy et al 2012) was concerned with the evaluation of treatment cost Community Acquired Pneumonia (CAP) and its affordability. Other studies have considered a mix basket of medicines by including some child specific medicine with main adult medicines. WHO-HAI's methodology recommends examining 50 medicines for the price, availability and affordability analysis. Only two studies (Kotwani et al 2011; KR et al 2012) have followed this criterion.

Timeframe of the Reviewed Studies

Four studies (Dixit et al 2011; Pujari et al 2016; Roy et al 2012;Mishra et al 2011) did not mention timeframe of their research. Many studies (n=6) developed their research over two months or less time period. Only two studies (Lekshmi et al 2014; Swain et al 2015) were based on a timeframe of 6 months or more.

Tools of Data Collection in Reviewed Studies

Majority of studies used questionnaire or survey to collect the relevant data. Half of the studies (Kotwani 2003; Swain et al 2015;Kotwani and Holloway 2013; KR et al 2012; Ravindran et al 2012;Kotwani 2011;Patel et al 2006;Tripathi et al 2005) used WHO-HAI's medicine price survey form. One study (Prinja et al 2015) makes use of the facility level medicine availability and stock out tool. Another study (Selvaraj et al 2014) based their research on the WHO Universal Health Coverage concept.

Statistical Tools used in the Reviewed Studies

Majority of the studies used similar statistical measures such as mean, median, ratios, percentage, standard deviation and inter-quartile ranges and simple Microsoft Excel applications. One study (Mishra et al 2011) applied the logistic regression and multivariable model and conducted the data analysis with STATA v10. The studies based on WHO-HAI's methodology used the Medicine Price and Availability Workbook Part-1 for the data analysis.

Findings

All these studies were observational cross sectional studies. Almost half of the studies (n=7) dealt with the analysis of general essential medicines' price, availability and affordability, few of the studies (n=4) analyzed only availability and few other (n=2) explored medicine availability and their prices. One study was concerned with the evaluation of treatment cost and its affordability. Another study (Mishra et al 2011) was focused upon the prescription practices and the availability of Artemisinin monotherapy in India and one more study (Selvaraj et al 2014) analysed three dimensions of universal health coverage that also involves the availability of essential medicines in its service coverage dimension. The study sample for medicines varied from 1 (Mishra et al 2011) to 187 (Dixit 2011) for availability analysis, 20 (Ravindran et al 2012) to 34 (Swain et al 2015) for availability and price analysis, 30 prescriptions for cost and affordability analysis and 32 (Tripathi et at 2005) to 58 (Kotwani 2011) for medicines' prices, availability and affordability analysis. The studies included a sample of 1 to 129 public health facilities, 20 to 80 private /retail pharmacies and 5 to 20 other sector/ NGOs/ mission sector facilities. Some studies were regional (Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal), two were local (Khamman district, Andhra Pradesh and Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala), one was cross-regional (Punjab and Haryana) and two were national studies

involving 5 Indian States and 1 UT and 17 Indian states and 2 UTs respectively.

A significant number of studies (n=6) collected primary data on the medicine prices, availability and affordability according to the survey methodology given by WHO-Health Action International. Other studies used other simple survey methods. In the studies using WHO-HAI's methodology, the public sector patient prices for medicines were not reported since essential drugs are provided free of cost in the government health facilities. Public sector procurement prices and availability of innovators brand drugs/medicines (IBs) were also not reported by any study because in general only generic versions of drugs are being procured by the government. In private sector, the availability of individual medicines is reported as the percentage of medicine outlets in which the medicine was found on the day of data collection. In the present review paper, the following ranges given by Gelders*et al* (2006) are used for describing availability:

- • < 30 per cent very low
- • 30–49 per cent low
- • 50–80 per cent fairly high
- • >80 per cent high

The medicine prices were compared to the latest edition of the International Reference Prices (IRP) given by Management Sciences for Health (MSH) that serves as an external standard to facilitate national and international comparison. Medicine prices were presented as median price ratio (MPR) i.e. the median unit price across the surveyed outlets divided by the International reference price, both in local currency. For example, MPR of 2 means local medicine price is twice that of the international reference price.

$$\text{Price Ratio (MPR)} = \frac{\text{Median local unit price}}{\text{International reference unit price}}$$

In general a MPR of 2 or less in the public procurement sector is considered as efficient and MPR of 5 or more as exorbitant. Medicine affordability was measured by determining the number of days' wages a lowest paid unskilled government worker requires to purchase selected courses of treatment for common acute and chronic health conditions. A model treatment is considered affordable, if it costs less than 5 days' wages of a lowest paid unskilled govt. worker.

Medicine Prices in Public and Private Sector

Public Sector Procurement Prices

Eight studies (Kotwani 2003;Swain et al 2015;Kotwani and Holloway 2013;KR et al 2012; Ravindran 2012;Kotwani et al 2011;Patel et al 2006;Tripathi et al 2005) included data on the public sector medicine procurement prices (Table no.2). Seven of these studies reported the procurement prices and Private retail pharmacy prices in MPR (Median Price Ratios) while one study (Ravindran et al 2012) reported its result in Indian Rupees. Another study (Lekshmi et al 2014) provided private sector and community pharmacy's medicine prices in Indian rupees. It was observed that govt. was procuring these medicines at less 1 MPR (min. 0.1, max. 1.22) in majority (85.71 per cent) of the cases. It means that the public sector procurement prices were less than the International Medicine Reference prices. Maximum MPR for public sector procurement reported in a Delhi based study (Kotwani and Holloway 2013) belongs to the essential and high-end antibiotics.

Private Sector Patient Prices

There was not much difference in the MPRs of different states/ regions/ areas. Nine studies evaluated private sector patient prices. Two of these studies reported MPR for child-specific medicines in Chhattisgarh and Odisha (KR et al2012; Swain 2015). A study from Delhi reported the MPR (0.94-7.21.) for essential and

high-end antibiotics (Kotwani and Holloway 2013). While the other studies reported MPR for general essential medicines (that includes some of the child specific as well) and found that for LPGs it ranged between 1.83(Kotwani2003) in Rajasthan to 3.12 (Kotwani2011) in Delhi and for IBs it ranged between 2.81 (Kotwani 2003) to 4.71 (Kotwani and Holloway 2013) in Delhi. One study (Lekshmi et al 2014) only analysed the price of medicines used for hypertension in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. The private sector LPGs prices were 1.9 to 5.9 times higher than the public sector procurement prices. In the case of IBs, it varied between 2.9 to 9.12 times the procurement prices. Further, the IBs were priced 1.2 to 2.1 times higher than their lowest priced generic versions.

Medicine Availability in Public and Private Sector

Medicine Availability in the Public Sector

Thirteen studies included data on the availability of medicines in the public sector health facilities. Out of these studies, three studies conducted in Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh reported that only 17 per cent child specific medicines were available while a study from Andhra Pradesh reported it to be 30-35per cent (KR et al 2012; Swain 2015; Pujari 2016; Ravindran 2012). A study (Gitanjali and Manikandan, 2011) used the method of snap shot survey to analyse the availability of five child-specific medicines in 17 states and 2 UTs (Union Territories) and reported high (80 per cent) but variable availability of these medicines. For essential and high-end antibiotics it was 38 per cent, 52 percent and 67 per cent in the primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare facilities, respectively, under the Directorate of Health Services in the Government of National Capital Territory (NCT), Delhi (Kotwani and Holloway2013). Only one study reported cent percent medicine availability in the public health facility in Andhra Pradesh (Dixit, 2011).Few studies observed the mean and median medicines' availability between 23.2 per cent to 66 per cent (Delhi) and 15.8 per cent (Maharashtra) to 40.6 per cent (West Bengal)

respectively. One study based in Kerala, (Lekshmi et al 2014) reported that the mean availability of anti-hypertensive medicines was 91.32 per cent, 64.19 per cent and 58.33 per cent in the Taluk Hospitals, Community Health Centers and Primary Health Centers, respectively. While two medicines were altogether absent from the public sector. Another study based in Rajasthan (Selvarajet al 2014) reported very encouraging level of medicine availability in the Primary Health Centers, Community Health Centers and District Hospital (61, 64 and 75 per cent, respectively) (Table no.2).

Medicine Availability in the Private Sector for LPGs (Lowest Priced Generics)

Nine studies reported the availability details of LPGs in the private sector / retail pharmacies. Four of them were concerned with children specific LPGs availability and observed less than 50 per cent (37.85, 46, 38.5 and 38.5 per cent) availability in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh, respectively. For essential and high-end antibiotics, the availability was 68.75 per cent and 70.45 per cent in retail and chain pharmacies of Delhi. The remaining studies reported mean and median LPGs availability to be 68.8 per cent in Delhi and 57.3 per cent in Maharashtra (Patel et al 2006) to 95 per cent in Rajasthan (Kotwani 2003) respectively. One study examined the availability of Artemisinin monotherapy in Delhi, Assam, Goa, Gujarat, Jharkhand and Odisha and found that it was available in 72.6 per cent pharmacies.

Medicine Availability in the Private Sector for IBs (Innovator Drugs/Medicines)

Six studies reported data on IBs availability in the private sector / retail pharmacies. Three studies conducted in Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh (KR et al 2012; Pujari et al 2016; Swain et al 2015) explored the availability of child- specific IBs and found

very low mean availability of these medicines (14, 10.8 and 20.8 per cent , respectively). The studies conducted by KR et al. (2012) and Pujari et al. (2016) have reported the results for highest prices medicines instead of branded drugs. One study reported very low (17.6 and 18.7 per cent) and highly variable mean availability of essential and high-end antibiotics in retail and chain pharmacies of Delhi (Kotwani and Holloway 2013). While other studies (n=3) reported that the mean and median medicines' availability was 29.3per cent in Delhi and 2.1 per cent in Maharashtra to 40 per cent in West Bengal, respectively.(Table no.2)

Private Sector Medicine Affordability

Seven studies evaluated affordability aspect of medicines in their analysis and did not include any consultation/ transportation charges etc. Six of them included data on affordability of medicine for lowest paid unskilled govt. workers in different parts of India (Table 3). One Delhi based study (Roy et al, 2012) assessed affordability in terms of the percentage of the Monthly per Capita Consumer Expenditure on food and total expenditure and observed that rural population had to spend more on prescription. A worker with minimum daily wage would have to work for 1 to 17 days to purchase his prescription medicines for Community Acquired Pneumonia (CAP) and 1-3 days to pay for his cost of treatment. It also discussed the cost of prescription and treatment for different categories of workers such as unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, non-matriculate, matriculate and graduates. Another study (Lekshmiet al, 2014) also used somewhat similar worker categories to present affordability analysis for maximum and minimum priced medicines in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. It was observed that only minimum priced medicine were affordable for the unskilled workers. A study (Tripathi et al, 2005) also provided affordability results for a worker in unorganized sector in West Bengal and found that for some medicines their affordability was lower than their counterparts in the govt. sector. The remaining five studies conducted in Rajasthan, West Bengal,

Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Delhi, included affordability data for IBs and LPGs separately and found that majority of generic drugs were affordable according to the international standards. For only one generic medicine (ceftriaxone) 7.7 days' wages were required in West Bengal. (Tripathi et al, 2005) Even in the case of branded/ innovator drugs the maximum number of days a worker had to work to purchase his medicine were 2.2 days.

Discussion

The availability and affordability of healthcare is a very pertinent issue taking into consideration that 90per cent of expenditure on health is out-of-pocket expenditure in India. A large proportion of treatment expenditure is being spent on the purchase of medicines. As mentioned in the NSS report (2014), medicines accounted for nearly 80per cent of out-patients medical expenses in India. Since, it is empirically proven and widely recognized that education and health impact the growth of an economy and providing accessible, affordable and equitable quality health care, especially to the marginalized and vulnerable sections of the population is one of the key objectives of the Government (Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2015-16). Poor health of workers will negatively affect their productivity, reduce labour force participation and cost the economy in terms of loss of production (Pacheco and Webber, 2011). According to Bloom and Canning (2000) health can affect productivity in four ways: a healthy labour force may be more productive because workers have more physical and mental energy and are absent from work less often; individuals with a longer life expectancy may choose to invest more in education and receive greater returns from their investments; with longer life expectancy, individuals may be motivated to save more for retirement, resulting in a greater accumulation of physical capital; and improvement in the survival and health of young children may provide incentives for reduced fertility and may result in an increase in labour force participation —which may, in turn, result in increased per capita income if these individuals are

accommodated by the labour market. In another study conducted by Bloom et al. (2001), it was found that health has a positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth. It is evident therefore, that the investment in the form of provision of improved health facilities will enhance the efficiency of human/population particularly for labour surplus nations like India.

The studies mentioned in this review paper confirm that the public sector procurement is efficient and the reason behind this can be the competitive nature of pharmaceutical industry in India. In the case of private sector, the price of only high-end antibiotics was more than 7 times the MPR, otherwise the highest MPR for LPGs was 3.12 and for IBs 4.71. But if the difference between the procurement rates and private sector LPGs prices is analysed carefully, we can say that this price gap can be and should be narrowed down by taking into account the margins or different mark ups involved in deciding the final retail price of a medicine (Kotwani 2007). India is famous for being the lowest-price generic manufacturer in the world. This advantage should also be reflected in terms of private sector medicine prices. Since in India, we have mainly generic versions for all medicines, they are also known as 'branded' and 'branded generics' and IBs are also pooled with 'branded' medicines (Kotwani, 2011) and therefore it is very important to bring their prices to a more reasonable level. According to the ranges given by Gelders et al. (2006), the studies added in this review paper confirm the medicine availability ranging between very low to fairly high in the public sector. In the private sector it ranged between very-low to low and fairly high to high for IBs and LPGs respectively. The availability of generic drugs was greater than their branded/ innovator counterparts.

In the case of medicine affordability, it is found that all generic medicines are affordable for lowest paid unskilled government workers (with only Ceftriaxone being an exception) (Tripathiet al 2005). We have to interpret the medicine affordability results keeping in mind that medicines are affordable, only for those people who are earning those minimum wages. In India 39.79per cent of the population is working/ employed in the public and

private sectors of the economy. Only 29.58 million of the working population is in the organized sector (Labour Bureau, 2017) and as far as the lowest paid unskilled government workers are concerned, they comprise a very small segment of this working class (almost 1/4th of the public sector workers)(Nagaraj,2014). A large number of workers are employed in the unorganized sector and earn less than the lowest paid government workers and also if more than one dependent (non-working) family member is suffering from a disease, the medicine affordability measured by this criterion is under-estimated.

Since, the public sector health facilities are the primary source of medicines for the poor population and availability of free medicines is very crucial for achieving universal health care, the level of medicine availability in the public sector must be increased and drug stock should be maintained in each facility. Every Indian state follow an independent mechanism of procurement of medicines and various different kinds of drug procurement methods have been implemented in Tamilnadu (mixed procurement system), Kerala (centralized system), Punjab and Haryana (decentralized system) and Rajasthan for achieving universal health coverage (Prinja et al 2015).The medicine procurement systems adopted by each state has its own advantages and drawbacks. So the existing medicine procurement systems should be evaluated at a broader level and procurement price reducing systems such as pooled procurement should be adopted. Patients should be made more aware about the prices and quality of generic medicines so that if they have to buy a medicine in the private pharmacy, they can save their money or at least buy it within their financial constraints. A study by Singalet al(2011) found that price to patients for branded medicine was higher (14 to 41per cent) than the 'branded-generics' equivalents whereas the quality of branded and branded-generics was found to be same. And also, since generic substitution is not legal in India, the awareness of the patients regarding the inter-changeability between generic and branded products will help in improving the affordability. The doctors and medicine prescribers should be

motivated to prescribe generic drugs. Similarly programmes such as 'Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Jan Aushadhi Scheme' should be made more effective in rural and remote areas of the country. The number of this kind of generic medicine stores should be increased. It was observed that patients in rural India can have better medicine access if they are available at lower prices and will prefer to buy generic medicines if it is advised by the physician (Dongre and Mahadevappa, 2010). The Drug Price control order, 2013 while broadening its ambit of medicines comprising different therapeutic categories will too go steps further in ensuring the affordability of medicines in the country.

References

Bigdeli, M., Jacobs, B., Tomson, G., Laing, R., Ghaffar, A., Dujardin, B and Damme, WV(2013).'Access to medicines from a health system perspective', *Health Policy and Planning,* 28: 692-704.

Bloom, D and Canning, D (2000). 'The Health and Wealth of Nations', *Scinence's Compass*, 1207-1209.

Bloom, D E., Canning, D and Sevilla, J (2001). 'The Effect of Health on Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence', Working Paper #8587. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Camaron, A.,Ewen, M., Ross-Degnan, D., Ball, D andLaing, R (2008). 'Medicine prices, availability, and affordability in 36 developing and middle-income countries: A secondary analysis',*The Lancet,* 2008, available at: http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/access/medicines_prices_avai lability_and_ affordability_in_36_developing_and_middle_income_ countries_a_secondary_analysis.pdf.(accessed December 15, 2018)

CII-Confederation of Indian Industry.Pharma Summit-2010. Indian Pharma Inc.:Capitalising on India's Growth Potential.

Dixit, R.,Vinay, M., Jayasree,T., Ubedulla, S., Manohar, V S and Chandrasekhar, N (2011). 'Availability of essential medicines : A primary health care perspective', *Indian Journal of Pharmacology*, 43(5):599-600, available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3195136/ (accessed December 16, 2018)

Dongre , Y and Mahadevappa, R (2010). 'Building access to healthcare in rural India: possibility and feasibility of low-cost medicine', *International Journal of Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Marketing,*4(4): 396–407, available at:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17506121011095227 (accessed November 15, 2018)

Garg, C C and Karan, AK (May, 2005). 'Health and Millennium Development Goal 1: Reducing out-of-pocket expenditures to reduce income poverty - *Evidence from India*',EQUITAP Project: Working Paper #15.

Gelders, S., Ewen, M., Noguchi, N and Laing, R (2006). 'Price availability and affordability An international comparison of chronic disease medicines',Background report prepared for the WHO Planning Meeting on the Global Initiative for Treatment of Chronic Diseases held in Cairo in December 2005.

Gitanjali, B and Manikandan, S. (2011) 'Availability of five essential medicines for children in public health facilities in India : A snapshot survey', *Journal of Pharmacology and Pharmacotherapeutics*,2(2): 95-99, available at: http://www. jpharmacol.com/temp/JPharmacother2295_4720058_011840.pdf (accessed December 15, 2018)

Gupte, MD., Ramchandra,Vand Mutatkar, RK (2001). 'Epidemiological profile of India: Historical and contemporary prospects', *J Biosci, 26* (4).

High Level Expert Group Report on Universal Health Coverage for India (2011) Planning Commission of India, New Delhi.

Kotwani, A (2003). 'Medicine Prices in the state of Rajasthan, India-Report of a survey of medicine prices, availability, affordability and price components in Rajasthan, India', Delhi Society for Promotion of Rational Use of Drugs, New Delhi, India, available at: http://www.apps. who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18026en/s18026en.pdf(accessed December 14, 2018)

Kotwani, A (2011). 'Medicine prices, availability, affordability and medicine price components in NCT, Delhi : WHO/HAI methodology', Project Report.

Kotwani , A and Holloway, K (2013).'Access to antibiotics in New Delhi, India: implications for antibiotic policy', *Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice*, 6(6), available at:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3987069/pdf/2052-3211-6-6.pdf(accessed December 13, 2018)

Kotwani , A (2013). 'Where are we now : assessing the price, availability and affordability of essential medicines in Delhi as India plans free medicine for all', *BioMed Central Health Services Research,*13, available at: http://www.bmchealthserves.boimedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1 472-6963-13-285 (accessed December 11, 2018)

KR,A., Jain,V.,Kokh, P and Jain, K (2012). 'Study assessing prices, availability and affordability of children's medicine in Chhattisgarh, India', Part of the Better Medicine for Children project.

Labour Bureau (2017) Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India.

Leach, B and Paluzzi, JE (2005). 'Prescription for healthy development: increasing access to medicines', UN Millennium Project Task Force on HIV/AIDS,

Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on Access to Essential Medicines.

Lekshmi, S., Mohanta, GP., Revikumar, KG and Manna, PK (2014). 'Study on availability and affordability of anti hypertensive medicines in the state of Keral', ,*International Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences,* 6 (10): 366-369.

Mendis,S., Fukino,K., Cameron,A., Laing, R., Filipe, Jr A.,Khatib,O., Leowski, J and Ewen, M (2007). 'The availability and affordability of selected essential medicines for chronic diseases in six low- and middle-income countries', Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 85(4): 279-288, available at: http:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/articles/PMC 2636320/pdf/06-033647.pdf(accessed December 10, 2018)

Ministry of Finance: Economic Survey (2015-16), Government of India.

Mishra,N.,Anvikar, AR., Shah,NK.,Kamal,VK., Sharma, SK., Srivastava, HC., Das, MK., Pradhan, K., Kumar,H., Gupta,YK., Gupta, P., Dash, AP and Valecha, N (2011).'Prescription practices and availability of artemisinin monotherapy in India: where do we stand ?',*BioMed Central Malaria Journal,*10.

Nagaraj, R (2014). 'Public Sector Employment – What has changed ?', Conference on Political Economy of Contemporary India.

NLEM-WHO.National List of Essential Medicines- Essential Medicines and Health products information portal, available at: http://apps.www.int/ medicinedocs/en/d/Js23088en/(accessed December 1, 2018)

NSS (National Sample Survey) 68th round (2014).Household Consumption of Various Goods and Services in India,(2011-2012).Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. Government of India.

Pacheco, G and Webber DJ (2011). 'Employment propensity: The roles of mental and physical health', Working Paper Series, Department of Economics , Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand.

Patel, A.,Thawani, V and Gharpure, K (2006). 'Medicine Pricing, Availability and Affordability- Report of Four Regions, Maharashtra, India', Health Action International and World Health Organization, available at: http://www.apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18025en/s180 25en.pdf(accessed November 28, 2018)

Pharmexcil (Pharmaceuticals Export Promotion Council of India). 12th Annual Report 2015-16.

Pharmexcil (Pharmaceuticals Export Promotion Council of India), 14th Annual Report 2017-18.

Planning Commission. (2013). Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-2017)- Faster, More Inclusive and Sustainable Growth,1,241.

Prinja , S.,Bahuguna,P., Tripathi, JP and Kumar, R (2015). 'Availability of medicines in public sector health facilities of two North Indian States',*BMC Pharmacology and Toxicology*, 16, available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm. nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4690305/pdf/40360_2015_Article_43.pdf(accessed November 28, 2018)

Pujari, NM., Sachan, AK and Kumar, Y (2016). 'Cross-sectional study on availability and affordability of some essential child-specific medicines in Uttar Pradesh',*International Journal of Medical Science and Public Health, 5* (10) : 2047-2051.

Ravindran , L., Bandyopadhyay, M., Bagchi, C and Tripathi, SK (2012). 'A preliminary assessment of availability and pricing of children's medicines in government hospitals and private retail pharmacies in a district of Andhra Pradesh',*Indian Journal of Pharmacology*,44(4) : 536-537, available at :http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc /articles/PMC 3469967/(accessed November 28, 2018)

Roy, V.,Gupta, U and Agarwal, AK (2012). 'Cost of medicines & their affordability in private pharmacies in private pharmacies in Dehli (India)',*Indian J Med Res*,136(5): 827-835, available at : http://icmr.nic.in/ijmr/2012/ november/1115.pdf(accessed November 28, 2018)

Selvaraj, S, Mukhopadhyay, I., Kumar,P., Aisola, M., Datta, P., Bhat, P., Mehta, A., Srivastava, S and Pachauli , C (2014). 'Universal access to medicines: evidence from Rajasthan, India', *Policy and practice- WHO South- East Asia Journal of Public Health, 3*: 289-299.

Singal ,GL., Nanda. A and Kotwani, A (2011). 'A comparative evaluation of price and quality of some branded versus branded-generic medicines of the same manufacturer in India', *Indian Journal of Pharmacology*,43(2):131-136, available at: http://www.apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s 18748en/s18748en/s18748en.pdf(accessed November 27, 2018)

Srinivasan, S (2011). "Medicines for All', the Pharma Industry and the Indian State', *Economic & Political Weekly,* XLVI (24): 43-50.

Swain,TR., Rath, B., Dehury,S., Tarai,A., Das,P.,Samal, R., Samal, S and Nayak, H (2015).'Pricing and availability of some essential child specific medicines in Odisha', *Indian Journal of Pharmocology*, 47 (5): 496-501, available at:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 4621669 (accessed November 03, 2018)

Tripathi ,SA., Dey, D and Hazra, A (2005). 'Medicine Prices and Affordability in the State of West Bengal, India',Report of a survey supported by WORLD Health Organization and Health Action International, available at: http://www.haiweb.org/medicineprices/surveys/200412Iw/survey _report.pdf(accessed November 02, 2018)

UN Millennium Project. (2005). 'Prescription for Healthy Development: Increasing Access to Medicines', Report of the Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria,

TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on Access to Essential Medicines.ISBN:1-84407-227-4.

vanDoorslaer, E., O'Donnell, O., Rannan-Eliya, RP.,Somanathan, A., Adhikari, RK., Garg, CC., Harbianto, D., Herrin, AN.,Huq,MN., Ibragimova, S., Karan, A., Ng, CW., Pande, BR., Racelis, R., Tao, S., Tin,K., Tisayayaticom, K., Trisnantoro,L., Vasavid, C and Zhdo, Y (2006). ' Effect of payments for health care on poverty estimates in 11 countries in Asia: an analysis of household survey data', *The Lancet, 368*,1357-1364.

WHO Medicines Strategy- Countries At the Core (2004). Geneva, Switzerland.

WHO Medicines Strategy: 2000–2003 (2000) Framework for Action in Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy. Department of Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy, Health Technology and Pharmaceuticals Cluster WHO Headquarters, Geneva, Switzerland

WHO-HAI (World Health Organization – Health Action International) 2008. 'Measuring medicine prices, availability, affordability and price components', 2nd Edition.

World Health Organization.InformationDoMaH, editor.Global burden of disease. 2009

World Health Organization (1993).The World Health Report. Geneva.

Yadav, S and Arokiasamy, P (2014). 'Understanding epidemiological transition in India- Special Issue: Epidemiological Transitions- Beyond Omran's Theory',*Global Health Acti.*

Yogesh Snehi and Lallan Baghel, Eds. *Modernity and Changing Social Fabric of Punjab and Haryana.* Shimla/New Delhi: Indian Institute of Advanced Study & Primus Books, 2018.

Mahesh Sharma*

'Modernity and Changing Social Fabric' is a collection of essays focusing on the states of Punjab and Haryana, the huge territory of undivided Punjab before the reorganization of the states on linguistic basis. With a predominant agrarian economy and attitudes associated with and driven by agricultural and landed practices, the emphasis of this book is on the region as a continuum rather than two separate entities. It therefore brings to sharp focus as to what constitutes a region, surmounting differences of identity and geographical boundaries which are fluid and keep changing every century or so.

In their introduction, the editors clearly state their priorities in this compilation by problematising the idea of modernity vis-a-vis regionality. Should we perceive modernity as an opposing binary to tradition that is located in the everyday reckoning? Snehi and Baghel conceive modernity as experiential, which is comprehended in the dynamics of everyday life, essentially in the timeframe of the present. Modernity is to be understood therefore

* Professor of History, Department of Evening studies, Panjab University.

in the strategies of 'self-making, positioning, and prioritizing'. The editors explain their emphasis on region because of Punjab-Haryana being historically 'inter-connected zones' where everyday life is defined by the 'pathology of extreme violence'. The regions' 'many moment of modernity' has influenced its engagement with caste, self, religions and language through a 'complex of' agrarian transformation, identity politics, colonialism, war and nationalisms. I wish to point out that this inter-connection however extends to Jammu, Kangra, and the western-Punjab as well—which could have further nuanced and enriched the debate. But we must accept that there are limitations of space and these may be the focus of the next book.

Apart from the introduction by the editors, the book consists of fifteen interrelated essays, which are conceived in five parts: 'Landscape of modernity'; 'Caste hegemony and the question of self'; 'Land, labour and agrarian crisis'; 'State, institutions and inheritance'; and, 'Migration, Diaspora and identities'. In the first essay of the part-I, Sanjay Sharma locates the region beyond physical geography, culture, and territoriality and in the human-political landscape formed by the struggles of social classes and communities influenced by the distinct modes of production. The combination of all these configures the 'modernist project'. He concludes that the regional assertion, which can be disruptive, 'cannot stymie the modernist project' of nation-building.

Navprit Kaur, in her essay on the modern city of Chandigarh, conjures a space of 'multiple cities' within a city which segregates on the basis of class and gender. She narrates how Nehru's Chandigarh was built upon the displacement and struggles for compensation of the Jat farmers, yet raised the hope of the landless and service providing rural classes of this area. She discusses how the planning of roads segregated the sections of the society and became the devise for control and protocol and how the upper and middle classes inhabitants celebrated the cleanliness mirroring their notions of purity and pollution-less. Finally, using the trope of popular culture, Navprit discusses how the Punjabi males

distance themselves from their rural bonds in the modernity of the city, with its westernized outlook and trappings. Her essay posits a disjunction between modernity and tradition, and questions the notion of modernity. The confounded notion of tradition and modernity is further emphasised by Mahima Manchanda, who interrogates the 'modernist' idea of women's education by documenting the Sikh women's college of Ferozepur that sought westernized outlook while being firmly rooted in the local religious-cultural ethos. This led to the homogenization and codification of exclusive religious-cultural identities and rethinking of gender relations within the communities. This project however emulated the Victorian ideals of English speaking, educated homemaker and companion, well grounded in religious instruction, who would raise good 'religious' children and become a better wife.

The essays in part II and III are interrelated, though the focus of the first is on Haryana and the second on Punjab. Bhupinder Yadav comments on the modernity of Haryana Jats and differentiates between westernization—expressed through materiality—and modernity, which is located in ideas and emotions. Jat modernity is narrowed into three concepts of dignity, individuation, and accountability. What these concepts are are however left undefined. Ajay Kumar furthers the outlook by focusing on the Khaps and history of gotra marriage by taking a peep into early past. Needless to say that exogamic gotra are basic to most communities that regulate marriage, which become a bone of contention in Haryana where these are regulated by the Khap leaders who are mostly rich landlords. While Khaps are the symbols of tradition the inter-caste love marriages, the idea of modernity challenge their control over the agrarian-cultural traditions.

The three essays on Punjab rural economy are related to labour and agriculture crisis. Manjit and Taylor details the changing contexts of the bonded and 'unfree' labour which has moved away from the caste bonds. This is primarily because of the pressure built

by the OBC and SC electoral politics that has challenged the traditional structures of authority and curtailed the power of elites to conjure bondage. However, they warn, that as long as the 'globalising' forces concentrate the control of resources in the hands of few, while a section of the population stays backward, illiterate and poor, such marginalisation will stay. The skewed control over resources is analysed further by Singh, Kinger, and Sangeet. They locate the current agriculture crisis in Punjab in the declining share of agriculture in GDP, diminishing returns to farmers, decreasing workforce, and depesantization, along with indebtedness. This has triggered suicides by farmers in recent years, a theme that is then taken to the landless workforce by Vishav Bharti. He finds that reduced workdays, stagnant wages and debt as the reason for such suicides. However, he thinks that some measures like MNREGA, Atta-dal schemes are instrumental in the assertion of the rights by the landless against the oppression of the landed-classes and provide some hope against distress caused by suicides.

In the first of the three papers of part-IV, Jatinder Singh questions the institutionalisation of dissent by the state. Working with the data from Punjab, he argues that the Indian state provided certain fundamental rights, albeit with conditions. Since the social fabric of the Indian society was inherently unequal, the conditional rights demonstrate the dilemma of modernity. The exclusion of 'class' from the articulation of modernity by the state encouraged the process of identity formation around castes. The caste based configurations foreclosed the possibility of radical challenge to the structures of power. The rights in land and housing are explored in a forceful essay by GopaIyer. This is one of the two essays in the collection that focuses on both Haryana and Punjab, and analyses why the land reform acts failed in the redistribution of land to the disadvantaged section by the rich landholders. Moreover, how 'reverse-tenancy' has been used to defeat the purpose of land-ceiling that has in fact decimated the small and marginal farmers, particularly in Punjab. Similarly, how the encroachments by the rich and the lackadaisical approach of implementing agencies has

frustrated the distribution of village common-land to the marginal sections. Yet in the area of housing, he finds that Haryana has a better policy and implementation than Punjab. Iyer draws our attention to the fact that globalisation and agrarian crisis has further distressed the small farmers and led to 'pauperization' while spiking the suicide rate, which is more accentuated in Punjab than Haryana. Promulgation of SEZ has also threatened the land-owners and agriculture labour. This witnessed massive resistance in the Punjab, which ensured better land price for urbanities, though farmers in Haryana have been resisting the sale of land even at higher price.

In the last paper of this section, Prem Chaudhry, discusses the important issue of claiming inheritance by women in Haryana, the rights that were first vested in the 1956 Hindu Succession Act. She goes back to analyse how this was resisted by the Khaps. Significantly, the 2005 act was promulgated to remove lacunas of the existing provisions despite the stiff resistance of landed patriarch and tacit political support. Now with the growing urbanisation, rising land prices and the changing socio-political economy are challenging the old values of son's rights and succession. Even though the dominant opinion remains unsympathetic and political and executive prohibitive and obstructive, the women are noticeably coming forward to claim their rights.

The last section deals with Diaspora and migrations. Radhika Chopra uses the metaphor of ours/others (apne/praye)—belonging/alienation—to document the making of Punjabi community in Southall that bore the brunt of the 1979 riots by the others—the British. The lone 'white' male who sacrificed his life in fact became symbolic of 'other' as 'our'. This in turn became the metaphor of transition in the making of self, a community, which is again used by Radhika in the articulation of community-in-diaspora after the 1984 siege of the Golden temple followed by Delhi riots. The traumatic event of 1984 left the community traumatised, betrayed by 'ours'. Even as the community came to

terms with the new homeland in diaspora, it used the traditional symbols of funeral procession and mourning of the dead to commemorate the sense of betrayal as well as to register its protest. The idea of community-making in diaspora is furthered by Anjali Gera, who analysis the transformation of Bhangra performance that celebrates the Jat Sikh identity and leverages it by positing its centrality to the south-Asian community and its appropriation in the global music industry. While the advantaged Jats built their dominance as a group through this genre, the other critical voices and performers, the dalits drummers or mirasi performers, for instance, were marginalised, misrepresenting the idea of cultural Punjab.

The reflection of issues at 'home' in the identity politics in diaspora are convincingly mapped by Paramjit Judge. He analyse the murder of Chamar leader in Vienna as a point that sets off the community-making by breaking with the larger Sikh tradition and pivoting the Ad-dharma community around its own 'distinct sacred book'. The event had significant influence on reordering the class relationship with the landholding castes in Punjab as well as reorganising and cohering the class and religious distinctions among the Chamars. The community making however transforms the Chamars as an exclusive caste, distinct from other Dalits, which the author asserts is key 'to the attainment of a higher status in the Punjab society'. The perception of status however does not account for the way sexualities are treated within the communities of caste. Diepirieye Kuku-Siemons maps the modernity of homophobia in the post-colonial contexts. He analysis two cases from Punjab and Haryana to delve on the role that the 'public space' plays in constructing 'normative masculinity'. He argues that the queerness disrupts the hetro-normative, the embodied sense of normality that targets inter-gender sexualities. These 'others' are often targeted by name calling—janana-effeminate, faggot, or sissy—thus psychologically scarred by public rebuke. Kuku-Siemons conceptualise these abuses as acts of disciplining, that he projects into as accepted justifications for child-beatings or wife-beatings, which precludes the mutuality in relationships, yet is

celebrated in public discourse.

The book covers a huge range that shapes the everyday life: economy, caste, community, labour issues, sexualities, and gender rights. It starts with an encouraging note seeking to configure Punjab and Haryana as an inter-connected region. However, barring two essays by Iyer and Kuku-Siemons, all the essays are exclusively on Punjab or Haryana. The selection is skewed as there are only three, of the fifteen essays, on Haryana, dealing with Jats, Khaps, and women inheritance. Significantly, the issues and crisis of agriculture, farm labour, indebtedness, and farmers' suicide are common issues that have been explored only in Punjab. How different are these in Haryana would have provided an interesting comparison and context. For instance, honour killing in Punjab could have been explored also in Haryana, as also the making of landed Jat community in Punjab as in Haryana. Similarly, the issues of Dalits and marginalisation echo similarly in both the rural-scapes, irrespective of religious differences. We must however bear with the editors since the book is an outcome of a conference and perhaps had little control over the choice of subject and area.

The area of region and state finds larger space and conceptualisation than the articulation of modernity in this compilation. Modernity is not seen as an urban and post-industrial phenomenon, but is located in the 'everyday' moments of rural India that is mechanised yet driven by the migrant labour. This in itself is laudable, as we have scantly interrogated modernity out of urban spaces. The contexts and concepts discussed moreover remain the same—the ideas of caste, agriculture production, stratification, community making and marginalisation. In many essays the analysis is shaped by structuralism, having a distinct economic determinism where discussion is geared towards class characteristics, modes of production and ownership of means. In most cases, modernity and modernization needs qualification just as tradition needs to be clearly defined, not withstanding Yadav's definition of Modernity on unqualified norms of dignity,

universalization, and individuation that begs for clarity and context, without which these norms make little sense. Mostly, in the essays, tradition is used as opposite to modernity. I must remind that tradition is also an articulation that is often an outcome of modernity. The goal-post of tradition keeps changing over time. Thus, what constitutes tradition needs to be explicitly stated and contextualised. For example, Mahima's essay is as much about the making of tradition as of modernity, just as Navprit locates tradition more than modernity in the 'modern-city'. We should however commend the editors for making a valiant attempt in contextualising modernity in the everyday experience and organising the book keeping with that in mind.

The book is useful and welcome for the range of topics analysed that coheres around the broad theme of modernity and change in Haryana and Punjab. There have been rare studies that have seen Haryana and Punjab as one social and economic entity, particularly after the Indian Independence. The conception of this book debunks the notion of political state boundaries and affirms that the territoriality of social, cultural, and economic categories is more useful and viable space for analysis. The spatial inter-connectedness, it is hoped, provides better frame for analysis in and might become a torchbearer for a similar understanding of other regions, transcending the narrow administrative units and their boundaries. Further, the book also sets a tone for understanding modernity in the every-day moments of agrarian society where changing perceptions and attitudes spar with the perceived notions of what constitute the rural world. What constitutes modernity, where to locate modernity, remains a challenge and this books bares some of the issues, which I am sure will coax other researchers to take up in earnest. This book is an essential read for those grappling with the issues of social change and rural dynamics. I have no hesitation in recommending this book, both to the students and researchers, who wish to understand the changing rural-scape of post-colonial north India.

Chander, Rajesh Kumar,
Combating Social Exclusion,
Intersectionalities of Caste,
Class, Gender and Regions,
New Delhi, Studera Press, 2019. 4

Rajesh Gill*

Social exclusion in the Indian context is multifaceted and multidimensional, in view of the social categories of caste, class, gender, region, language and religion. The book under review is based upon an empirical analysis of the interface between caste, gender, class and region. Beginning with the etymology of the term 'Dalit', diverse conceptualizations of social exclusion and inclusion are discussed by the author, providing an adequate backdrop to the study. Spread over seven chapters, the work addresses the issues of social exclusion and inclusion of Dalits in the state of Punjab, in terms of the intersectionality primarily between caste and gender. The author has synonymously used the terms 'Dalits', 'Scheduled Castes' and 'Untouchables'.

The rationale of locating this study in Punjab is given in terms of relatively higher proportion of Dalits at 31.94 per cent in the total population of the State, according to the 2011 Census. The strength of the study lies in a very elaborate methodology adopted, wherein four regions in Punjab, i.e. Doaba, Majha, Malwa and Kandi, were

*Professor , Department of Sociology, Panjab University

chosen out of which 8 villages have been extensively studied. Mixed methods approach was employed, using triangulation method. Both quantitative and qualitative techniques have been used, thus capturing the ground reality quite comprehensively. 415 households, by selecting at least 50 from each of the 8 villages, were covered in fieldwork. In addition, 21 case studies of Most Depressed Scheduled Castes were also conducted, which actually bring out the extent and kind of discrimination suffered by these communities. The author has done a good job by underlining the heterogeneity within the Dalits in Punjab, thus pointing at the disparities existing within the community.

The author presents an impressive review of the empirical studies conducted all over India in general and Punjab in particular, specifically on the Scheduled Castes, in terms of their status, problems confronted by them and the process of social and occupational/educational mobility over the years. The literature indicates a greater social exclusion of Dalit women in comparison to men, in terms of implementation of Constitutional provisions, as well as subject of social science research. Citing Hershman (1981), the author highlights the neglect of the ground reality of casteism in Punjab by modern anthropologists and then goes on to discuss the exclusion and resultant discrimination of Dalits/Scheduled Castes/Untouchables in Punjab in cultural, political, economic, spatial and social spheres. As per Census 2011, more than 73% of the Scheduled Caste population in Punjab was living in rural areas, with a literacy rate of about 65%, against the total literacy of 76% for the State as a whole. The study covered 15 dalit castes residing in Punjab, i.e. Mazhabi Sikh, Ad-dharmi, Balmiki, Barar, Bawaria, Bazigar, Doom, Gandhila, Od, Rai Sikh, Ramdasia, Sansi, Sikligar, Sirkiband and Sarere. The analysis based upon both the quantitative and qualitative techniques, highlights the fact that Dalits in the study areas of Punjab have by and large have remained excluded/segregated with regard to places of worship, cremation grounds and residential areas. With most of these communities having remained dormant over the years, only the Ad-dharmis among the Scheduled Castes were found to be

asserting their identity, particularly in term of a separate religion. An interesting contribution of the book is the revelation that Scheduled Castes in Punjab constitute a highly heterogeneous category, with huge variations therein.

An upward trend in educational profile among Scheduled Castes has been noticed, in terms of intergenerational mobility, though the dropout rate was found to be much higher among them in comparison to their counterparts from upper castes. Emigration to other countries was found to have a positive impact upon the Dalit families, as the study reflects status enhancement among these families in terms of modern lifestyles, elevated status and higher self-perception. However, these being only a few individual cases, migration has failed to lift the Dalits on a mass scale. Men among Ad-dharmis in Doaba region and Mazhabi Sikhs in Majha region were predominantly found to have migrated abroad, while there were hardly any such cases in other castes studied. The State schemes and developmental programs were hardly found to bear fruit, in case of Dalits in Punjab, mainly for want of sufficient educational opportunities in the villages, apart from acute poverty. A sizeable proportion among the households studied were below poverty line, thus indicating their economic, social and political marginalization. Although the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act has brought the Dalits into political mainstream to some extent, Dalit women are yet to see light of the day, as reflected in the study. The work brings out the stagnation at the level of poorest of the poor among Dalits, especially in the rural set up, mainly owing to lack of resources and channels of mobility.

The analysis of 21 case studies of the Most Depressed Dalits give out some interesting facts. In all these cases, a convergence between economic, political and social exclusion was conspicuous, with women as the worst sufferers. There were hardly any cases of international migration among these cases, thus indicating a stagnant social and economic status. Ad-dharmis and Mazhabi Sikhs were relatively better off in comparison to other Scheduled Castes, while Ad-dharmis and Balmikis were the most indebted

Dalits. Upward occupational mobility was quite restricted, mainly found among the Ad-dharmis, and to some extent among the Mazhabi Sikhs and Ramdasias.

Interestingly, inter-caste marriages were forbidden among the Scheduled Castes and a strong resistance to these has been found by the author. Any out of caste marriages met with strong resistance, thus indicating strong caste consciousness. Geographically, these castes were still segregated at ecologically marginal spaces within the villages, thus continuing with the tradition of physical marginalization. This segregation was found even in places of worship and cremation grounds. A mere 5% of the 415 Dalit households approached in the study owned any land, which pointed at the problem of landlessness leading to their economic and social deprivation. Political empowerment had failed to take off due to the persistent caste and patriarchal structures in rural areas. While sex ratio was higher among Dalits, it hardly got translated into gender equality and women's empowerment. Literacy rate was even lower among them, most of them dropping out of school very early. The study lists landlessness, lack of educational infrastructure, lack of employment opportunities and caste discrimination, as the major causes for the continuous pathetic status of Dalits in Punjab.

The author, while concluding his study, makes some pertinent recommendations for amelioration of the situation. Important among these is the need for empowering the Dalits, bringing out the Dalit Human Development Report, building up an Inclusive and Quality educational infrastructure, Separate policies for most depressed castes and women and working for Dalit consciousness. The book is a must read for all researchers working on social exclusion, multiple identities and marginalization. It sensitizes the reader to the ground realities in the twenty first century Punjab in a lucid and analytical manner.

Manuscript Submission Guidelines

1. Manuscripts and all editorial correspondence, including comments on the contents of the journal, should be addressed to the Chief Editor, *Panjab University Research Journal Social Sciences* (PURJSS)

   Name & E-mail address of the Chief Editor: Professor Pampa Mukherjee, Department of Political Science, Panjab University, Chandigarh. socialsciencejournal@pu.ac.in

   Name & E-mail address of the Editor: Professor Renu Thakur, Department of Ancient Indian History, Culture & Archaeology, Panjab University, Chandigarh. drrenuthakur@gmail.com

2. Contributors must provide their affiliations and complete postal and e-mail address with their papers.

3. Papers submitted for consideration for publication in the Journal, should be original and not published elsewhere earlier.

4. Contributors to PURJSS are advised to be careful as not to violate any provisions of the Copyright Act and the Rules made there under as regards the material/ maps used in articles or their sources and/or of the computer software used by them. The Journal is not responsible for any violations or lapses, in this regard, on the part of the contributors.

5. The copy right of the papers, published in PURJSS rests solely with the Journal; any reproduction of the contents of the Journal will have to be done with written permission of the PURJSS.

6. Contributions should be submitted electronically through email.

7. Papers should not be more than 9,000 words. The word limit is inclusive of all notes, references tables, annexures and appendices.

8. All articles must be accompanied by an abstract of 150-200 words. Notes should be numbered serially and presented as footnotes. Notes, other than website sources, must contain more than a mere reference.

9. The Journal reserves its right to make stylistic changes or other editorial changes in the article(s) submitted and accepted for publication.

10. PURJSS is a refereed journal and all manuscripts will be subjected to a double blind referral system.

11. US spellings throughout; universal 'z' in '-ize' and 'ization' words.

12. Single quotes throughout. Double quotes within single quotes. Spellings of words in quotations should not be changed. Quotations of 45 words or more should be separated from the text and indented with one line space above and below.

13. Use 'twentieth century', '1990s'. Spell out numbers from one to ninety-nine, 100 and above to remain in figures. However, for exact measurements, use only figures (3 k., 9 per cent, not %). Use thousands and millions, not lakhs and crores.

14. All contributions should be on A4 format, with 1.5 line spacing. Matter should be left-aligned, with a one-and-a half inch margin on the right and typed in 10-point font size in Times New Roman.

15. Use of italics and diacriticals should be minimized, but consistent.

16. Graphs, tables and charts prepared in MS Office (Word/Excel Format) or equivalent format are preferred.

17. Tables and figures should be indicated by number separately (see Table 1), not by placement (see Table below). Present each table and figure on a separate sheet of paper, gathering them together at the end of the article.

18. A consolidated alphabetical list of all books, articles, essays, theses and documents referred to (including any referred to in

the tables, graphs and maps) should be provided at the end of the article. All articles books and theses should be listed in alphabetical order of author, giving the author's surname first followed by first name. If more than one publication by the same author is listed, the items should be given in chronological order. References should be embedded in text in the anthropological style. For example: (Sarkar, 1987: 145).

19. Citations should be first alphabetical and then chronological, for example, '(Ahmed 1987; New York Times 2005; Sarkar 1987; Wignaraja 1960)'. The detailed style of referencing is as follows:

Article

Wang, Y. (2004). 'Offensive Realism and the Rise of China', *Issues and Studies*, 40(1): 173-201.

Book

Seth, S. (2013). *Postcolonial Theory and International Relations: A Critical Introduction*, London and New York: Routledge.

Edited Book

Shilliam, R., Anievas, A. and Manchanda, N. (eds) (2014). *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line,* London: Routledge.

Chapter in Edited Book

Mastanduno M. (2014) 'Realism and Asia' in Pekannen, S. M., Ravenhill, J. and Foot, R. (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia,* Oxford: Oxford University Press: 25-44.

Internet Source

Thayer, B. A. (2006). 'In Defense of Primacy', *The National Interest*, available at http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/in-defense-of-primacy-1300 (accessed 19 August 2016).

Newspaper

Pradhan, B. (2006). 'India's Foreign Policy', *Hindu*, 26 June.

New York Times (2005). 'US-NATO Alliance', 5 April (for news items).

Reports

Ghuman, R.S., Singh, S. and Brar, J.S. (2005). *Unit Cost of Higher Education in Rural Punjab: A Case Study of Universities and their Affiliated Colleges*, New Delhi. A Report submitted to the Association of Indian Universities (AIU).

Thesis

Arora, Sachna (2016). China and India in 'Global' Climate Change Negotiations: Domestic Imperatives and International Obligations. PhD thesis (unpublished) Chandigarh: Panjab University.

Book reviews must contain name of author and book reviewed, place of publication and publisher, year of publication, number of pages and price.

Submitted papers must be accompanied by (a) a declaration that it has not been previously published nor is being considered for publication elsewhere, and (b) a brief biographical sketch of the author giving current/recent institutional affiliation, major publications and present research interests.

Manuscripts not accepted for publication will not be returned to the authors(s). Please keep copies for your own record.

Subscription

Subscription	Inland	Foreign
Institutions	Rs. 5000/-	
Individuals	Rs. 3000/-	

Annual Subscription:

Institutions	Rs. 500/-	US $ 50
Individual	Rs. 300/-	US $ 30
For teachers within the P.U. System	Rs. 200/-	
Students and retired teachers	Rs. 150/-	US $ 15
Single Issue	Rs. 150/-	US $ 15
Single Issue for Students	Rs. 50/-	

All payments should be made through a Bank Draft drawn in favour of the Registrar, Panjab University, Chandigarh. The subscription request along with the draft may be sent to the Chief Editor, Research Journal Social Sciences, Panjab University, Chandigarh.

Contents